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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2009-1926 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and submits the following post hearing memorandum regarding application of 
Idaho Code § 12-117: 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 1 
Z:\MRCases\Eslate\ Wiggins V\Magistrale\Post Hearing Memorandum re Attorney Fees. wpd 
I. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RENDITION OF 
THE UNDERLYING FACTS IS INCORRECT. 
The personal representative repeatedly states that the Department "assisted" the Wiggins 
in dividing their property,l or that the Department "participated" in the removal of Vivian's 
interest in the real property.2 The personal representative also claims the Department stipulated 
that the property of the estate was not community property. There is, of course, nothing in the 
record to support such claims. The Department's stipulation was as follows: 
MR. MASINGILL: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated to. That the 
department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though t!!ID' had a 
marriage settlement agreement that divided their assets. The marriage settlement 
agreement would have transmuted the property from community property to 
separate property to each party. The marriage settlement agreem!;:nt would have 
been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the admission -- stipulate to 
the admission ofthe exhibits that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I 
believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001 through 097. 
We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took place in 2002 and 
it is shown as Bates nos. 033 through 03S. That the second applic::ation was 
applied for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. OS8-060. 
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage settlement agreement 
had been -- unless it had been executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to 
receive Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibits from his latest 
reply brief. I believe they're lien documents. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the reply brief. 
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright, is that the stipulation 
on behalf of the State -- the claimant? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor. I wOlld offer one 
other stipulation at this point and that's that neither party has belm able to locate 
the original marriage settlement agreement. 
IPlaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion' or Attorney Fees and Costs, pp. 
5, 7, 13, 14. 
2Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion 'or Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 
7. 
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Tr. p. 4, 1. 20 to p. 5,1. 25 (emphasis added).3 That is the extent of the stipulation. The 
Department understands that the court inferred from this that the Department stipulated that there 
was, indeed, a marriage settlement agreement. The Department's counsel should probably have 
been more explicit. What the Department stipulated to was that, for eligibility purposes, the 
Department treated the couple as if they had a marriage settlement agrec::ment. A marriage 
settlement agreement may have existed, or this may have been the result of an error by the 
eligibility staff who may have been told that one existed or simply presumed it as a fact, since, as 
the stipulation states, no marriage settlement agreement has ever been d'iscovered either in the 
Department's records or those of the decedents. In all candor, as further discussed herein, from 
the Department's perspective it didn't matter. If it had mattered, counsd would, perhaps, have 
been more cautious in phrasing the stipulation. In any event, there is nothing in this stipulation to 
suggest the Department participated in or assisted the couple in dividing their assets.4 Nor did 
the Department stipulate that the property was not community property hefore the death of 
Vivian. Nor is the personal representative's suggestion as to what his witness might have said 
either credible or in evidence in this case. 
The claim ofthe Department's assistance or participation in the division ofthe Wiggins's 
property is made in connection with a claim of estoppel, presented for the first time here. Of 
3 A copy of the transcript is attached. 
4Federal Medicaid eligibility law ignores state community property principles aLd specifically authorizes 
spouses to transfer property between themselves. Therefore, couples seeking medical assistance can transfer their assets 
between themselves to assist in meeting eligibility criteria. This is their choice; because of federal law requirements it is 
neither required nor prohibited by the Department. 
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course, even if these claims were true, estoppel cannot lie against the stC\te in perfonning its 
governmental functions. Floyd v. Board of Com Irs of Bonneville Countv, 37 Idaho 718, 727,52 
P .3d 863, 872 (2002) ("Nor may the defense of estoppel be applied against the state in matters 
affecting its governmental or sovereign functions."); accord State v. Taylor, 44 Idaho 353, , 
256 P. 953, 955 (1927) (State not estopped from ejecting lessee after accepting lease payments). 
While reluctant to address issues that should be irrelevant, the Di~partment recognizes that 
the record of this case may be read by others, including an appellate court. Accordingly, the 
Department feels obligated to respond to the personal attacks made against the Department's 
counsel in the final page of the personal representative's brief. The Department will limit itself 
to simply denying any rude or unprofessional comments or behavior in this matter. The 
Department has filed, with this brief, the Second Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright which 
attaches the collected email communications between the parties. An interested reader may 
judge for himselfthe tenor of those communications. 
H. 
IDAHO CODE § 12-117 ONLY PROVIDES FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES WHERE AN AGENCY ACTED 
WITHOUT A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. 
The personal representative cites a dissenting opinion in the case of Taylor v. Canyon 
County Bd. o.fCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009), together with the case of Rammel! v. 
Idaho State Dept. of Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415, 210 P.3d 523 (2009), jor the proposition that an 
erroneous interpretation of a statute subjects a state agency to attorney f~es under Idaho Code § 
12-117. This is incorrect. Even if Justice Horton's opinion was the majority opinion in Taylor, 
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what Justice Horton said was that "there is no statutory authority for review of any portion of the 
Vickers' petition for review." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 443,210 P.3d at 551 (underline added). 
Therefore, in Justice Horton's view, it wasn't an erroneous interpretation of statute that should 
have subjected the Vickers to attorney fees, it was the absence of any aUl:hortiy for their action. 
Likewise, in the Rammel! case the court upheld a detennination that the Rammells had acted 
"without any basis in law or fact." Rammel!, 147 Idaho at 422,210 P.3d at 530 (underline 
added). Again, it was not an erroneous interpretation, it was the absencI;: oflegal authority that 
triggered Idaho Code § 12-117.5 
The most complete discussion of Idaho Code § 12-117 by the Idaho Supreme Court is 
found in Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 1 n P.3d 1081 (2007), 
where the court explained that "if an agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but 
erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees should not be awarded." 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 809, 172 P.3d at 1084. The court went on to explain as 
follows: 
decision. 
Typically, in analyzing an award of fees under I. C. § 12- .117, this Court 
has looked to detennine whether there was no authority at all for the agency's 
actions or whether, on the other hand, the law was not clear or u;lsettled as to 
whether the agency had the ability to act. In University of Utah Ho.)p. v. Ada 
County Bd. Of Com 'rs., 143 Idaho 808, 153 P.3d 1154 (2007), this Court awarded 
attorney fees against the County when there were clear statutory procedures which 
the County had failed to follow in denying an application for medical indigency. 
There were no facts indicating a good faith attempt to interpret the applicable 
statutes or reasonable confusion about the County's duties. In Fischer v. City of 
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005), the Court awar(ied attorney fees 
against the City of Ketchum because it had granted a conditional U~3e pennit 
5The court went on to find that Idaho Code § 12-117 wasn't applicable to the un derlying administrative 
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without requiring certification from a licensed engineer. The Kel chum Zoning 
Code specifically required such certification before a conditiona: use permit could 
issue and this Court found that the City had "ignored the plain la nguage of the 
ordinance that a certification ... is required before granting a CUJ." 141 Idaho at 
356, 109 P.3d at 1098. 
On the other hand, in Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, supra, the Court did 
not award attorney fees against the City of Burley, even though we found the City 
acted in violation of the constitutional limits on its power and in violation of the 
LLUP A by adopting a zoning ordinance affecting an impact area lying outside the 
City's limits. The Court noted there was case precedent dating "as far back as 
1949 that a city's exercise of jurisdiction in an impact area lying beyond a city's 
limits is inconsistent with the constitutional limitations placed 011 a city's powers 
by Artic1e XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution." 140 Idaho at 120, 90 P.3d at 345. 
Nevertheless, because the City was making a reasonable attempt to interpret the 
LLUP A, no fees were awarded. 
In Karel v. Department a/Finance, 144 Idaho 379, 162 L3d 758 (2007), 
this Court declined to award fees even though we determined thf: Department had 
no authority to request documents from a securities agent when 1 here was no 
statutory obligation to maintain the requested documents. There were statutory 
recordkeeping provisions, but the Department admitted it was fi(,t requesting any 
of those documents from the securities agent. However, because this was a matter 
of first impression in determining how the recordkeeping requin:ments should be 
applied, we denied an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117. 
The question presented by this appeal is whether the Count'! acted without 
authority in the face of clear provisions and thus, without a reas(,nable basis in 
fact or law when it enacted the Ordinance; or alternatively, whether the County's 
actions were based upon a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear 
law. 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 809-10, 172 P.3d at 1084-5. Tle court further 
explained: 
Although Naylor Farms was the prevailing party below, lhe district court 
declined to award fees because the conflict between the Ordinance and state law 
"was by no means obvious." In explanation, the court noted that Latah County 
was empowered through the LLUP A to consider the effects of l::nd use 
regulations on water. Although the court concluded that the Ordinance went 
beyond considering the effects on water and, in effect, was an attempt to manage 
water in Idaho, the court also concluded that the County's interpretation of its 
duties under LLUP A was not unreasonable. 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
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In considering whether Naylor Farms is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees, we must determine whether the County was faced with an ambiguous or 
unclear statute that would excuse a reasonable but erroneous int([llretation, in the 
absence of applicable case law. 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 810, 172 P.3d at 1085 (underline added). Finally, the 
court concluded that the County had not acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law: 
Even though the district court ruled against the County and set a,ide the 
Ordinance, it did so on the basis that the County's actions were preempted by 
State law and not because the County acted wrongfully or withont any authority. 
Because there was a legitimate question about the validity cfthe County's 
actions in adopting the Ordinance, the County did not act withOl.t a reasonable 
basis in fact or law and, therefore, we affirm the district court's decision denying 
an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117. 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 811, 172 P.3d at 1086. 
Similarly, in the case of Matter of Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 904 P 2d 
566 (1995), the court dealt with what it described as a "reasonable but erroneous" interpretation 
of statute: 
We disagree with the district court's conclusion that the !=:ommission acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. First, the Commission's license 
revocation action against Russet Valley was warranted, as the hE aring officer 
found violations of both the license agreement and the Commission's regulations. 
The Commission's February 18th order, among other things, confirmed those 
violations. The district court also confirmed those violations whm Russet Valley 
appealed the February 18th order. Moreover, the issue ofwhethtr Russet Valley's 
violations were "continuing violations" was not free from doubt The 
Commission's interpretation regarding continuing violations wa; a "reasonable, 
but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute." See, e.g. Cox v. Department 
orlns., 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.2d 177, 182 (Ct.App.1991) (rt~versingdistrict 
court's award of attorney fees against agency). Under the circumstances, we 
cannot say that the Commission has altogether acted without a rnasonable basis in 
fact or law, and hence, no attorney fees should have been awarded under I.C. § 
12-117. Krueger v. Board of Pro. Discipline, 122 Idaho 577, 58:1, 836 P2d 523, 
529 (1992) (where board did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law, no 
attorney fees will be granted under I.C. § 12-117). Accordingly, the portion of the 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
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district court's memorandum decision awarding to Russet Valley its costs and 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is reversed, and the district court's September 
10, 1993 ruling on costs and attorney fees, which awarded Russet Valley 
$4,943.80, is vacated. 
Matter of Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho at 661,904 P.2d at 57:1 (underline added). 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the issue is a matter of 
first impression, or other states have conflicting case-law, attorney fees :;hould not be awarded 
under Idaho Code § 12-117. The case of Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218 P .3d 
1133 (2009), involved the question of whether a postal meter imprint was the equivalent of a 
post-mark for purposes of meeting administrative filing deadlines: 
Reasonable attorney's fees and costs are available to the prevailing party 
under Idaho Code § 12-117 "if the court finds that the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact oraw." The issue of 
whether a postage-meter mark can substitute as a postmark when determining the 
filing date of an appeal is an issue of first impression in Idaho ar.d one on which 
other state courts disagree. (citations omitted) 
Accordingly, Smith acted with a reasonable basis in law :md the 
Department is not entitled to attorney fees. Costs on appeal to R,~spondent. 
Smith, 148 Idaho at 218 P.3d at 1137 (underline added); see also S,lint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862,863,204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009) ("Because the 
issue of standing presented a question of first impression under the amelded statutes, we 
conclude that Ada County did not act without a reasonable basis in law, and we deny St. 
Alphonsus' request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117."). In T(ootenai Medical Center 
ex reI. Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 886, 216 P.3d 630, 
644 (2009), the court stated: 
These issues have not been previously addressed by an Idaho apoellate court, and 
therefore involve matters of first impression. In Wheeler v. IdahJ Dept. of Health 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 8 
Z:\MRCases\Estate\WigginsV\MagistratelPost fearing Memorandum re Attorney Fees.wpd 
and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266-67, 207 P.3d 988,997-98 (2009), this Court 
declined to award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 when a case involves issues of 
first impression. (citing In re Ferdig, 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 
(2009)). Therefore, we decline to award the Department attorney fees on appeal. 
Kootenai Medical Center ex reI. Teresa K, 147 Idaho at 886, 216 P.3d at 644 (underline added). 
Finally, in State, Dept. a/Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 1 P.3d 783 
(2000), the court dealt with the claim that the state agency failed to consider existing case law: 
The crux ofRSC's argument here is that the Department failed to consider 
case law standing for the proposition that lease lotteries, such as those involved in 
this case, are not considered securities and therefore, the Department acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing and maintaining suit against 
RSC for violation of the Idaho Securities Act. In particular, RSC argues that the 
Department "steadfastly refused to find merit in the [SEC v. Encirgy Group of 
America, 459 F.Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y.1978) ] decision" which it asserts was 
relied upon by this Court in RSC I. It should be noted that while this Court cited 
favorably to the Energy Group decision in its ultimate determination on the issue, 
other courts and securities administrators addressing the issue h8ve found, 
contrary to Energy Group, that application filing services such as the one operated 
by RSC may qualify as investment contracts and may therefore be securities. 
(citations omitted). 
Therefore, although this Court ultimately determined thaI: the particular 
lottery lease filing service operated by RSC did not constitute an "investment 
contract" in violation of the Idaho Securities Act, we hold, basee}. upon the lack of 
case law of this state in addition to supporting decisions from other jurisdictions, 
that the Department was not without a reasonable basis in fact OJ law in bringing 
and maintaining suit against RSC for violation of the Idaho Securities Act. 
State, Dept. of Finance, 134 Idaho at 285, 1 P.3d at 786 (underline added). 
Clearly, it is not enough that the personal representative prevailEd. Rather the personal 
representative must show that there was not a reasonable basis for the Department's claim in this 
matter. 
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III. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM IS SUPPORTED BY LAW. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse 
of a Medicaid recipient: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of(he spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community 
property of the Medicaid spouse owned at death. The court found that such a limitation exists, 
and by such ruling the statute is necessarily ambiguous. The Department's position that "the 
estate of the spouse" includes property that had been transferred to that :;:pouse by the Medicaid 
recipient is not unreasonable, even if erroneous. 
Likewise the Department's rules support the Department's interpretation. IDAPA 
16.03.09.900.20 states: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * * 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited 10 the value of the 
assets ofthe estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community 
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). Also, IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such AgreemE nt. 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the esta:e of the deceased 
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or 
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07) 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
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IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and 
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619,84 P.3d 551,555 (2004). Clearly, even if 
erroneous, the Department's pursuit of its claim against the estate of Everest was not 
unreasonable. 
IV. 
THIS IS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN InAHO 
AND THERE IS CONFLICTING CASE LAW FRO!it{ 
OTHER STATES. 
The Department believed the case of Idaho Department of Heahh and Welfare v. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) conclusively decided this issue in favor of the 
Department. Obviously, the court found Jackman to not apply to the facts of this case. 
Moreover, the statute has been modified several times since Jackman, most recently in 2008 to 
provide for the Department's claim in this matter. Accordingly, this is nn issue of first 
impression in Idaho and no Idaho appellate court has spoken to this issue. Contrary to the 
suggestion of the personal representative, In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324 
(2005), has no bearing on this issue. In Elliott the court considered the lights of the Department 
where the Medicaid recipient's spouse died first and probate was openel Idaho Code § 56-
218(1) permitted the Department's claim to "be established against the '~state." The Department 
believed that federal law prohibited it from filing a claim in the estate 0 f a pre-deceased spouse 
of a Medicaid recipient, where the Medicaid recipient was still living, and instead sought to 
intervene in the probate estate as an "interested person" as defined by the probate code. The 
Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) unambiguously required the Department to file 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 11 
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a claim in the estate of the predeceased spouse.6 The Court concluded that the Department had 
acted without a reasonable basis in law in seeking to intervene in a probate proceeding without 
filing a claim. None of this has anything to do with the issue in this case. 
In concluding that Jackman does not apply to this case, the court has necessarily held that 
the question presented here (whether the Department can make a claim to formerly community 
property transferred to a spouse) is a matter of first impression and has not been decided by any 
appellate court in Idaho. Indeed, the issue has only been considered by one other magistrate 
division court, and that decision was issued following oral argument in ithis case and was decided 
on different grounds. It would be accurate to say that this court is the first to rule on this issue in 
this way in Idaho. 
Additionally, the courts of other states have made conflicting dedsions on this same 
Issue. In In re Estate 0/ Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), the Minnesota Sllpreme Court held that a 
claim of the type here could not be made, and based its decision on federal law pre-emption. The 
court in this matter did not adopt Barg. On the other hand, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held just the opposite in the case of In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). To say 
this area of the law is unsettled would be an understatement. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Being the prevailing party, alone, is not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees. 
6This would necessarily be a contingent claim as provided for in Idaho Code § 15-3-810. Following this 
decision the legislature amended Idaho Code § 56-218 to provide the current method of filing contingent claims where 
probate is opened while one of the spouses survives. 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
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Under Idaho Code § 12-117, the personal representative must show the Department "acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The Department's claim was well supported by both 
fact and law. Moreover, attorney fees are not awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117 where, as 
here, the law is unsettled or not clear, or where the matter is one of first Impression in this state 
and the case law from other states is conflicting. The Department did not pursue this matter 
without a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2010, 
!J/0~:21= 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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(Proceedings begin.) 
COURT: The Court's on reco n the matter of the 
estates of Vivian and Emerson Wiggins. Attorney for the 
estate, Mr. Masingill, is present with the personal 
representative, Lynn Wiggins. Mr. Cartright's here on 
behalf of the State. 
The issue before the Court is that apparently 
Vivian Wiggins received some Hedicaid benefits and as a 
result, when the estate was filed, the State filed a lien 
to recover those and the issue was whether or not that lien 
should stand and whether or not they have a right to claim 
assets which the estate believes to be separate property of 
Emerson Wiggins. 
And it's my understanding after having met with 
both counsel in chambers that there would be at least some 
stipulation of facts we can put on the record. 
MR. HASINGILL: Do you want me to give it a shot, 
Cory? 
COURT: Mr. Hasingill. 
MR. MASINGILL: Your Honor, this is what we've 
sti pulated to. That the department treated the couple, 
Emerson and Vivian, as though they had a marriage 
settlement agreement that divided their assets. The 
marriage settlement agreement would have transmuted the 
property from community property to separate property to 
4 
each party. The marriage settlement agreement would have 
been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the 
admission -- stipulate to the admiSSion of the exhibits 
that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I 
believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 
00 1 through 097. 
We stipulate that the first application for 
Medicaid took place in 2002 and it is shown as Bates nos. 
033 through 035. That the second application was applied 
for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. 058-060. 
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage 
settlement agreement had been -- unless it had been 
executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to receive 
Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibits 
from his latest reply brief. I believe they're lien 
documents. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the 
reply brief. 
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright, 
is that the stipulation on behalf of the State -- the 
claimant? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor. 
would offer one other stipulation at this point and that's 
that neither party has been able to locate the original 
marriage settlement agreement. 
5 
1 MR. [LL: That's true. Your Honor, we'd be 
2 brief if the Court vvould like to 
3 direct us how you wilnt to go. 
4 COURT: Thi,; appears, based on the stipulation, to 
5 be, you know, a matter of law. It involves fE~deral laws 
6 and state laws and there are a couple cases involved. 
7 For the record, I received this morning the first 
8 reply brief of the Sti'te's and I've had an opportunity to 
9 read the reply brief. I tlad not had an opportunity to 
10 review the Exhibit C which was a copy of the decision in 
11 the -- I'm referring to as the Jackman case I believe or at 
12 least the --
13 MR. MASINGrLL: The first of the Jackman cases. 
14 MR. CARTWPIGHT: The original and superseded 
15 Jackman deciSion. 
16 COURT: Ant: so frankly, I'm not prepared to rule as 
17 a matter of law todclY because it's a fairly complicated 
18 matter. I need sonre time to look at this. So I guess the 
19 question I have is whether or not there is any -- the 
20 parties want to present some oral argument today? 
21 HR. CARTWRIGHT: I would like to present some brief 
22 argument, Your Honor. 
23 MR. MASINGILL: I would too. 
24 COURT: In looking at this -- I got so caught up in 
25 the law. Let's see. We have a claim -- we have a claim 
6 
1 made on the estate. We have a denial of the claim. I'm 
2 trying to figure out who's got the burden to go first. 
3 MR. CARTW'UGHT: I believe it's actually my 
4 petition for allowance, Your Honor, that's before the 
5 Court. 
6 COURT: Go ahead. 
7 MR. CARTWUGHT: Your Honor, I think that just 
8 about everything is in the brief so I'm just going to 
9 summarize here a little bit. 
10 The claim of the department was originally 
11 disallowed for the r:ason given in the disallowance that 
12 the property that tr e department was claiming against was 
13 the separate propel ty of Emerson Wiggins. And so our 
14 original brief that we filed back about December 1 
15 essentially went to chat issue to show that Idaho law 
16 clearly allows us to recover property, whether it was 
17 separate or not, as long as it had been the Joint or 
18 separate -- or community property rather of the couple at 
19 some time in the PilSt and sometime after, of course 1993, 
20 which In this case seems to be the case. 
21 Mr. Masingill's brief then that he filed on Friday 
22 of this last week channed the issue a little bit ar)d went 
23 to the argument es 5er.tially of a federal preemption saying 
24 that the Minnesota Su:xeme Court case of :3arg -- Henry Barg 
25 essentially set fortr la N that showed that the federal law 
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agreement was valid or not. It was 
marriage settlement agreement signed by Barbara Jackman on 
behalf of her mother was -- using her power of attorney was 
valid and effective and therefore this distinction that Mr. 
Masingill's making doesn't really exist. That in this 
case! it's really the same case as it was in Jackman. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has already decided this question and 
that should conclude the matter. That's all. 
COURT: Mr. Masingill. 
MR. MASINGILL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I just wanted to address that last item that Corey 
just provided to the Court and to just start, the Jackman 
case itself doesn't say what Corey says it does. There's 
nothing in the Jackman case that says that we reheard this. 
The reason we're making a different decision was because of 
the 1993 change in the statute and that this case, Hildor's 
and Lionel's, took place prior to the 1993 statute making 
it effective. 
Corey says that but there's nothing in the decision 
that says that and in fact on my -- in my brief, I 
specified exactly what Jackman says. This is the first 
Jackman case and it says, "The federal definition is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's 
estate all real and personal property and other assets 
12 
i included within the individual's estate and any other real 
2 or personal property and other assets in which the 
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individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death." 
That's the provision of the federal statute that 
gives life to Medicaid in any state that wants to sign up 
for it. That definition is absolutely significant because 
it only includes in the definition of the things that the 
State can go over are those things in which the reCipients 
of the Medicaid had and, second, on the third page of my 
brief, I showed what Jackman said about Hildor's assets and 
it says, "The agreement does not affect the status of 
assets the federal law considers to be part of the 
recipient'S estate because the definition of assets 
includes income or resources which the individual or such 
individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive 
because of action by a person with legal authority to act 
in place of or on behalf of the Individual or such 
individual's spouse." And they quote -- or they refer to 
40 USC 139(e)(1)(B). 
And the Supreme Court said, "Jackman's signing --" 
and remember Jackman is Barbara Jackman -- "signing of the 
agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of 
Hildor and Lionel." 
The significance of that is that that's the r-eason 
1 that Jackman changed and Jackman 1 
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have it on the ink ies the fifth page of 
brief says, "We conclude, however, that federal law applies 
applicable in this ca!:e prohibited this recovery except 
from any communit" property the spouses may have 
accumulated after a marriage settlement agreement 
transmitting their cc mr;lunity property into separate 
property of each." 
I don't think it can be much clearer than that. 
Jackman says just v hat Barg says and that is you can't go 
after -- after you trc:nsrnuted the assets to separate 
property, you cannc t go after the separate property of 
the -- of the non-Medicaid receiving spouse. And Corey's 
reference to it I thir k misstates what Jackman 1 and 
Jackman 2 say. 
Clearly Jack' nan 1 -- or Jackman 2 comes out and 
says you can't go of after separate property of the other 
spouse when it's be,n transmuted and it doesn't say in here 
In the Jackman 2 case. This is only applicable to cases 
that existed prior to 1993. The Supreme Court's deCision 
doesn't reference trat at all. 
Corey's theml), one that makes that claim and 
because he was invllved In the case, he probably knows a 
little bit more about it but I don't think from reading the 
Jackman case you on conclude that that was what they based 
14 
1 this on. 
2 In fact, they don't mention that at all and so the 
3 latest pronouncemEnt for the State of Idaho is you can't go 
4 after the separate ~ roperty of the non-Medicaid spouse. 
5 That's exactly what Ba'-g said. Barg, that case out of 
6 Minnesota, interpre:ed what the federal statute granted to 
7 the states and said you can't do it. Jackman says you 
8 can't do it. Yet the deQartment has continued to go after 
9 the separate propel ty of the non-Medicaid soouse and we 
10 believe that after Yllu've read all of the lega! statutes 
11 and all of the brieflllg and so forth that you'll conclude 
12 that the present St2 te of law in Idaho is Emerson's 
13 separate property 11 this estate is not recoverable under 
14 the Medicaid statut:. Thank you. 
15 COURT: Your response. 
16 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'd 
17 like to refer to a quote that's on page 11 of the reply 
18 brief. 
19 COURT: Give me just a second. Go ahead. 
20 MR. CARTVV RIGHT: Okay. This quote takes up the 
21 center of the page there and it's out of the-- not the 
22 original Jackman dl~cision but the substitute opinion 
23 released by the court Nhere the court explains exactiy 
24 why -- why they or anqed their decision here. It says here, 
conclude that the definition of assets is not 
15 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THRID JUDICIAL D [STRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VI ASHINGTON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CV 2009-1926 
ORDER ON A 1 TORNEY 
FEES 
Hearing on the state's request for an award of attorney fees lrade pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-117 was held on April 21, 2010. The court granted the estate 14 days to 
file a brief and the Department of Health and Welfare 14 days to file a responsive brief. 
The estate filed a motion to strike the Department's Post Hearing Memorandum 
and affidavit of Cory Cartwright. The Department's Post Hearing 1\1 emorandum was 
filed on May 19,2010. The estate's memorandum was filed on May 5,2010 and was 
served on the Department May 6, 2010. The court at hearing on the motion for attorney's 
fees set a briefing schedule different than IRCP 54. 
The Department's filing complied with the courts direction. The estate also asks 
that the Department's brief and affidavit be struck by the court because the Department 
attempts to litigate issues already decided by this court (the denial ofthe Department's 
claim). Since an inquiry into the legal and factual basis for the Depnrtrnent's claim must 
be evaluated by the court before an award of attorney's fees could be granted pursuant to 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
Idaho Code 12-117 the original positions of the parties and their arguments must be 
considered. Even though much of the briefing and argument goes to issues not before the 
court in this matter, but to the behavior and posturing of the parties the court is able to 
determine what is relevant from what is not. The motions to strike are therefore denied. 
Idaho Code 12-117 provides that a prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses in a judicial proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency ..... and a person, if the court finds tbat the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in ftct or law. 
The Department of Health & Welfare is a state agency who made a claim against 
the joint estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins for r.,ledicare funds 
expended by the state for the care of Vivian M. Wiggins. In a memo randum decision and 
order the Department's claim for reimbursement was denied. 
To determine if attorney's fees should be awarded to the estace the court must 
consider the legal and factual basis of the Department's claim and e\ aluate whether the 
legal and factual basis is reasonable or groundless or arbitrary. Rincover v. State Dep 't of 
Finance, 129 Idaho 442, 926 P.2nd 626 (1996). 
The Supreme Court described the purpose ofLC. section 12-117 in Bogner v. 
State Dep'tofRev. and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 693 P.2nd 1056 (1984) as follows: 
We believe the purpose of that statute is two fold: (1) to serv,~ as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have 
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against gromdless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
The court later reversed an award of attorney fees under I.C. J 2-117 where the 
Insurance Department improperly filed a complaint against an insurance agent, stating: 
If an error in a case involved a reasonable, but erroneous, interpretation of an 
ambiguous statue, then attorney fees generally would not be Ilwarded. [Id.] 
However, if the error involved either an unreasonable interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute or an erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute, then 
the court stated that a fee award may well be warranted. [Id.] 
Utilizing [that] analysis in the application of I.C. 12-117 to the facts ofthis case, 
we hold that the district court's award of costs and attorney D;;es was in error. We 
think the department's actions fall into the first category outlJned above, namely a 
reasonable, yet erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous, or at least confusingly-
worded state. Cox v. Dep't ofIns., 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.211d 177, 182 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Since the factual and legal basis was originally evaluated by the court, the court 
will adopt its original Memorandum and Decision denying the Depaiment's claim and 
will incorporate it hereby as if set out in full. 
It is clear that funds were expended by the state for the care (lfVivian Wiggins 
and that the Department has a legal right to recover Medicaid funds ~xpended for her 
care. Federal law allows for the claim as does state law. Federal M(~dicaid eligibility law 
applies to all of the states. Some are community property states, but the majority are not. 
Federal law does not prohibit spouses in community property states from transferring 
assets to their spouses for eligibility purposes. But the practice as applied in this case by 
the Department is in contradiction to the community property laws of this State. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
The court finds that this case is one of first impression under current state and 
federal Medicaid laws in Idaho. The Department has a legal duty to collect Medicaid 
funds expended on behalf of its citizens. The Wiggins received Medicaid funds to pay 
for Vivian's care until her death and therefore the Department had a [actual basis to make 
its claim against the joint estate. 
The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation of an 
ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. This court determined in its 
memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law expanding collection from a 
spouses separate property to be in contravention ofIdaho's community property law and 
"was not reasonable". Perhaps the appropriate term should have been "too expansive" 
since that interpretation would render Marital Settlement Agreement;) recognized by 
Idaho to be meaningless. The law on this matter is not settled and each party had a basis 
to make its arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department are neither 
arbitrary nor groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive j nterpretation of the 
law. 
The claim for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.e. 12-1) 7 is therefore denied. 
BE IT SO ORDERED this:23. day of e 2010. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
BRAD MASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208) 414-0490 
email bmasingiH{a}hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TmRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF: ) Case No.: CV-2rtI09-1926 
) 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and ) 
) NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
COMES NOW, The above entitle estate, by and through its aHorney of record, R. Brad 
Masingill, of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeals the Department I)f Health and Welfare's 
Appeal tiled on March 18,2010. 
1. The title of the Court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County 
of Washington, Magistrate Gregory F. Frates, presiding. 
2. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken i~: the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington, 
District Judge Renae J. Hoff, presiding. 
Notice of Cross Appeal - 1 
3. The Estate cross-appeals from two decisions of the Magistrate: (a) that Order on 
Attorney Fees filed Jllle 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the decision which 
failed to award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: Attorney's Fees 
and Costs filed on April 30, 2010. 
4. This cross appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law. 
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 3, 2010, but proceedings were 
also held on April 21, 2010, and the transcript for each is fi'~quested. It is cOlllsel's 
belief that the same were recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the 
clerk. 
6. The issues on cross-appeal are: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in failing to grant the Estate its a:itomey's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-121 and 12-120? 
h. Did the Magistrate err in failing to grant the Estate its atomey's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-117? 
7. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant 
and from the two orders ofthe Magistrate denying attorney'ii fees to the Estate. 
S. Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay the 
estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made availahle. The Cross-Appellant 
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not akeady 
included in the Appellant's request. It is unnecessary tc duplicate the transcript, 
however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to 
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throl\ghout the entire case, not 
just the briefing relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21, 
Notice of Cross Appeal- 2 
2010 hearing, but to include the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability 
ofIdaho Code 12-117, which was referenced in the June 23, 2010 Order on Attomey 
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010. 
9. Additional Transcript: The Cross-Appellant further reqllests that the stipulation 
put on the record on February 26, 2010 and the entire transcript of that hearing be 
made part of the record. 
10. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's record: In addition to those 
documents automatically included in the record pursuant to IAR 28, and in addition to 
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of Appeal shall be as follows: 
The Cross-Appellant requests that all filings in the Magistra~e case be included in the 
record, including all motions, all memorandums, all briefs all affidavits, including 
but not limited to the following: 
a. Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24, 2009; and 
b. Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Agains: Emerson D. Wiggins' 
Property dated January 29, 2010; and 
c. Responsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of ben Against Emerson D. 
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and 
d. Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legi~;lative History of Idaho 
Code 56-218 dated February 8,2010; and 
e. Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05, 2010; and 
f. Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for AttJrney's Fees and Costs, 
Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated April 6, 2010; and 
g. Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and 
Notice of Cross Appeal - 3 
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion for Stay re Attorney's Fees 
dated April 20, 2010; and 
i. Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay dated April 9, 
2010; and 
j. Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
dated April 6, 2010; and 
k. Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated Mmch 31, 2010; and 
l. First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Estate of George D. Perry, 
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15,2010; and 
ID. Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 2010. 
11. Cross Appellant further requests that the transcript of the hearing of February 3,2010 
be part of the record. 
12. Appellant further agrees to pay any cost of preparation of the clerk's record or the 
transcript as required by law when such is submitted. 
13. Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this~day of July, 2010. ;;TV i1/~~~-
R. Brad Masil'2gill 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ctp'Ctay of July, 2010, a tnle and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Appeal was sent via facsimile and mailed by regular United States mail, 
postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiigins 
1520 W. 28 Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste B 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
> 11/,-vin ,1/1 1fJi\ I "Lll.-,--'W 
R. Brad M:l~ligill 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision disallowing a creditor's claim in a 
probate proceeding. It involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate 
recovery, as provided by Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal 
and state law that seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to 
reimburse the taxpayers for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter 
involves the Department's claim filed in the joint estate of a deceased 1tledicaid recipient and her 
spouse. 
Course of Proceedings 
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on May 22, 2009. The 
Department filed a claim, in the amount of $264,674.45, on November 23,2009. On November 
24,2009, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of Claim £am the personal 
representative. On November 30, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of 
Claim. Hearing was held on the Department's Petition on February 3, 201 O. On March 30, 
2010, Judge Frates issued his Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the 
Estate. This appeal followed. 
Statement ofthe Facts 
Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") was born and died February 9, 2009, at 
the age of98. Vivian Wiggins ("Vivian") was born , and died January 30, 
2009 at the age of 98. At all times material to this proceeding, until the death of Vivian, 
Emerson and Vivian were husband and wife. About June 7,2002, Vivian was admitted to a 
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nursing home. Emerson and Vivian applied for medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, on 
November 18, 2002, to help pay for Vivian's medical care. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid 
on September 1, 2003, and between that time and Vivian's death the Department provided 
payment for Vivian's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least 
$272,134.68. 1 The property of this estate consists of a bank account with an inventory value of 
$78,659.44. 
IThe Department received a voluntary payment in April, 2008, in the amount of $7,460.23, resulting in thee 
Department's claim amount of $264,876.45. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Magistrate err in detennining that a Marriage Settlement Agreement 
(MSA) existed and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's 
community property to separate property (of Emerson Wiggins), and thiit such MSA was 
executed in 2002, and that such MSA met all of the fonnalities required by Idaho law, and that 
the Department was not in error in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56-
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of Emerson Wiggins? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as 
pre-empting application of Idaho Code § 56-218? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho SuprEme Court holding in 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this 
case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This matter involves the interpretation of state and federal law and state administrative 
rules. The interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which the court exercises free 
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224P.3d 458 (2008) citing 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). 
The Department has also challenged some of the Magistrate's findings of fact. In 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) the Idaho ~;upreme Court 
explained: 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a). A 
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by 
substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence. 
Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 431, 196 P .3d at 349. 
II. 
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 CLEARLY AUTHORIZES THE 
RECOVERY IN THIS ESTATE. 
A. This Is an Ordinary Estate Recovery Case. 
This appeal arises from a common and ordinary Medicaid estate recovery claim. 
Emerson and Vivian Wiggins were an elderly couple. Due to her advanced age, Vivian needed 
nursing home care. Nursing home care is very expensive and Emerson and Vivian applied for 
medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, from the Department. Vivian was determined to be 
eligible for Medicaid and between September 1, 2003, and the time ofter death, the Department 
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provided medical assistance benefits to Vivian in the sum of$272,134.68. Emerson died less 
than two weeks after Vivian and probate was opened. The property of the estate consists of a 
bank account which the estate inventory values at $78,659.44. The Department filed its Claim 
Against Estate which was disallowed by the personal representative. The court upheld the 
disallowance and this appeal resulted. 
The Magistrate held that the property of the estate was Emerson's separate property when 
Vivian died, and held that this precludes the Department from recovering those assets. 
B. Idaho Law Clearly Authorizes the Department to Recover the Ajisets of this Estate. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse 
of a Medicaid recipient: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate oLhe spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This section oflaw is clear and unambiguous. 
Nothing in the law suggests that recovery is limited to the community or other property the 
Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any kind on what property of 
the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is unambiguous, there is no need for 
construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. o/Agriculture, 143 Idaho 
366,368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006). 
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By rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or 
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93).2 IDAP A 
16.03.09.900.20 states: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
*** 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets ofthe estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community 
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that a transfer 
of property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right of recovery. Assuming, as 
the Magistrate held, there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case, such an agreement 
would have no affect on the Department's recovery. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreem("nt. 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estal;e of the deceased 
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or 
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07) 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and 
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619,84 P.3d 551,555 (2004). 
The Magistrate seemed concerned that the property of the estate was Emerson's separate 
property. Of course, it had not always been so. Moreover, it would have been Emerson's 
separate property at the time of his death whether there was a marriage !;etnement agreement or 
not. If there was a marriage settlement agreement, it would have divided the couple's property 
while Vivian was alive. However, even without a marriage settlement Lgreement, there is really 
2This exception was required by the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in IdaA 0 Department of Health and 
Welfare v< Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below beginning at page 15. 
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no difference, since upon Vivian's death, the couple's property would have become Emerson's 
separate property. Idaho Code § 15-2-102. As long as the property had originally been the 
couple's community property, whether it later becomes the separate property of the non-
Medicaid spouse is not relevant. 
Clearly, Idaho law permits the Department's claim in this estate" regardless of whether 
the estate consisted of community property or separate property, and the claim should have been 
allowed against the estate. 
III. 
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW ANTICIPATES RECOVERY 
OF ASSETS THAT HAD BEEN COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
lbe Magistrate's Memorandum Decision and Order refers onlyindirectIy to federal 
Medicaid law and it is difficult to determine whether federal law had an effect on his ruling. 
However, federal law also anticipates recovery in this case. 
A. Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept. 
Medicaid for elderly couples is simple in concept. Long term care is very expensive. 
Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare does not cover long 
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to 
support it. It is a public welfare program funded by the general funds of the state and federal 
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly cml obtain medical 
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Wbere a couple is 
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the 
other remains living in the community. These rules permit spouses to transfer property between 
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themselves. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are recovered to reimburse the 
Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need. 
B. The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recov'~:r the Assets of this 
Estate. 
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long 
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration ofIdaho's modern estate 
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as followB: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. 
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when th{~ individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if lhere be no estate 
the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for su\:h aid paid to 
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance correctly 
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no 
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any, 
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under 
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
Transfers of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress passed the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first 
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care withollt impoverishing the 
community (or at-home) spouse.3 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers 
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recou} these transferred assets 
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute. 
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to lBe the Medicaid program, 
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets. 
3The MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisiom for Medicaid were retained. 
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The language ofthe congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of 
Div. of Medical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is oj:en quoted: 
The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and 
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not 
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent 
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for 
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from 
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This 
is unacceptable to the Committee. 
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985). 
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4,668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA 
continued to echo these same concerns: 
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made 
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent afflu>ent individuals 
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nur::ing home 
coverage. In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlem~mt program for 
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealt;h from nursing 
home patients to their non-dependent children. 
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
857,896,1987 WL 61566, p. 31). 
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed.4 This law 
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The 
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets di"ided for purposes of 
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered. 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The program must identify 
4The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Defici t Reduction Act of 2005 giving 
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being 
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions ofthe DRA go to enhanced ast,et transfer penalties and the 
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here. 
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and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility J!urposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-t~3.sed services, 
and other specified long-term care services. The program must I=Tomptly ascertain 
when the individual and the surviving spouse, if anv, dies, and must provide for 
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behialf of the 
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including ass~;ts conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life t~state, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added). 
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition of a definition of "assets" for 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows: 
(h) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, i:; 1396p. "Assets" 
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes re;sources transferred by 
the individual to the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(:5): 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such terrn in section 
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to 
the exclusion described in subsection (a) (1 ) of such section. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(1), 
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsecfon (h)(l) includes the 
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couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. Clearly, "assets" in this case include any 
property Vivian may have transferred to Emerson through a marriage settlement agreement. 
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found 
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4): 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", w:l:h respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and othe;: assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1)( C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including sucha.ssets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual throughjoir:t tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(4) is, of course, part of 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p. Therefore, the term "assets" used here includes any property which Vivian may have 
transferred to Emerson. 
C. There Is No "Automatic-on-Death" Requirement in Subsection (Q)ill. 
Recall that subsection (b)( 4) was part of OBRA '93 and that part of the intent of OBRA 
'93 was to "identifY and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and 
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ... from the estate of the 
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 
1993), Section 5112 (cited above). Section (b)(4) is very broad and expansive: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection,S the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
5The "subsection" is 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate t lat states pursue estate 
recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1). 
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(B) may include, at the option ofthe State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (l )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including SUch.!lssets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through i!~nt tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or otht~r arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)( 4) (emphasis added). 
\Alhen this language is read in context with the remainder of the ~mbsection and the 
definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes clear. The phrase beginning with "including" 
shows the breadth of this section. In case the drafters missed something, they included the words 
"or other arrangement." The North Dakota Supreme Court found this language sufficiently 
expansive to include property such as that at issue in this case. In re Es.tate o/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 
882 (N.D. 2000). 
The Magistrate felt that subsection (b)( 4) would not apply to thi:~ case because it lists 
several transfers that occur automatically on death and the Magistrate deduced that only 
automatically-an-death transfers were included. This distinction, howe\'er, is not found 
anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a 
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate 0/ Hull v. 
Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443,885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The reneficiary holds only the 
beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4), when read 
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recip ,ent, by whatever means, 
may have attempted to shelter or protect. 
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D. The Correct Question Is Whether the Propertv of this Estate, Ev~n If Vivian Transferred 
It Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery. 
The Magistrate stated: "The Department may only recover against property in which the 
recipient spouse had an interest at the time of death." The underlying assumption was that if 
Vivian had entered into a marriage settlement agreement, then the property was no longer an 
"asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was incorrect. The correct question was 
whether the property of the estate was "assets" of the individual as defined by state and federal 
law. This is the correct question because, the whole point ofthe definition of assets in 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1396p(h)(1) is that the term "assets" includes property transferred by tIle Medicaid recipient to 
the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was transferred (so long as it was after OBRA 
'93), or even if it was transferred. The important question was whether, even after any purported 
transfer, it is subject to recovery under the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was. 
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset 
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) which has been discussed. Another if: Idaho Code § 56-218(1) 
itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the property of 
Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) states that: 
... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the 
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The 
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the prohate code and is not 
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place 
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes. 
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A clear example of this is found in another part of Idaho Code § 56··218: subsection 
(4)(b). That section, which adopts the language found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) states, in part, 
as follows: 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
*** 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through . .life estate .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life 
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor, 
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not exti.nguished on death, but 
remains an "asset" of the estate.6 The question here, involving the recoyery of property which 
has become the separate property of the non-Medicaid spouse, is the same thing. The legislature, 
through Idaho Code § 56-218, has modified Idaho probate and marital property law to say that if 
a person transfers community property to her spouse, and receives Medicaid benefits in the 
future, the property remains subject to recovery. 
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of 
assets and expanded definition of estate), is the property in this estate ar. "asset" subj ect to 
recovery, the "at the time of death" argument becomes irrelevant. This is not an attempt to grab 
back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing that under Idaho and federal 
law, whether transferred or not, the property of this estate, like the life estate discussed above, is 
an "asset" of Vivian's subject to estate recovery. 
6See e.g. State Dept. of Human Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, l36 PJd 66 (2006) ("For purpcses of 
the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a I ife estate interest, the life estate 
continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate ofLaughec.d, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 
2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be inc1u:led in the estate for purposes of 
estate recovery). 
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IV. 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY 
DECIDED THIS ISSUE. 
In the case of Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackrr:an, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P .2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid 
spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred an 
her property to her spouse, Lionel, by a marriage settlement agreement. Hildor passed away first 
and Lionel passed away two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of 
Lionel's estate and the Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative 
challenged the Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal preemption. The 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition 
of estate permitted by federal law, together with the definition of assets :~und at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(h)(l), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after Qctober 1, 1993, been 
community property. 
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the wa) it was decided. The 
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It 
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on 
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held whollyn favor of the 
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modifiec its decision because the 
effective date of the federal law on which the Court had relied in its oril~nal opinion was after 
the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery 
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would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the 
federal law, "OBRA 93.,,7 
The Magistrate seemed to believe that Jackman held that only property which remains 
community property at death is subject to recovery. This is incorrect. If the Magistrate were 
correct, the Supreme Court's entire discussion of OBRA '93 and its effe:tive date, the definition 
of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h)), and the expanded definition of estate, would 
all be superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since there \Vas a marriage settlement 
agreement and the property was transferred before death, there can be no recovery." That is not 
what the Court did. The discussion of the effective date ofOBRA '93 central to the court's 
holding, and Jackman is an important case because it demonstrates what Congress did in 
enacting OBRA '93, and how the outcome of the case would have been different had the transfer 
been after the effective date of OBRA '93, as it was in this case. 
The court began with the over-arching holding: 
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed a, times applicable 
to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments from 
Lionel's estate. We agree. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8, 970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to stlte that the Department 
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid rel~ipient to her husband 
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had believed there '~ould be no recovery of 
property transferred before death, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of 
the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pain:; to discuss the effective 
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. ~:ne court discussed the 
7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recowry to property that had been 
community property at any time after October 1, 1993. 
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expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the f;;deral definition of 
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of 
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage E;ettlement agreement was 
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, the new federal laws did not apply to the 
transferred property: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
a!rreement which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and HildQr on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendm~mts to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). 
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department 
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. 
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which appUes to Medicaid 
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after Octob\~r 1, 1993, 
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other 
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as 
dermed by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10,970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary 
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.c. f 1396p([h])(1), 'other 
assets'" would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipiert to her husband through 
the marriage settlement agreement. Things that are necessarily implied ca."':} have legal effect. 
There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 161) P.3d 739, 741-42 
(2007», implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 
P.3d 473,476 (2009)), and implied promises (Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 
378,387,210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009)) among other things. There is no need to guess at the mea:'1ing 
of the Court here. The Court was clearly explaining the effect of OBRA '93 when it comes to 
spousal recovery in Idaho. 
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Since even if there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case it would have been 
post-OBRA '93, then under Jackman the property is subject to estate recovery. 
V. 
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT STIPULATE TO THE 
FACTS UPON WHICH THE lVlAGISTRATE RELIED. 
The Magistrate made findings of fact that included the following: 
1. The Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian 1vViggins and 
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Marriage Settlement Agreement 
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets. 
2. The MSA transmutted (sic) Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's 
community property to separate property. 
3. Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court, 
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002. 
* * * 
5. Unless the MSA had been executed, Vivian Wiggins would not have 
been eligible for Medicaid Benefits. 
* * * 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against Estate, p. 2. While finding number 
1 is correct, findings 2 and 3 are not part of the stipulation the Department made. Finding 5 is 
correct, except that the inference that a MSA must have existed is not supported since the 
Department may have been in error in believing an MSA existed. 8 
The actual stipulation is as follows: 
MR. MASIN GILL: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated to. That the 
department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though olley had a 
marriage settlement agreement that divided their assets. The manage settlement 
agreement would have transmuted the property from community property to 
separate property to each party. The marriage settlement agreement would have 
been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the admissio t1 -- stipulate to 
the admission of the exhibits that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I 
believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001 through 097. 
SIf an error was made and the Department paid Vivian's Medicaid benefits in elTor, it would still have recovered 
those payments as a creditor of this estate, Idaho Code § 56-224. 
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"'We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took place in 2002 and 
it is shown as Bates nos. 033 through 03S. That the second application was 
applied for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. OS8-060. 
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage settlement agreement 
had been -- unless it had been executed. Vivian would not have been eligible to 
receive Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibit:; from his latest 
reply brief. I believe they're lien documents. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the reply brief. 
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright, is th;3t the stipulation 
on behalf of the State -- the claimant? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor. I would offer one 
other stipulation at this point and that's that neither party has been able to locate 
the original marriage settlement agreement. 
Tr. p. 4, 1. 20 to p. 5, 1. 25 (emphasis added). That is the extent of the stpulation. The 
Department does not disagree with the statements made, only the broad inferences drawn by the 
Magistrate from those statements. 
As discussed above, from the Department's perspective, whether a marriage settlement 
agreement existed or not was not relevant. The Department agreed that Vivian had been made 
eligible as if a MSA existed. Since Vivian was made eligible in 2003, tle marriage settlement 
agreement, ifit existed, would have been executed about that time. This is as far as the 
Department was willing to stipulate. The Department did not stipulate 'hat an agreement actually 
existed. Had the Department been aware that the existence of the MSA w:mld become a critical 
issue for the Magistrate, it would have been more cautious to clarify the scope of its stipulation. 
There is no substantial competent evidence that a MSA actually existed. Even if it can be 
inferred, from the Department's stipulation, that an MSA existed, there is no basis for inferring 
the tenus of the agreement or that the agreement included the fonualities required in Idaho Code 
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§ § 32-917 and 918.9 There was no evidence from anyone who claimed to have seen the 
document or drafted it, and therefore could have known of its existence and contents. Evidence 
that the Department acted as if a MSA existed is not sufficient to infer the contents or terms of 
any such agreement. 
VI. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state a!~ency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attomey's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously 
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representati ve has advanced an 
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The personal representative, in disallowing 
the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law and the Department 
should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Did the Magistrate err in determining that a Marriage Se:tlement Agreement 
(MSA) existed and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Em;rson Wiggin's 
9The Magistrate found it significant that the Department had not sought to set adde the MSA under Idaho Code 
§ 56-218(2). As explained, above, there was no need to set aside any transfers between be spouses because transferred 
assets are already "assets" subject to estate recovery. However, it would not have been p)ss;ble to bring an action to set 
aside a MSA that couldn't even have been shown to have existed. 
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community property to separate property (of Emerson Wiggins), and the:: such MSA was 
executed in 2002, and that such MSA met all of the formalities required by Idaho law, and that 
the Department was not in error in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins? 
Yes. The evidence only showed that the Department treated Emerson and Vivian as if 
they had a MSA. There is no substantial competent evidence that one a·~:tually existed, nor of the 
terms of any such agreement, nor that any such agreement met the required formalities under the 
law. 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56· 
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of Emerson Wiggins? 
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 clearly and unambiguously permits fhe recovery in this case. 
There is nothing in section 56-218 that suggests that assets that had become the separate property 
of the non-Medicaid spouse are not included in recoverable assets. 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as 
pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-218? 
Yes, assuming this was, in fact, the Magistrate's conclusion and reason for not applying 
the plain language ofIdaho Code § 56-218. Federal Medicaid law expands the definitions of 
assets and estate, for purposes of Medicaid estate recovery, to include p:operty spouses have 
transferred between themselves. 
Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in 
Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts ofthis 
case? 
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Yes. The necessary and unavoidable implication ofthe Supreme Court's holding in 
Jackman upholds the recovery of assets which had, at any time after the adoption of OBRA '93, 
been community property. 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
Yes. Since, Idaho Code § 56-218 clearly and unambiguously pe;~mits the Department to 
recover in this case, the personal representative's disallowance of the Depfu-tment's claim was 
without any reasonable basis in fact or law. 
DATED this 17 day of September, 2010, 
/:~~ ~:><1 1N~C~CARTvnrIGf-[T~-------
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate 
proceeding and Respondent's application for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-
117 and Idaho Code 12-121. This case involves the State seeking to impose it's Medicaid lien 
against the separate property of Emerson Wiggins (hereinafter Emerson) based on "medical 
assistance," provided to Emerson's spouse, Vivian Wiggins (hereinafter Vivian). The attempted 
imposition of it's lien is based on Idaho Code § 56-218, and the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p, upon which the State's statute finds its existence. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Personal Representative was appointed in this estate on May :~2, 2009. The Department 
filed a claim in the amount of $264,674.45 on November 23, 2009. On November 24, 2009, the 
Department received a Notice of Disallowance of Claim from the Personal Representative. On 
November 30, 2009, the Department filed it's Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held 
on the Department's Petition on February 3, 2010. At the hearing, the State entered into a 
stipulation which provided that in order for Vivian to have been qualified to receive Medicaid funds 
there must have been an agreement transmuting Vivian and Emerson's property to their sole and 
separate property. The transmutation agreement detennined the amount of spend-down required of 
Vivian before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two after the 
transmutation agreement was executed, the Department detennined that Vivian had spent down her 
separate property and because she had no interest in any other property, including Emerson's, 
Vivian was granted Medicaid eligibility. 
It was upon this eligibility that the claim arose. The attempted imposition of the lien is 
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based on that eligibility of Vivian, but the Department now seeks to impose a lien upon 
Emerson's separate property. It is with slight- of- hand that the State seeks to impose it's lien 
against property owned solely by Emerson. This was accomplished by the transformation 
agreement so that Vivian could be eligible for Medicaid. The State supervised the spend-down 
of Vivian's only assets. The State made the determination that Vivian had spent down all her 
assets and by virtue thereof qualified for Medicaid. The State provided Medicaid to Vivian in 
the amount of the claim. Vivian died and was followed in death by Emerson. By virtue of he 
transmutation agreement the only property in the probate was the separate property of Emerson. 
After assisting in divesting Vivian of any assets, the State filed a claim for lien against 
Emerson's separate property. The State, with a straight face, and despite being involved in 
transmuting his property into separate property so Vivian would qualify for Medicaid, now 
seeks to recover all of Emerson's separate property. 
It is the contradictory, attempted imposition of it's lien against Emerson's separate 
property which was the subject of the Magistrate's decision that the lien could not apply to 
Emerson's separate property under the law in effect at that time. 
The State has appealed the denial of it's attempted imposition of a lien on Emerson's 
separate property. The Estate being the prevailing party in this action sought attorney's fees 
and costs against the State pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121. The 
Magistrate, despite finding the State's assertion of it's lien against Emerson's separate property 
was due to it's unreasonable interpretation of the federal statute, failed to grant the Estate 
attorney's fees and some costs. 
Another case was making it's way through the probate system in Ada County, descrihed 
herein as In Re the Estate of Perry. The Magistrate also denied a li,;m in favor of the State 
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based on the same statutory and case law. The Perry Magistrate, however, found in favor of the 
Perry estate on it's motion for attorney's fees and costs. 
Neither the Idaho, nor the Federal statutes permit the State's lien and because the 
statutory and case law is clear the Respondent estate is entitled to attorney's fees and costs both 
on the underlying case and on appeal. 
The simple way to state the issue before the court is that the two cases in the Magistrate 
level found that the separate property of the non-recipient spouse is not subject to a Medicaid 
lien. 
The Respondent timely filed it's appeal of the denial of attorney's fees and costs. Both 
appeals are now before this Court. 
Statement of the Facts 
Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") was born and died February 9, 
2009, at the age of 98. Vivian Wiggins ("Vivian") was born  and died 
January 30, 2009 at the age of 98. At all times material to this proceeding, until the death 
of Vivian, Emerson and Vivian were husband and wife. The State describes the "facts" in 
it's Appellate Brief without mention of the transmutation they participated in, nor the spend 
down of Vivian's assets to allow her to qualify for Medicaid. The State instead states: 
"About June 7, 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home in Weiser, Idaho. 
Emerson and Vivian applied for medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, on or about 
November 18,2002, to help pay for Vivian's medical care. As the State's brief indicates, 
Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September 1, 2003, and between that time and 
Vivian's death the Department provided payment for Vivian's 111edical care, through the 
Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $272,134.68. 1 The property of this estate 
consists of a bank account with an inventory value of $78,659.44. 
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The State's participation in the transmutation is entirely inconsistent with it's subs.e~quent 
effort to impose a lien on property they helped to be transferred and transmuted into Emerson's 
separate property. The facts also show the State did not inform either Vivian or Emerson, who were 
blind and cared for by their son, the Personal Representative, of it':; intention to come after 
Emerson's separate property prior to filing it's claim in the probate. The State's participation in 
the transmutation caused Vivian to have no interest in Emerson's property. Emerson's separate 
propel1y is all that is involved in this action. There is an inherent contradiction created by the 
State's participation in the transmutation, then "interpreting" the statute~; and case law in Idaho as 
providing that Emerson's separate property is subject to it's lien, and of course for the purpose of 
paying itself. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Stipulation. Did the Magistrate correctly interpret the State's stipulation on 
the record that a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA) existed, had apparently been lost, 
and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's community property 10 
separate property? 
2. State Statute. Did the Magistrate correctly determ;ned that Idaho Code 
56-218(1) did not provide for the State's lien against Emerson's separate property? 
3. Federal Statute. Did the Magistrate correctly interprtt 42 U.S.c. § 1396p, and 
it's subsections and definitions, as prohibiting the State a lien against the separate property of 
Emerson? 
4. Barg. Was Barg directly on point, pointing out the preclusion of recovery from 
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Emerson's separate property? 
5. Jackman. Did the Magistrate properly interpret the Idaho Supreme Court's 
holding in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) as 
precluding a lien to the State against Emerson's separate property? 
6. Did the Magistrate correctly interpret Perry as agreeing with his interpretation 
of the law prohibiting a Medicaid lien against the separate property of the non-recipient 
spouse, Emerson? 
7. Attorney's Fees at Magistrate Level. Is the Estate entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121 at the trial level? 
8. Attorney's Fees on Appeal. Is the Estate entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves the interpretation of state and federal statutory and case law. The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free 
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008) citing State v. 
Hart, 135 Idaho 827 (2001). 
It is hopeful this case is not a common and ordinary Medicaid estate recovery case (as the 
Appellant's Brief indicates) because it shows significant flaws by the State Department of Health 
and Welfare (hereinafter Department) in both it's procedural and substantive processes, it's flawed 
interpretation of the State statute, it's equally flawed analysis of the controlling Federal statute, as 
well as failure to follow case law in Idaho and elsewhere on this issue. The Department has 
commented that they have taken other citizen's separate property in cases similar to this one, but no 
one has objected. It is respectfully submitted that reliance on the failure of other citizens to take on 
the State of Idaho (despite being absolutely correct as a matter of law and fact) should not be 
construed that the Department's actions are, or have been proper. Indulgence in the Department's 
"we have always done it this way" approach to this case is disturbinl~ for past recoveries and 
inapplicable to the instant case. 
The standard of review of issues of law by this Court will simply require proper statutory 
and case law interpretation, all of which is clearly inapposite to the State's position. 
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II. 
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT A LIEN 
AGAINST EMERSON'S SEPARATE PROPERTY 
A. The Stipulation. 
To understand the predicate for the Stipulation it is best to review the procedure used in the 
underlying Medicaid processes. Vivian was determined to be eligible for Medicaid as previously 
discussed, and between September 1, 2003 and the time of her death the Department provided 
medical assistance benefit's to Vivian in the sum of $272,134.68. Emerson died less than two 
weeks after Vivian and a joint probate was opened. The property of the Estate consists of a bank 
account which the estate inventory valued at $78,659.44, all of which i:;; the separate propelty of 
Emerson. In fact, the funds still in existence are the funds transmuted to Emerson by the 
Department, or with its help. The funds were declared Emerson's sepamte property at the time of 
the transmutation and the amount still on hand is due to the fact he did not spend it down as did 
Vivian. The Magistrates in both the Ada County case and in the case at bar ruled the lien do(~s not 
attach to the separate property of the non-recipient surviving spouse. Tht: Department now appeals 
Judge Frates' ruling. 
The State stipulated in open court that it is impossible for Viviar to have been eligible for 
Medicaid without the transmutation. See the Transcript of the hearing on the 3rd day of February, 
2010, which states in pertinent part as follows:: 
"Judge Frates: And it my understanding after having met with both counsel in 
chambers that there would be at least some stipUlation of facts we can put on the record. 
Mr. Masingill: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated [0. That the Department 
treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though they had a marriage settl€;ment 
agreement that divided their assets. The marriage settlement agreement would have 
transmuted the property from community property to separate property to each party. 
The marriage settlement agreement would have been dated approximately 2002. That we 
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agreed to the admission-stipulate to the admission of the Exhibit's that I have presented 
which are Exhibit A through G, I believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001 
through 097. 
We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took plaee in 2002 and it is shown 
as Bates nos. 033 through 097. That the second application was applied for on 8-27-03 and 
it is Bates nos. 058-060. 
We've stipulated that unless the ]\tIS-the marriage settllement had been - unless 
it had been executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to received Medicaid 
benefit's ..... 
Judge Frates: Okay. Just a second. Mr. Cartwright is tbat the stipulation on 
behalf of the State-the claimant? 
Mr. Cartwright: That is correct, your Honor. I would oHer one other stipUlation at 
this point and that's that neither party has been able to locate the original marriage settlement 
agreement." (emphasis added). 
See also Judge Frates' comment after the stipUlation was entered on the record: 
Judge Frates: This appears, based on the stipUlation, to be, you know, a matter of 
law. It involves federal laws and state laws and there are a ::ouple of cases involved. 
Judge Frates was well within his judicial province to accept the stipulation and treat this case 
as one of determination of the law applied to those facts. The State's ~;sertion that there is some 
factual dispute after the stipulation, and that the stipulation did not me:m what it clearly said, is 
inappropriate considering the Magistrate's proper reliance thereon. 
Frankly, the attempts by the State to avoid the application of its stipulation is factually 
dishonest. In fact, when the facts are stipulated the parties and the Court is entitled to rely thereon. 
Judicial admissions are favored by the law. The State had the obligation to make clear to the 
Magistrate, and opposing counsel, that reliance on its judicial admission was misplaced and that 
somewhere down the road in the proceedings the State would attempt to back out of the same. In 
fact, the Estate had a witness who was going to testify that the Department regularly used Marriage 
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Settlement Agreements and that a substantial amount were lost by the Department after being 
transmitted from her (the local) office to the Department. The stipulation on the record came about 
on the date of hearing after the Department's counsel was advised in chambers of the nature of the 
witnesses' proposed testimony. Given the propensity to lose the written agreements and the fact that 
Vivian could not have become eligible for benefits without one, directly preceded the stipulation. 
B. Judicial Admissions. The Idaho Supreme Court in In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 
144 Idaho 751 (Idaho, 2007) described the nature and effect of a judicial admission: 
"A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or lttorney, in the course of 
judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof 
by the opposing party of some fact." Sun Valley Potato Growels, Inc. v. Texas Refinery 
Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). itA judicial admission is a deliberate, 
clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact vrithin the party's peculiar 
knowledge, not a matter of law .... [and] not opinion." 29A Arr. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 770 
(1994). 
In prior OpInIOnS, we have held that judicial admissions include admitting an 
allegation in an opposing party's pleading, Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 
341, 63 P.3d 441, 447 (2003); a stipulation entered into by pal!'ties or their counsel, 
Reding v. Reding, 141 Idaho 369, 109 P.3d 1111 (2005); and counsel's admission at trial 
of a factual issue upon which the opposing party had the burden of proof, McLean v. 
City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 782-83,430 P.2d 670,673-74 (1967). 
The stipulation on the record resolves any issue, illusory or not, that Emerson's property was 
transmuted into his separate property. 
C. Idaho Code 56-218(1) Does Not Permit the Department to Lien the Non-
Recipient Spouse's Separate Property. 
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) reads as follows: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistanGe may be recovered from 
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse if any, for such aid paid to either or 
both; 
The glaring problem with Idaho Code § 56-218(1) is its failure to define the "estate of the 
syouse". As the Court is aware, Idaho is a community property state and property held by an 
individual can be characterized as community property or separate propelty (this is not intended to 
imply those are the only types of property holding allowed in Idaho, but are those at issue). 
To determine what the legislature meant by the "estate of the spolse", the usual method is 
finding a definition of the same. However, the Idaho legislation does ne,t contain a definition. A 
review of the legislative history of the statute contradicts the State's position that separate property 
is part of the "estate of the spouse" for purposes of the lien. 
Furthermore, the very beginning of Idaho Code 56-218(1) contains a pre-condition. That 
pre-condition is that the federal statute must first exempt any action by the State. As hereinafter 
discussed, that pre-condition defeats the Department's attempted recovery. 
When the language of a statute is ambiguous, the intention (J the legislation can be 
ascertained by its history. The following is the language from the Senate bill, thereafter becoming 
Idaho Code 56-218. The legislative history specifically states that its purpose is to limit recovery 
to the community property of the non-institutionalized spouse, not the separate property of the non-
institutionalized spouse: 
"MEDICAL ASSISTANCE - Amends existing law to clarify when medical assistance may 
be recovered; and to specify when the cause of action accrues to void a transfer which was 
made without adequate consideration. 
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Under federal and state law, the state is authorized to set aside transfers of assets owned by 
recipients of Medicaid where the transfer is made without adequate consideration and those 
assets could have been used to pay for the medical assistance provided through Medicaid. In 
a recent decision, a state district court ruled that the state's action was barred by a four year 
statute of limitations which ran from the date of the transfer even though the circumstances 
of the transfer were not reasonably discovered by the state until after the four years had 
elapsed. The proposed legislation adds language to Idaho Code Section 56-218 that would 
prevent the statute of limitations from running until such time is the state discovers, or 
reasonably could have discovered, that the asset transfer was without adequate consideration. 
"Discovers" or "reasonably could have discovered" as used in proposed subsection 56-218(8) 
is intended to have the same meaning as "discovery", as inte-preted by the courts, in 
subsection 5-218(4), Idaho Code. The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction 
to Idaho Code 56-218 to clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of 1 Medicaid recipient need 
not survive the Medicaid recipient in order for the department te, file a claim against the 
"community property" of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate. (emphasis added)." 
The foregoing legislative history shows that the legislature never intended the statute to 
permit a lien for repayment of Medicaid from the separate property of the :mrviving spouse. 
The Department's position encompasses, within its ambit, such sit lations as occur when two 
older folks marry, both having substantial separate property from their 'urmer relationships. The 
Department's position is such that the subject couple can do nothing to protect each other's separate 
property from the Medicaid lien. It is unconscionable to think that folks who get married the second 
or third time around, presumably in their later years, would lose their separate property to a 
Medicaid lien against the non-recipient spouse. The statute as applied in the manner demanded by 
the Department, is overbroad and unconstitutional. State v Bitt, 118 Idaho 584 (1990). 
The statute need not be interpreted as unconstitutional, as it is clear the legislature intended 
only "community property" of the non-institutionalized spouse to be subject to the Medicaid lien. 
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The Department's claim that its lien also applies to the non-institutionalized spouse's separate 
property is not supported by the legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218(1). 
The claims of the Department in its Appellant's Brief that their own rule provides that it has 
the right to assert its lien against the non-institutionalized spouse's separate property is contrary to 
the legislative history and thus has no effect on the case at bar. A rule promulgated in error is 
entitled to no weight. 
D. Property Which was Community "at Some Time" Does Not Makes it Subject to 
the Lien. 
The Department argues in its Brief on appeal for the first time, (and we hereby move to 
strike the same) that it does not matter if the property it is seeking a lien against is now separate 
property, so long as it was community property at some time in the past. .Such a conclusion is not a 
substitute for reading the statutory and case law on this subject. In the case at bar, it is the 
Department's own actions which transmuted the community property of Emerson and Vivian into 
separate property. It cannot now claim its action in doing so had no effecl. 
In fact, once property is deemed separate, Idaho law applies. Idaho law does not distinguish 
between "once upon a time community by now separate property" and other forms of property 
ownership. No case law makes that distinction that this author could locate. The definitions of 
separate and community property are supplied by statute. The legislature did not mention in Idaho 
Code § 56-218(1) such a distinction, nor does the legislative history dhcuss such a thing. It is 
presumed the legislature knows its other enactments when it signs new law into effect. Had the 
legislature made such a distinction between kinds of separate property, it had an obligation to 
supply new law to that effect. 
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Its failure to do so requires construction of the statute by the definitions of separate and 
community property already in existence. Despite the attempt by the Department to create a new 
kind of separate property, it is the legislature which has the right to do so, not the Department. 
By way of conclusion, there are no set of facts, no law either statulory or case law, in Idaho, 
which supports the Department's right to a lien against the separate properly of Emerson. 
III. 
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW 
RECOVERY OF EMERSON'S SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
A. Motion to Strike Narrative Statement as Not Part of the R~cord. 
The Department supplies this Court with its analysis of Medicaid law and how and why it 
applies to elderly couples. However, all the information gratuitously nbmitted is not a pmt of 
the record and the respondent requests the Court to strike those unsolicited statements made in 
paragraph IIICA) of Appellant's brief. 
B. The History of Estate Recovery is Not Relevant. 
The Department again tries in its Brief to avoid a discussion ah)ut the language of the 
statutes, and case law which interprets them, in favor of the "we have always done it this way" 
legal concept. Despite attempts, this author could not locate any cases which stand for the 
proposition that improper application of the law becomes the law itself. 
In the Department's reference to the first paragraph of the 1988 version of Idaho Code 
56-218, no mention of extending a lien to the separate property of the surviving spouse is 
found. It is the same ambiguous language found on the present statute ruld thus provides no 
guidance for the court on the issues presented in this appeal. 
C. Federal Statute Definitions. The Federal statute granfng the States the right to 
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impose liens for recovery of Medicaid benefits is central to this case. The Department made 
conclusions [Appellant's Brief at paragraph IIl(B)] about the language of the statute, but despite 
those conclusions they do not overcome the language of the statute as set lorIh below. 
D. The General Portion of the Statute. The federal statute , pertinent to 
this case, starts with the general statement that no recovery will be allowed, ~xcept for those items 
set forth in 42 U.S.c. J396p(b)(J): 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid urder a State plan. 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment 
or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a ,(1 )(B) of this section, the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the indivMual's estate or upon sale 
of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid 
on behalf of the individual. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting of 
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-hased services, and related 
hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan.'<' 
As the Court can readily see, there is absolutely no federal statutory basis for recovery from 
the spouse's estate. The word "individual" cannot be reasonably ccnstrued as meaning from 
another's separate property. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF-14 
E. The Definition Section. The federal statute has defi:r5,tions which explain the 
intention of the recovery legislation (contrary to the Idaho statute). The definition section, 42 
U.S.c. J396p(b)(4), is quoted in pertinent part: 
"(4) For purposes ofthis subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State pro hate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i)* applies) [*if the Medicaid was 
improperly granted], any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. (emphasis 
added) 
The definition section of the federal statute specifically menticns only "individual" and 
"individual's estate". At no place in the entire federal statute will the Court find any language 
which mentions a spouse, a spouse's assets, a spouse's estate, a spouse':; separate property, or the 
like. This case does not include any of the arrangements such as joint tenants, etc described in 
U.S.c. J396p(b)(4). The Magistrate specifically found that the federal E:ta1ute mentioned some of 
the arrangements to which a lien would apply, and found that those arrangements do not exist in the 
case at bar. 
In fact, applying statutory principles of construction, the failure to specifically grant a 
remedy against a spouse, or a spouse's separate estate, or a spouse's separate property, when the 
right to recovery is only given as an exception to the anti-lien rule, shows there is no right of 
recovery against Emerson's separate property. Without it, all of the Appellant's arguments faiL 
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If Congress intended the separate property estate of the non-Medicaid spouse to available for 
recovery, it would have been included in the language of the statute. Its failure to do so is, by 
statutory construction, is evidence of Congress prohibiting recovery from the non-Medicaid 
spouse's separate property. Barg, supra; C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Jlatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515, 
547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488,493 
(2002); and Callies v. O'Neal, 216 P.3d 130 (Idaho, 2009). 
See also State v. Maybee, Docket No. 35200 (Idaho 1115/2010) (Idaho, 2010) which stated: 
"rules of statutory construction dictate that a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a 
manner that leads to an absurd result, In re Daniel W., 14,5 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765, 768 
(2008), and the legislature in drafting a statute is charged with knowledge of applicable 
statutory background and legal precedent. DrufJel v. State, Deptt of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 
856,41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). " 
There has been no authority offered by the Department which agrees with its interpretation 
of the federal statute. The federal statute is clear and unambiguous, and s:ates that only the "estate" 
of the recipient or property to which the recipient had an interest at death, are liable for recovery. 
F. In re the Estate of Barg. 
The Department has not pointed this Court to any decision which contradicts the well-
founded and articulated case of In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2nd 54(Afinn. 2008), hereinafter 
Barg. The Barg case was not cited by the Jackman court because Barg was decided nearly 10 
years later. If the Jackman court had been privy to the analysis of the B{jrg case, it is likely the 
flawless logic ofthat decision would have found its way into the Idaho SUJreme Court's decision. 
The law as it stands today, has the Jackman case disallowin~; recovery from the non-
recipient spouse's separate property. It was the post-1993 federal statute, which was analyzed by 
Barg. Despite the Department's attempt to paint Jackman with a pre-1993 statute, and disregard 
Barg, is pre versus post-1993 statute analysis is without any substance. As the Court is aware, State 
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statutes are trumped by the federal legislation, and the Idaho Supreme Court has so stated recently in 
Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439 (2008): 
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid 
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a 
Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284,126 S. Ct. at 1763,164 LEd.2d at 473-74. A state 
Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibit's states from 
placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)." 
(emphasis added). 
Hudelson brings home the truth about the Medicaid statute. It is a prohibition against any 
recovery unless specifically authorized by the exceptions in the fede:ral statute. The statute is 
"anti-lien". Thus, there is no right to recovery (under Idaho law) unless tte federal Medicaid statute 
authorizes it specifically as an exception to the mandatory lien prohibition of the statute. 
Barg was quoted in a Missouri case, In re the Estate of Bruce, 2(0 S.W. 3rd 398 (Mo. App. 
2008) where an award in favor of the State of Missouri was reversed where tenancy in entirety was 
involved. In Bruce, supra, the Supremacy clause required Missouri ":0 comply with 42 USC 
1396p(b)(4)B. Missouri's claim was disallowed based on the same rationale as in the case at bar. 
Bruce makes the very same distinction as Respondent and Judge Frates a~, to subsection (b)(4)B, as 
well as agreeing with Respondent's interpretation of subsection (b)( 4)A. In fact, tenancy by the 
entirety is very similar to Idaho's Community Property. 
G. Jackman. 
The case of Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackmal,!, 132 Idaho 213 ([998), 
hereinafter Jackman, as it applies to this case is interesting, but not helpflll to the State. Should the 
State attempt to use before this Court what it has previously described as a "draft" of the Jackman 
case, the Court should entirely ignore the same and not give it any weight whatsoever. The 
Respondent states its position relatively thereto hereinafter, but the same should not be construed as 
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an admission that such has any legal right or weight in this case, but only as rebuttal to any such 
claim of the Appellant. 
Jackman is cited in national pUblications for the following proposi;:ion: 
"States have, however, occasionally been aggressive agaim:t the estate of a surviving 
spouse, even when this appears to fly in the face of the law. [See Idaho Dep't of Health and 
Welfare v Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), which permitted recovery after the 
death of the surviving spouse, to the extent of the predeceasing recipient-spouse's 
community interest acquired after institutionalization." See Elder Law Answer Book, 
Second Edition, Aspen Publishers, Robert B. Fleming and Lisa .Nachmias Davis, authors. 
Other than the Department's contention that the Idaho Supreme C)urt decided the Jackman 
case incorrectly, and revised it (the evidence of which is an unsigned and unfiled draft presented by 
Mr. Cartwright), the reported Jackman case, found at 132 Idaho 213 (1998) reads exactly the way 
the national publications have depicted it. 
The Court is not authorized to use the unpublished, unsigned, and unauthenticated "draft" as 
authority for the position of the Idaho Supreme Court in any case, let alone this one. 
What is probative is the language of the federal statute and statutory construction. 
IV. 
STATE PROPERTY LAW 
A. Separate Property. As to Emerson's separate property, Idaho law clearly states 
that separate property is exempt from any interest of a spouse. 
Idaho Code 32-903 states as follows: 
"All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him 0.' her before marriage, and 
that acquired afterward by either by gift, bequest, devise or deSCEnt, or that which either he 
or she shall acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, shall remain his or her 
sole and separate property. " 
Separate property in Idaho is guarded by the Courts. The owner i:; free to do with his or her 
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separate property as he or she pleases, including gifting, devising, or transferring, without any notice 
to a spouse. See Simpiot v. Simpiot, 96 Idaho 239,526 P.2d 844 (Idaho, 1974) which stated: 
"The right to preserve separate property was acknowledged in the 1vfalone case." 
In Vanwassenhove v. Vanwassenhove, 134 Idaho 198 (Idaho App., 2000) the Idaho Court of 
Appeals reinforced this concept by holding: 
"It is a well-settled principle of Idaho community property law that only net income 
from separate property becomes community property. Malone v. Malone, 64 Idaho 252,261, 
130 P.2d 674, 678 (1942); Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 236, 858 P.2d 766, 
775 (CLApp. 1993). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that to "hold otherwise 
would cause the community to, in time, entirely consume the separate estates of the members 
thereof and would nUllify [§ 32-903] and [§ 32-906] of the code." Malone, 64, Idaho at 261, 
130 P.2d at 678. Thus, the net income rule protects both "the rights and interests of 
individual spouses in the preservation and maintenance of separa~)roperty as well as ... 
the interests of the community." Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 571,512 P.2d 1317,1320 
(1973). (emphasis added). 
The right of the Department to recover money, lawfully paid on behalf of an institutionalized 
spouse, hereinafter the Medicaid spouse, is restricted by the terms of thE federal statute governing 
Medicaid, and by Idaho's separate property statute and case law. The C:mrt is asked to remember 
that even if this legislature subsequently sees fit to lay claim to the non-Medicaid spouse's separate 
property, it is not lawful to do so unless the federal Medicaid statute authorized it as an exception to 
the prohibition against recovery. 
B. Statutory Construction Belies the Department's Entire Case. Had the Idaho 
legislature have intended to apply Ida/tO Code 56-218(1) to the separate property of the non-
recipient spouse, it could have so stated. Its failure to do so is deemed to have expressed its 
intention not to do so. With the (a) legislative history showing community property of the non-
recipient spouse to be the only target available to the statute, (b) the legislature's failure to state 
therein that separate property was a part of the estate of the non-recipient spouse, and (c) it's failure 
to provide for the same in a definition section of the statute, there is no way to read Idaho Code 56-
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218(1) to include separate property of the non-recipient spouse as recoverable. In fact, statutory 
construction makes such an interpretation unreasonable. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in Kelso & Irwin, PA v. State ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130 
(Idaho, 2000) as follows: 
"An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free 
review. See State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 
(1997). Additionally, if it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, then we will 
attempt to ascertain legislative intent. Id. at 733, 947 P.2d at 406. Finally, in construing a 
statute, this Court may examine the language used, the reasom.bleness of the proposed 
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Id." 
As mentioned infra, the legislature in drafting a statute is chHrged with knowledge of 
applicable statutory background and legal precedent. 
c. Transfer Not Important Argument. The Depanment claims ill it's 
Appellant's Brief that the proper analysis is as follows: "The Correct Question L'i Whether The 
Property Of This Estate, Even If Vivian Transferred It, Remains An Asset Subject To Estate 
Recovery." However, that conclusion still must be supported by the definition of "assets" under 42 
U.S.c. J396p(h)(J) which the Department has seriously misinterpreted. 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(J) 
applies a definition for property not received by either spouse. This provision clearly is intended to 
prohibit a Medicaid recipient from transferring property into such an entiTY as a living trust, LLC or 
other entity, or transferring to an insider within five years of eligibility. It does not prohibit a 
transfer over five years prior to the application for Medicaid, so long as a spouse ends up with it. If 
it ends up in an entity to which the federal statute has allowed the states to seek recovery, then it is 
recoverable. We don't have that case here. It is likely, although not pertinent to this case, that a 
person may transfer his or her separate property in any manner it sees fit, so long as it is not into an 
entity in which the Medicaid recipient spouse has a legal interest. 
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The proper statute for assessing if an asset is recoverable is 42 0.8.(;. 1396p(b)(4). It has 
been discussed infra, however to fully rebut that issue disguised by <{he Appellant's Brief, an 
"estate" has been defined by 42 U.S.C J396p(b)(4) as follows: 
"(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other a:,sets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an individual 
to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i)* applies) [*if the Medicaid was improperly granted], 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had anv 
legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through ioint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorsbi111life estate, livingjrust, 
or other arrangement. 
D. Automatic Transfers at Death. Just as Idaho Code 56-218m does not allow a 
life estate to avoid recovery, it is following 42 U.S.C 1396p(b)(4)(B) which specifically allows 
(contrary to the anti-recovery statute) recovery against certain types of attempts to remove assets 
from a Medicaid recipient's estate, such as joint tenancies, life estates, aild those other specifically 
allowed recoveries. Judge Frates properly interpreted the same. The Department criticizes Judge 
Frates' insight into the intricacies of the federal statute, but that critiGism is unfounded as the 
automatically transferred methods are clearly excluded from the anti-recovery portion of the statute 
and thus makes them recoverable. Nothing else, including Emerson's separate property, is 
recoverable under subsection (b)(4)(B). 
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V. 
PERRY DECISION 
The Department was not only having trouble applying the "we have always done it this 'Nay" 
theory of recovery in the case at bar, but it was under attack for it's failure to follow the law 
regarding the same issue as before this court. In Perry, the Department was trying to lien separate 
property. The case was in Ada County, before Judge Beiter. Attached hereto is a copy of the 
Affidavit of Pete Sisson, attorney representing the estate in the Perry decision. It includes the claim 
of lien of the Department, the Notice of Disallowance of the Departments Claim, Petition for 
Allowance of Claim and Objection thereto, Order Disallowing the Claim, i.e. the Perry decision. 
Further, it is counsel's understanding that Judge Bieter allowed attorney's fees and costs against the 
Department in Bieter. 
The Perry decision represents the flaws in the Department's "we have always done it this 
way" theory as to the same issues as presented in the case at bar. Perry was another defeat of the 
Department's theory of recovery, i.e. "we will do it until someone stops us." 
In this case, the flaw is exposed. Neither Pete Sisson nor this aubor knew of the contest of 
each of their respective clients until after the Perry decision was handed down. The Department 
failed to advise the Court, or opposing counsel, of the companion case in Ada County. 
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VI. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-117 
A. The Statute. Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to provide mandatory relief to 
estates which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because a governmental agency acted without 
any basis in law or fact. 
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows: 
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state 
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, 1he court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasolllable 
basis in fact or law." 
In the Memorandum decision, Judge Frates found the Department's interpretation of federal 
law to be unreasonable. Such is all that is required for an award of attomey's fees pursuant to this 
code section. 
B. Case Law. 
This statute has been applied against the State of Idaho regarding it's improper attempt to 
impose its lien under the very same code section, Idaho Code 56-218. See In re the Mmter of 
Estate (~r Elliott which stated as follows: 
" [I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state 
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, ;:he court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. I.e. § 12-117(1)(2004). This Court has held thai the purpose of this statute 
is "two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to 
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens 
defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never 
should ha[ve] made." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549,976 
P.2d 473,475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 
859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a 
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reasonable basis in fact or law, an award of attorney fees under I.C § 12-117 is mandatory. 
Id." 
c. No Facts. Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the present case. The State had no 
law upon which it could make a cogent argument. Furthermore, the facts of the case clearly 
showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property the State was seeking to lien was not community 
property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property of Mrs. \Viggins, but the separate 
property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts upon which the Staff could have been justified 
in bring this lien claim. 
D. On Appeal. The Respondent requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-117. 
VII. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-121 
The Estate was clearly the prevailing party in every issue in this case. The Estate is entitled 
to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121, becam:e of the frivolous and 
unreasonable actions and positions taken by the State. Idaho Code 12-121 confers the broad 
power of the court to "award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing patty or parties" in any civil 
action. An award under this code section requires an analysis of IRep 54(e), which generally 
provides that attorney fees can only be awarded when the Court finds, fro m the facts presented, that 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
By way of synopsis, the following reasons show the State's attempt to lien Emerson's 
separate property was frivolous under Idaho Code 12-121: 
a. Joint Probate: First, the Department claimed that the filing of a joint probate 
rendered it's lien valid against Emerson. The filing of a joint probml~, when the schedules of 
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property show that all the money in the estate was the separate property of Emerson, is completely 
valid. In fact, joint probates are filed all the time, but which decedent owns property is set forth in 
the schedules. The claim that a joint filing makes the State's lien effective is frivolous. Filing a 
joint probate did not transmute Emerson's separate property into community property or into 
property to which the State's lien attaches. 
b. Emerson's Separate Property: Second, the Department claimed that the fact that 
there was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like had an impact on the Court's decision. 
That claim is frivolous. In open Court, as well as by written stipulation, the Department stipulated 
that the property at issue in this case is Emerson's separate property. 
c. Perry: The Department claimed the Perry decision did nJt address the dispositive 
authorities. That claim is frivolous. The Perry decision discussed the appropriate statutes, both 
federal and state and the dispositive case, In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W 2nd 54(Minn. 2008). 
d. Failure to Alert. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, lost the 
identical issue in the Perry case. The State failed to alert the Court or opposing counsel of the Perry 
decision, despite it's obvious relevance to this case. The failure to disdose disposition, relevant 
case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if done by private counsel. The State of Idaho's 
counsel should be held to a higher standard. The State's blatant failure to disclose is relevant to the 
issue of attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121. 
e. The State has denied the obvious intention and effect of it's own stipulation put on 
record before the Magistrate. 
f. The State attempted to convince the Magistrate that the Personal Representative had 
a conflict whereby the Estate could not collect attorney's fees despite Idaho Code 15-3-720 which 
provides in pertinent part: 
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"a personal representative who defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether 
successful or not.... is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and 
disbursements including reasonable+ attorney's fees incurred." 
g. On Appeal. The Respondent requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursurmt to 
Idaho Code 12-121. 
VIII. 
COSTS 
A. Costs Generally: 
In Idaho, "costs" incurred in an action are to be paid as set fortb in the rules of the court. 
Idaho Code 12-101 states as follows: 
"12-101. Costs. Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil trial or proceeding to the 
parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
B. Costs as a Matter of Right. Costs as a matter of right [Lre set forth in lRCP 
54(d)(1)(C). Those costs include service fees. The cost of subpoenaing witnesses is such a cost. 
The Estate is entitled to recover the $20.00 it spent for the subpoena service. The Court on appeal is 
requested an award of those costs, as more fully set forth in Exhibit A to the Affidavit of R. Brad 
Masingill in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed in the C~lse in chief. Further, costs 
on appeal are requested. 
Discretionary costs are also allowed pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(I)(n). The Court on appeal, 
in addition to an award of costs on appeal, is requested to affirm the award of costs for the 
consultation with an elder law expert, Dennis Voorhees, in the amount of $700.00. 
Additionally, IRCP 54( e )(5) provides for attorney's fees as costs. The fees incurred 
to Dennis Voorhees were awarded by the Court and are requested to be further awarded on 
appeal under the not to well known provision of IRCP 54. That awa:rd is applicable to the 
present case by virtue of IRCP 54(e)(8) which provides: 
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"The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to all claims 
for attorney's fees made pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, and to any claim for 
attorney fees made pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any contract, to the extent 
that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be 
inconsistent with such other statute or contract." 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the following facts and law support the position that the Department's 
attempted lien against Emerson's separate property must fail: 
a. The lien filed by the Department only applied to property to which Vivian had an interest 
as of the date of death, and does not apply against Emerson's sf'parate property; and 
h. The Department provided Vivian and Emerson with a Marria ge Settlement Agreement 
which transmuted their community property to their respective separate property; and 
c. The Federal statute clearly provides what the State may recov'~r. It can only recover (i) 
property in Vivian's estate, (ii) property Vivian had an interest in at death, and (iii) 
community property of Emerson; and 
d. Jackman, the only Idaho case dealing with this issue, has concluded that the Department 
can only seek recovery against the community property of the spouse; and 
e. Barg, the most thorough and logical interpretation of the fed,~ral statute, concludes the 
federal statute does not permit recovery from Emerson's separate property; and 
f. All the documents in the Wiggins file, entered into evidencels Exhibit's A through G, 
fail to advise the Wiggins of the remedy the Department nov! seeks against Emerson's 
separate property; and 
g. Transmutation of community property to separate property, only to seek recovery of the 
separate property upon the death of the non-recipient spom;e, is contradictory to the 
Department's position; and 
h. The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,42 V:S.C. 1396p(b)(1), and (4) 
(the federal statute) allows recovery only against the "individmJ's estate; and 
i. Idaho Code 56-218 and Idaho case law makes recovery a:~;ainst Emerson's separate 
property subject to the federal statute, which disallows it; and 
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j. Recovery against Emerson's separate property is not supported by federal law. 
k. In re Perry supports the Magistrate's decision that the Department's lien IS not 
applicable to a non-recipient spouse's separate property. 
1. The Estate is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's £~es and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-117, on the underlying case and on appeal. 
m. The Estate is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's :D~es and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-121, on the underlying case and on appeal. 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court is left with no authority upon which to grant 
the State a lien against Emerson's separate property. Because the law is so clear, it is up to the 
Department to appeal any decision and thereby explain to the Idaho Supreme Court why Idaho's 
statute would be allowed to exceed its federal mandate. 
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Respectfully s ~7/tted, 
1JJj~---,,---it_~{}Jl_, ~. Brad MasIngill 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
ill. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ~ day of October, 2010, a tme and correct copy of 
the foregoing Respondent's Brief was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon 
to the following: 
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Lynn Wi1gins 
1520 W. 2" Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
R. BRAD MASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone #1(208)414-0665 
Fax #1(208)414-0490 
Email: bmasingiUla).hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE STATE OF ID \.[10 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTO''l 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS 
Deceased. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: S5. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT Of 
PETER C. SISSii)N 
BRENDA 
PETER C. SISSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am legal counsel for the Personal Representative ("PR") of the Estate in" 
The Matter of George D. Perry, Case No. CV IE 0905214, Fourth kdicial District Count 
of Ada., State of Idaho (,"Perry Estate"). I make this affidavit based ml my personal 
knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit.\ is a true and correct 
copy of the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department") Claim 
Against Estate filed in the Perry Estate on April 13,2009. 
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3. The PR filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim on ltne 2. 2009, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. 
4. The Department then filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim on June 11th, 
2009. a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorpcrated herein as 
Exhibit C. 
5. In response to the Department's Petition for Allowanc:: afClaim the PR 
filed an Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim on June 23, 2009. a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit n. 
6. The matter came before the Honorable Christopher M. Bieter, Magistrate 
Judge, on February 26, 2010, for oral argument. Judge Bieter issued lis Order 
Disallowing Claim on March 10.2010, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit E. 
Funher your affiant sayeth naught. 
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Exhibit A 
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TIORNEY GENERAL 
STATE Of IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chiet: Division of Human Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
(goinsJ@dhw-idahoogovJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICr OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A 01\ 
rN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(I.C. § 15-3-804) 
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"), 
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This 
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of m{;dical assistance paid 
on behalf ofthe Decedent's spouse, MARTHA 1. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. The 
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA 1. 
PERR Y in the amount of SI06,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent mat the Claimant is 
CLAIM j\GAINST EST A TE - I 
Y:\MR{o .. _&I<:'J>m-yM\f"&o.wpd 
obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf of the Dececent's spouse, it reserves 
the right to supplement its claim. 
IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Departnerlt's right to establish 
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the decedent's spou;;e survives, there is no 
demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any 
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been 
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will Dot object to distribution of the estate 
to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that. before any other 
distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the furure paymeJlt of the Department's 
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81O(b)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to 
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect the 
eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordan~::e with Idaho Code 
§ 56-218(2). 
DATED this ~ day of April, 2009. 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and statcs; That [am the Claimant's 
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's ~tate and know the 
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated thereir: ar,~ true and correct. 
LIE RAICHART, Parllegal 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE -2 
Y:'\MRC~"",~hl\CkD,"';>d 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of AIlril, 2009. 
Commission Expires: g; --I tf --;;0 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
TIlE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the L3 day of April, 
2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
c/o PETER C SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE 10 83702 
ADA COUNTY CLERK 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE 10 83702 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3 
Y:IMIU-ascs'f.sulcli'CflyMIC.tD-wpd 
~/W>J., 0 LC~ 
Marche e Premo, LegE!1 ASSistant 
Division of Human Services 
Exhibit B 
Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jetferson Street 
Boise. Idaho 8) 702 
Tel: (108) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE Of IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MA TIER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 
(I.e. 15-3-806) 
TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF IlEAL TH AND WELFARE. Claimant. 
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitk-d estate hereby disallows 
your claim for $ t 06.25) .08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments 
made on behalf of Decedent's spouse) presented on April 13.2009. Claimant's reliance upon 
I. C. § 56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which. at any ti me. had been the 
community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had heen the property of 
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery allo\\'cd by federal law. is preempted by 
federal law. and is hereby disallowed. 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - I 
File 1#11-197 
Claimant"s demand that "before any other distribution of the estal.t~. adequate provision be 
made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.e. § 15-3-81O(b)(2)" is also 
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim. nor will 
they be upon Decedent's spouse' s death. 
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition for allowanec in the above named 
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned. within sixty (60) days after the 
mailing of this norice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being 
forever barred. 
DATED this ~ day of June. 2009. 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
: 55. 
County of Ada 
~ ,f4~<_zt?k ~ ~BARA K. McCORlvHCK 
Personal Representative 
On this ~ day of June. 2009. before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick. 
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name 
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she e',ecuted the same. 
ITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in 
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
Residing at Ald7i1;?JJ- . Idaho 
My commission expires :2 -1£ ' .. Mil. 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
File #OJI-197 
Exhibit C 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Street., Suite B 
P.O. Box. 83720 
Boise, Idaho 8372()"'()()36 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
ru:c'E.\VED ,.= 
jUN , ~ 1Uoo 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW the State ofidaho, DepartmentofHeaJth and Welfare (Department), claimant 
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806(b), petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) bmefits on behalf of the 
decedent's surviving spouse, MARWA J. PERRY in the amount of $109,464.23 to date; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement of the Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal 
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15, 2009; 
PETITION FOR ALLOW ANeE OF CLAIM - 2 
.. 
, 
3. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and paymcl'J should be allowed for 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent' s surviving spouse to the fullest 
extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court (:[Iter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009. 
~;.--
Deputy Attorney Genera 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETmON 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the U' day of 
June, 2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
cIa PETER C SISSON 
SISSON & SISSON 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE,ID 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
~C!t(J.Wh Q2:q Q 
Marche Ie Premo, Legal Assistant 
Exhi'bit D 
Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SiSSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise. idaho 83702 
Tel: (20g) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI~;TRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0: ADA 
IN THE MA TIER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
OBJECTION TO PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW. Barbara K. McConnick. the Personal Representative of the above-named 
t.!state. by and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson. and hereby objects to the Petition for 
Allowance of Claim tiled herein by the State ofIdaho. Department of Health mod Welfare. 
This Objection is based on the Memorandum in Support of Objectiorl to Petition for 
AlIO\\"ancc of Claim and affidavil(s) in support to be tiled in this matter. Oral argument is 
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10. 
1009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter alter that date. 
DATED this &01" June. 2009. ,. ~~-L.~ ___ _ 
I hTER (. SISSON 
Attorney for Personal Represen tative 
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net 
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only signiricant asset of 
George's estate. 
On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on 
June 4,2009, Ms. McConnick filed a notice of disallowance of the cla1im. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009. the Department filed its Petition for Allowance 
of Claim which is now before the court. 
ll. Issues Presented. 
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid henefits that it has 
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeru; of the sale of the 
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the 
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory change!! in 1993), it may 
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership inten::st from the 
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the 
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal. to Martha's 
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and 
neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the 
Department may recover any amount. 
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-:6-218( 1) which 
provides: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(I) Except where exempted or waived 
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant t(, this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if an):. for such aid paid to either or both: 
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(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate wiH be authorized 
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section 
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(emphasis added) 
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of 
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. lacilman 132 Idaho 
213 (1998).2 lackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the 
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recovelf appropriate 
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate 
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an 
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of wh:ich, the court 
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate. 
lackman does not directly address the critical question for our c;,lSe: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid re.:;ipient's interest 
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the bme of the 
recipient's death. 3 
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of 
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.c. 1396p{b)(1) 
provides: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that tlite State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
2 In ie Estate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to .recover Medicaid benefits from the 
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's daimwas unimely. 
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: '1'he record 
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property !!2 the time of Hildor's 
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefO! e be part of Hilder's 
"estate" that 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover I nd apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments." ld. at 216. (emphasis added) 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or olcler when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall see:}: adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, 
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4): 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(8) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real an!! ,personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or iI:tterest at the time 
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets cionveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
(emphasis added) 
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p{h) contains general definition provisions: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes 2111 income and 
resources of the individual and of th~individual's spouse, including any income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but 
does not recei ve because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrati ve body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the indi vidual or such individual's 
spouse. 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because 
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient'; spouse; 42 U.S.C. 
l396p(b)( 4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" ard 42 U .S.C. 
1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The 
court cannot accept this interpretation. 
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of 
Winz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid 
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the esta!): of Vema Witt, 
Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and 
"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Claren,::e Wirtz to 
Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery 
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpreta.tion of the 
tenn "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota. court in Wirtz 
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the fest of the section. 
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion 
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfe1rs and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of 
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding 
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic 
nature not any possible transfer. 
The case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more 
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not 
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale 
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estlte at all emanates 
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the 
Medicaid recipient Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the 
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the defin ition of "estate" for 
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal Jaw clearly limits that 
expansion to assets in which the recipiem had an interest at tile time of her death. 
ld at 71._{emphasis added) 
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Ill. Conclusion. 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of propeny 
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of 
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint 
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any 
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not 
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for AHow:mce of claim is 
denied. 
DATED This 10th day of March, 2010. 
CHRISTOPHER M. BIErER 
Hon. Christopher M. Bieter 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed. by United States Mail, one copy of the Order Disallowing Claim, pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envl~lopes 
addressed as follows: 
PETER SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON STREET 
BOISE 10 83702 
W. COREY CARlWRIGHT 
DEPUTY A TIORNEY GENERAL 
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PO BOX 83720 
BOISE 10 83720-0036 
Date: 10 March, 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District 
Ada County. ldah 
DEBR; By ________ -=~~-
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHAT IS NOT IN EVIDENCE 
Without citation to anything in the record, the personal representative advances "facts" 
that are completely unsupported in the record. For example, the persom~l representative states: 
The transmutation agreement determined the amount of spend-down required of 
Vivian before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two 
after the transmutation agreement was executed, the Department determined that 
Vivian had spent down her separate property and because she had no interest in 
any other property, including Emerson's, Vivian was granted Medicaid eligibility. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 1. The personal representative goes on to say: 
The State supervised the spend-down of Vivian's only assets. The State made the 
determination that Vivian had spent down all her assets and by YTIue thereof 
qualified for Medicaid. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 2. These "facts" are nothing more than surmise and conjecture by the 
personal representative. There is absolutely no evidence that the "transmutation agreement" if it 
existed, "determined the amount of spend-down required," or that the D:epartment determined 
"that Vivian had spent down her separate property" "[0 ]ver the course of a year or two after the 
transmutation agreement was executed," or that "[t]he State supervised the spend-down." None 
of this is in the record. At best, it can be inferred from the record that tl:.e Department determined 
that Vivian was "over-resource," i.e., had too much money to qualifY for Medicaid, and notified 
the couple of how much would have to be "spent-down" to qualifY for l'Aedicaid. It can also be 
inferred that, at a later date, Vivian was determined to be eligible for M ;dicaid benefits which 
would normally require her to have less than $2,000 of her own funds. There is nothing in the 
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record to suggest that the Department ever was presented with a marriag;e settlement agreement 
or "transmutation agreement" as the personal representative calls it. Instead, it may have simply 
been told that one existed. or assumed that one had been executed. The Denartment 
" 1. 
acknowledges that ifthis is so, it would have been an error on the part ofthe case worker. 
The personal representative further asserts as "facts" that the Department "participated" 
in the "transmutation agreement" (Respondent's Brief, p. 4), that the Department "did not inform 
either Vivian or Emerson ... of it's intention to come after" the estate property (pp. 4 and 27), 
that it was the "Department's own actions which transmuted the community property" (p. 12), 
and that the "Department provided Vivian and Emerson with a Marriage Settlement Agreement" 
(p. 27). None of these "facts" is supported by the record and are, at best, speculation by the 
personal representative. The only evidence that a marriage settlement a,§;reement even existed is 
the Department's stipulation that it treated Vivian "as though" she had one.! Assuming that one 
existed at all, there is no evidence as to who drafted it, what its terms w,:re, when it was signed, 
or by whom, or whether it met the formalities required by Idaho Code § 32-917. There is no 
evidence that the Department provided it, or had anything to do with it at all. There is no 
evidence that the Department supervised or participated in it. Nor can these "facts" be inferred 
from the Department's stipulation that "the department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, 
as thoug,.1} they had a marriage settlement agreement." Tr. p. 4, 11. 21-23 (underline added). 
JThe personal representative complains that the Department is "back[ing] out" of its stipulation, (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 8), and further that the Department "denied the obvious intent and effect" of its stipulation (p. 25). The 
Department continues to stand by what it stipulated to. It merely disagrees with the wild ;:xtrapolations drawn by the 
personal representative to the Department's stipulation that "the department treated the ccuple, Emerson and Vivian, as 
though they had a marriage settlement agreement." Tf. p. 4, 11. 21-23; see also Appellant's Brief, § V. 
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Further, the personal representative tells the court, as if it were e~tab1ished fact, that its 
witness was going to say that a "substantial amount" of marriage settlement agreements were lost 
by the Department (Respondent's Brief, p. 9), then goes on to refer to the Department's "[g]iven 
propensity to lose written agreements," while no such thing is in eviden.:e.2 Id. The personal 
representative then claims that the Department must not have told the decedents about future 
recovery because there is no document affirmatively stating as much in the Department's case 
file. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. There is no requirement in law or rule tix a written estate 
recovery advisory to be given Medicaid applicants.3 But if, as the personal representative seems 
to think, there were such a requirement, the personal representative apparently believes the 
Department's records are one hundred percent complete on every matter except the marriage 
settlement agreement. 
Finally, the personal representative falsely states that "[t]he Perry 'Magistrate, however, 
found in favor of the Perrl estate on its motion for attorney's fees and costs." Respondent's 
2The personal representative implies that the Department only stipulated that it treated Vivian as though she had 
a marriage settlement agreement when confronted with what his witness was going to say. Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9. 
The personal representative may have forgotten that the Department assisted him in searching for a marriage settlement 
agreement by voluntarily providing the entire case file, including narratives, and stipulating to its admission into the 
record. There was no reason for the Department to deny that it had acted as though there 'Nere a marriage settlement 
agreement, but the Department was never willing to stipulate that such an agreement actually existed. Moreover, the 
claimed "propensity to lose written agreements" was never part of any stipulation. 
3The personal representative leaves the court with the impression that the deced.;;nts didn't know that the 
Department would seek to recover their assets after their deaths. However, neither the Dt;partment's ordinary advice 
regarding estate recovery, nor any lack of notice is in evidence or inferrable from the record. Even in the unlikely event 
the decedents were not advised of estate recovery after their deaths, as stated by the Supreme Court in Ada County 
Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 371, 179 P.3d 323,334 (2008), "Our entire legal 
system is based upon the principle that persons are charged with constructive knowledge ufthe statutes and laws" quoting 
Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,970,703 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1985). Moreover, ,here is no explanation as to how 
the decedents would have paid the $272,134.68 paid by the Department had they declined Medicaid since there was only 
$78,659.44 left in their estates at their deaths. 
4In the matter o/George D. Perry, Ada County Case # CV IE 0905214. As discussed below, the magistrate's 
disallowance of the Department's claim in Perry is on appeal to the District Court, Judge Kathryn Sticklen, presiding. 
Oral argument is scheduled for November 18,2010. 
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p. 3. Likewise, the personal representative states: "Further, it is ccul1se!'s understanding 
that Judge Bieter allowed attorney's fees and costs against the Department in Bieter (sic)." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 22. It would have been a simple matter to check the record in Perry to 
discover the falseness of these claims. No costs or attorney fees were awarded in Perry. 
The personal representative is also fond of quoting things the Department never said. For 
example, the personal representative states, and puts the statement in quotes as if stated by the 
Department: "we have always done it this way". Respondent's Brief, pp. 6, 13, and 22. On page 
22, the personal representative adds, in quotations, the Department saying, ''we will do it until 
someone stops us." Of course, the Department has never made any such statements, and if they 
are intended as satire, they are of the crudest form. 
Similarly, the personal representative states that "[t]he Department has commented that 
they have taken other citizen's separate property in cases similar to this one, but no one has 
objected." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Again, if this is intended as a caricature or satire, it is of 
such a crude form that any actual statement by the Department it is supposed to represent is 
unidentifiable, and becomes merely a smear. 
II. 
REGARDING "CLAIMS" AND "LIENS" 
The personal representative frequently refers to the Department's claim in this matter as a 
"lien." He then cites State Dept. o/Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P3d 
905 (2008) for the proposition that, "[a] state Medicaid plan must comj:ly with section 1396p, 
which generally prohibit's states from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 17. However, Hudelson (a decision favorable tc the Department) was a 
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casualty case under Idaho Code § 56-209b, not Idaho Code § 56-218, and therefore involved a 
Medicaid recipient. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) provides, in part: 
(a) Imposition of lien against property of an individual en account 
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan 
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of any :l:1dividual prior to 
his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under 
the State plan, except .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(I) (underline added). While it has little real use where there is no real 
property involved, such as in this case, it is the current practice of the DC'Partment to file 
electronic liens in the office of the Secretary of State in estate recovery cases. These liens are 
authorized by Idaho Code § 56-218(6) which permits the Department to file a lien "against the 
property of any estate subject to a claim." In this case, the electronic liens were filed November 
17,2009, well after the death of both decedents. Therefore, section 1396p does not restrict the 
liens filed here. 
More importantly, this is not a lien foreclosure case. The Department has made no 
attempt to foreclose its Medicaid liens. Rather, this matter involves a pmbate claim against the 
decedent's estate. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides for this estate claim, which is distinct from 
any lien. In fact, Idaho Code § 56-218(6), specifically states: "Failure tn file a notice oflien does 
not affect the validity of claims made pursuant to this section." Therefcre, the Department's 
claim against these decedents' estate stands independently from its Medcaid liens. 
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III. 
THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE VERSUS COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY IS A RED HERRING IN THIS CASE. 
The personal representative complains bitterly that the Department is seeking recovery of 
property that, while formerly the decedents' community property, had h;;come the separate 
property of Emerson Wiggins before his death. See e.g. Respondent's Brief, pp. 2 and 4. The 
fact that the estate property had become Emerson Wiggins's separate property, however, is 
completely irrelevant for several reasons: First, the property of the last to die of a couple will 
always be separate property; Second, Idaho Code § 56-218(1) makes no distinction as to whether 
estate property had been separate or community property; and Third, the Medicaid "debt" is a 
debt chargeable against the spouse's separate property. 
A. 11 a Joint Probate. the Estate Property Is Always the Separate Pr)perty of the Last to Die. 
This is a joint probate. Idaho Code § 15-3-111 provides for join: probate and states as 
follows: 
15-3-111. Joint probate on death of survivor of marriage dissolved by 
death - In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of 
either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property 
of the decedent by will, law, or both. and the survivor died before any 
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose 
death occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a 
single proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate 0 f the spouse 
whose death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 5-3-108, Idaho 
Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The 
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding ~hall contain a 
statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is basee, b addition to all 
other statements required by this code to be made therein. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-111 (emphasis added). The very definition of a join t probate is a case where 
the survivor is entitled to all of the property of the decedent, by whatever means. In other words, 
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where joint probate is authorized, such as in this case, all of the couple's property has become the 
separate property of the survivor. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides, in ~\art, for claims in joint 
probate cases such as this: 
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint pre bate will be 
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under 
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
( c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made 
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, if the estate is 
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection 
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate ofthe first 
deceased spouse. or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by 
subsection (5) of this section. no claim shall be required until the tL.'TIe provided 
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1)(b) and (c) (underline added). These sections recognize that under joint 
probate, the property of the first deceased spouse passes to the survivor. There is only one estate 
in a joint probate. That estate always consists of the separate property cfthe survivor. 
The personal representative argues that the Statement ofPurpost! or the 2004 amendments 
to Idaho Code § 56-218 suggests that recovery is only to be made from:he community property 
of the Medicaid spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 11. But that's not what it says: 
The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218 
to clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive 
the Medicaid recipient in order for the department to file a claim a~ainst the 
community property of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 13525 (2004) (emphasis added). Since, as noted above, the property in 
the estate of the survivor will always be his separate property by operat on of law, the reference 
to community property must be to the property that had been community property prior to death. 
Importantly, the Statement of Purpose does not refer to the community property of the Medicaid 
spouse, but the community property of the non-Medicaid spouse. The reason for this is clear 
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when it is understood that the non-Medicaid spouse's estate is only obligated for property which 
had been community property or the property of the Medicaid spouse: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * * 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited 1:0 L~e value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October L 1993, communitv 
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate propert'j, and jointly 
owned property. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). 
This is why the personal representative is wrong about what happens "when two older 
folks marry." Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Contrary to the assertions of the personal 
representative, the Department does not recover from property which hes always been the 
separate property of the non-Medicaid spouse. When a couple marries late in life, bringing their 
separate property with them, they are not obligated for the Medicaid debt of the spouse, from 
property which they retain as their separate property. That is what IDAP A 16.03.09.900.20 does, 
it limits the Department's recovery to property which had been the couf Ie's community property, 
or the property of the Medicaid recipient. 5 
B. Idaho Code § 56-218 Makes No Distinction Between Separate Fro"oerty and Propem: 
Which Had Been Community Property. 
The personal representative complains that: 
The Department argues in its Brief on appeal for the firs"; time, (and we 
hereby move to strike the same) that it does not matter if the prcperty it is seeking 
a lien against is now separate property, so long as it was commt:nity property at 
some time in the past. 
5This provision implements the intent of Congress to track the resources of the .;:ouple, including assets 
excluded for eligibility, for later recovery. See discussion in Appellant's Brief, ll(B), ad section IV, below. 
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Respondent's Brief, p. 12. However, the Department's position has always been that whether 
Vivian transferred her property voluntarily to Emerson or whether the property became 
Emerson's bX operation oflaw doesn't make any difference. See e.g. Department's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (filed about Deceml:er 1, 2009), where the 
Department states: 
Idaho law clearly permits the Department to recover from this estate, regardless of 
whether it had become Emerson's separate property through transfers from Vivian 
or upon Vivian's death or both. The characterization of Emersofl 's property as 
"separate" makes no difference in this case. 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance, p. 6. 
The reason the Department made, and continues to make this po int is because Idaho Code 
§ 56-218 simply permits the Department to recover from the estate oftre rvIedicaid recipient's 
spouse and contains no limitation with regard to the source of the property: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federallaw6 medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). The only limitation is that found in IDAP A 
16.03.09.900.20, discussed above. There is no ambiguity here. The le~;islature meant what it 
said. 
The personal representative contends that section 56-218 is ambiguous because it doesn't 
define "estate ofthe spouse." Respondent's Brief, pp. 10 and 13. It is difficult to imagine how 
6In quoting this language, the personal representative states that "the federal st:::.tute must first exempt any action 
by the state." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. The personal representative seems to be saying; that Idaho Code § 56-218 can 
only be applied where the Department can find some exemption in federal law. Actually, the personal representative has 
this backward. As Idaho Code § 56-218 shows, the burden is on the personal representa:::ve to show that there is some 
federal provision that exempts or waives recovery here. 
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the legislature could have been more clear. "Spouse" is clearly defined in Idaho's marriage laws. 
"Estate" is clearly defined in Idaho Code § 56-218(4): 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other asset~; in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or a:;sign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). There is no missing definition. 
Similarly, the personal representative argues that "[h]ad the Idal:.o legislature have (sic) 
intended to apply Idaho Code 56-218(1) to the separate property of the Hon-recipient 
spouse, it could have so stated." Respondent's Brief, p. 19. However, isn't it more accurate to 
say that if the legislature had intended to carve out an exception to the simple "estate of the 
spouse" language, it could have so stated? There is nothing in the law, or its history, to suggest 
that the legislature didn't mean exactly what it said: the Department may recover from the estate 
of the spouse. 
The personal representative speaks dismissively of what it calls "once upon a time 
community by now separate property," (Respondent's Brief, p. 12), ane further states that the 
Department is trying to "create a new kind of separate property" (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). 
However, it is not the Department, but the personal representative that is trying to make a 
distinction based on the characterization of the estate property as community or separate. From 
the Department's point of view, this is not a distinction found in the la']!. The statute merely 
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states the Department may recover from the estate of the spouse. It is the personal representative 
who is trying to impose a requirement the legislature did not. 
C. The Department's Medicaid Claim Is the Type of Debt That Is C~hargeable to Separatie 
Property. 
It should not be a surprise that the legislature permitted a broad recovery that would 
include property that had become the separate property of the non-Medkaid spouse. Idaho 
recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code § 32-901 states 
that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and 
support." In the case of Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife entered into 
a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover fron the husband. The 
question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract for lodging 
entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affirmative: 
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that 
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and 
not upon any implied liability of his. 
* * * 
The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promis e to pay, while the 
husband's liabilitv for a necessary. such as board and room. grows out of and is 
incident to his marital duties. and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife 
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to 
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith 
of her own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that 
manner. If the creditor parts with his goods on the faith of the wife's promise to 
pay, he is entitled to recover against her if the debt is not paid. The fact that she is 
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband of his duty and 
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other h~1!ld, to have the 
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be 
relieved ofthat obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although 
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the 
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt. 
* * * 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11 Z;\MRCases\Estate\ Wi ,:gins V\D Coun\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the d(~bt" and that a 
good cause of action is stated against him. 
Edminston, 13 Idaho at _,92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature's choice in Idaho 
Code § 56-218, of making one spouse's estate liable for medical expen~';s paid on behalf ofthe 
other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that rone couple's money 
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimb~lrsed, can the remainder 
be distributed to the heirs.7 
IV. 
RECOVERY OF ASSETS SUCH AS THOSE IN THIS CASE 
IS A PLANNED AND ANTICIPATED PART OF 
PROVIDING MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY. 
A. Federal Medicaid Law Anticipates the Assets of Both Spouses V/ill Be Obligated for the 
Medicaid Debt. 
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive 8 While outsiders may 
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fa~t a joint state-federal 
program. Federal statutes provide a framework and the states then enact their own laws to 
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal fimncial participation. 
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike socill security disability or 
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program 
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resOJt. 
7While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inherit IDee, this program benefits them 
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for 
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, an·j therefore, the heirs are more 
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient. 
8Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of "labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost 
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724,727 (2nd CiT. 1976). 
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Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those ofee most limited 
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more theL'l $2,000 in available 
resources to qualify for assistance. 
'Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needS" nursing home care, the 
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and 
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can 
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse9 can retain the resources needed for his support. 
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restricticns are imposed on both 
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets 
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid 
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p( c). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualif/ for Medicaid, and 
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the 
courts. Idaho Code §§ 56-227 and 56-218(2). 
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress 
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers i:1 response to widespread 
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded 
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset translers. The legislative 
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a coup:.e's assets be traced to 
facilitate recovery: 
9In Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with 
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the 
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution. 
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Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The progral!l must identify 
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility nurposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services, 
and other specified long-tenn care services. The program must promptly ascertain 
when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and n!ust provide for 
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on beh:!lf of the 
individual for long-tenn care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse. The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).10 
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the sole 
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(c). The federal law uses tenns such as "for the sole benefit of the; individual's spouse." 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is detennined, all of the assets of both spouses 
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community 
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAP A 
16.03.05.735 to .752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure 
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that 
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the 
IOAfter citing some of the legislative history ofIdaho Code § 56-218 (Respondent's Brief, p. 11), the personal 
representative contends, on the one hand, that legislative history is irrelevant (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). Th,e 
Department believes these passages explaining the intent of Congress are valuable in navigating the compleXity of 
Medicaid law. The personal representative has, further, asked the court to strike part of the Department's argument. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 13. The personal representative has offered no authority or argument for striking the 
Department's argument. 
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contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse and provide 
for the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all. II 
B. Estate Recovery Is Part ofthe Whole Process of Medicaid for th~: Elderly. 
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate 
recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate 
found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b). Of course, these enactments 
are all related and support the legislative intent quoted in the house repol1, above. The intent was 
to prevent the impoverishment of the at-home spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery 
of the couple's assets after both had passed away and no longer needed them. 
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery of the assets 
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal 
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more 
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property 
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors frOIn the probate estate. 
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other 
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any othel: real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such i:tssets conveyed to 
I I There are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here. 
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a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or otht~r arrangement 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). 
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly. 
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the 
trade-off is that once the needs of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be repaid into 
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the neleds of others similarly 
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the non-dependent 
heirs of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the 
elderly couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed. 
C. It Is Not Inconsistent for the Department to Allow Couples to Divide Their Property 
Through a Marriage Settlement Agreement and Then Recover after the J)eath of Both. 
The personal representative claims that it is inconsistent for the Department to permit 
couples to divide their assets and then to seek recovery from both estates following their deaths. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 4 and 27. However, there is nothing inconsistent in any of this. The 
division of assets at eligibility time is for the purpose of protecting the ability of the non-
Medicaid spouse to live in the community. Once that need is met and both spouses have died, 
there is nothing inconsistent with recovering the couple's assets to reimburse, to the extent 
possible, the Medicaid program so the needs of other needy couples may be met 
What would be inconsistent would be for a public welfare program to pay the expenses of 
a needy person so that her non-dependent heirs can reap a windfall l2 by receiving the assets that 
12n is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medical bills, their inheritance 
would have been consumed by those costs. 
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could have paid for her care. 13 Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the 
poor,14 that it "should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth fi'om nursing home 
patients to their non-dependent children,,,15 and that the state should "track resources (whether or 
not excluded for eligibility purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse,,,16 one can only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what 
it said; (2) Congress made a huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is 
wrong. 
v. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UF\ON TWO 
\VORDS, READ OUT OF CONTEXT, IN THE FEDERAL 
MEDICAID LAW. 
The personal representative contends that the words "individual's estate" found in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) and (4), mean that recovery cannot be made from the estate of the spouse. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 14 and 21. This simplistic argument, however, ignores both the plain 
language and the context of the statute. 
Subsection (b)( 4) of section 1396p defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estat,(;", with respect 
to a deceased individual-
13The personal representative states that the Department has "the purpose of paying itself." Respondent's Brief, 
p.4. Perhaps he has forgotten that the Department paid $272,134.68 and seeks to recover $18,659.44. The Department 
is not profiting from this arrangement. 
l"H.R. Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985), cited in Cohen v. CommissionerofDiv. of 
Medical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769 (1996). 
15H.R. Rep. No. l05(II), lOOth Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
857,896,1987 WI. 61566, p. 31). 
16H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,1993), Section 5112. 
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(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, 
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i)17 applies), any 
other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a sllrvivor, heir. or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other_anangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual';, estate, for purposes of 
section 1396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate18 and includes "other 
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important 
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is de1ined in subsection (h) of 
section 1396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient: 
(h) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "assets". with respect to an individuat, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual' ~~llouse, 
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's 
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or admini~;trative body, 
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or 
such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative 
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or 
such individual's spouse. 
17The personal representative incorrectly states that the reference to (l)(C)(i) is to Medicaid improperly granted. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 21. However, this actually refers to those who receive benefits under a long-term care insurance 
policy. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)( C)(i). Such policies are not relevant here and this reference was added by the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Medicaid improperly paid is always recoverable. 
18See also Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, 
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which ccntained property placed there by 
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoid;.ng estate recovery). 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes 
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property trangferred to the spouse 
from the Medicaid recipient. 
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes. of section 1396p, 
includes the property of the spouse. 
The personal representative asserts that "[i]f Congress intended the separate property 
estate of the non-Medicaid spouse to available for recovery, it would have been included in the 
language of the statute." Respondent's Brief, p. 16. However, the marital property laws of the 
many states are distinct. Only a handful of states are "community prope:iy" states. Thus, 
Congress made no distinctions relating to state marital property laws. Rather, it attempted to 
paint in broad strokes and create a framework within which each state would be able to enforce 
its own law, policies and marital property principles. Idaho has set forth its law in Idaho Code § 
56-218. This section is entirely consistent with federallaw. 19 
VI. 
MINNESOTA'S IN RE ESTATE OF BARG CASE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE IN IDAHO. 
A. Only If Minnesota's In re Estate ofBarg Case Is Followed in Id;lho Is the Existence of a 
Marriage Settlement Agreement Important. 
While the court below did not cite In re Estate o/Barg, 752 N.Vl.2d 52 (2008) cert. 
denied by Vos v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009), the personal representative relied on this case 
19The personal representative states that "State statutes are trumped by the fedemllegislation." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 17. However, the federal law relating to estate recovery has not materially changed since the Idaho Supreme 
Comt's approval of spousal recovery in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jad man, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 
(1998). 
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below and again relies on it in Respondent's Brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 16. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Barg said that Minnesota could only recover from property that was owned by 
the Medicaid recipient at death. That is why the personal representative: raises the Barg case 
here. If the Barg case were the law in Idaho, the issue of whether there was a marriage 
settlement agreement becomes relevant. Under Barg, if there was a transfer during life, the 
transferred property is forever out of reach of estate'recovery. However" if there was no transfer, 
then the property is recoverable. 
The personal representative asserts that the Department was frivolous because it "claimed 
that the fact that there was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like had an impact on the 
Court's decision." Respondent's Brief, p. 25. However if, as the personal representative 
contends, Barg must be followed in Idaho, then the lack of a marriage settlement agreement is 
important because if there is no agreement, Barg does not stop recovery of this estate. It is for 
this very reason that the personal representative both adamantly advances the existence of the 
never-found marriage settlement agreement and the application of Barg in Idaho. Only if both 
are true is the Department's claim barred. 
As discussed in Appellant's Brief, § IV, the Department has always set forth Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2d 6 (1998) as establishing 
the validity of spousal recovery in Idaho. The personal representative c~mtends that "[i]fthe 
Jackman court had been privy to the analysis of the Barg case, it is likey the flawless logic of 
that decision would have found its way into the Idaho Supreme Court's decision." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 16. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court was interpreting\1innesota law, and it did 
not even consider the issues the Idaho Supreme Court found critical in Jackman. In Barg the 
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Minnesota Supreme Court found that Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially 
preempted by federal law. As discussed in Appellant's Brief, § IV, the.!ackman case relied on 
the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, the Barg holding and the Jackman 
holding, in which each state's highest court is interpreting its own law, :2Te not necessarily 
inconsistent. 20 
B. The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in JackInan. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found the federal definition of assets, then in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)21, important in its analysis. The original decision ::;tated the following: 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as 
well as from the estate ofthe surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "aU real and 
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. § 
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include he' income and 
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not 
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's 
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the 
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the 
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)(B). Jackman's 
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on beha:.f of Hildor and 
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from reccvering the balance 
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
20This was recognized by the Solicitor General in its brief before the United St~ tes Supreme Court on 
Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari: "The different results reached by the North Dakota Sllpreme Court and the court 
below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations offederal Medicaid law, but only different views of 
when, under state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse." Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14. Brief available online at: 
www.scotusblog.comlwp/wp .. .J06/08-603 _ cert _amicus _ us.pdf 
21Now 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(l). 
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Reply Brief (February 3, 201 0)) (underline 
added).22 On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their original holding except to 
recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the "assets" definition of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1)(B) became effective: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendm~nts to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1). "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C, § 15-1-201(15}. 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property trcffismuted by the 
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added).23 Th,~ Supreme Court did not 
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1). In fact, by necessary implication, it 
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) the transferred 
assets would have been part ofHildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery. 
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000): 
22-rhe personal representative refers to this document as "an unsigned and unfil~d draft." Respondent's Brief, p. 
18. The exhibit, however, contains the certification of the clerk of the Supreme Court on page 5. The document is 
offered, not as precedent, but to provide context for the court's ultimate ruling in the Jadman case. 
23 At p. 18 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites "Elder Law. \nswer Book" for its 
interpretation of the holding in Jackman. The Department submits that Idaho courts and attorneys, when fully informed, 
are better able to interpret Jackman than an out-of-state editor of an advocate's handbook 
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Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and 
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Vema Wirtz through "other 
arrangement. " 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's s.r:0use, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body" with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of 
on or before August 10, 1993). 
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal property, 
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his 
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement." 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to 
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the f{~deral statute and 
concluded: 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory rrovisions, in light 
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the nel~dy, reveals a 
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical 
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse 
dies. 
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna 'Nirtz before 
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's 
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever 
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W .2d 162, 166 
(Minn.Ct.App.l999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which 
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It do~s not provide that 
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased 
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added). 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider th.e effect of this important 
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jaclanan and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the 
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts. 
C. The Holding in In re Estate ofBarg Isn't Even Good Law in Mirmesota Any More. 
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to 
other state supreme court decisions such as Jaclanan and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that 
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding orits supreme court in 
Barg. The Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in 2009 (Exhibit D to 
Reply Brief (February 3,2010)), for the express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. These 
changes are now codified at Minnesota Statutes, 256B.l5.24 This legislltion makes it clear that a 
Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owni~d at any time during 
marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is 
exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jaclanan. 
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not 
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's Jaw permits recovery 
under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not necessaril y inconsistent with Barg. 
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made irrelevant by 
a change in Minnesota law. 
24This statute can be found online at: https:llwww.revisor.mn.gov!statutesl?id=256B.15 
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D. The Personal Representative Incorrectly Limits the Federal Defi:gition of Assets. 
The personal representative claims that the Department "seriously misinterpret[s]" 42 
U .S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) and states that the definition only applies to "property not received by 
either spouse." Respondent's Brief, p. 20. While the definition includeB property not received, it 
also includes the property of both spouses: 
(h) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, 
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's 
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative bod:,!, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (emphasis added). 
E. The Case of Estate of Bruce, Cited by the Personal Representati ve, Supports the 
Department's Position. 
The personal representative cites the case of In re Estate of Bruee, 260 S.W.3d 398 
(Mo.App. 2008)25 and argues: 
Missouri's claim was disallowed based on the same rationale a~ in the case at bar. 
Bruce makes the very same distinction as Respondent and Judg'~ Frates as to 
subsection (b) ( 4)B, as well as agreeing with Respondent's interpretation of 
subsection (b)( 4)A. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 17. The Estate of Bruce case, however, is contrary to the claims of the 
personal representative and supports the Department's position in this ease. 
25Copy attached as appendix hereto. 
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In Estate of Bruce, Minnie Bruce received Medicaid benefits from October 1990 until her 
death in 2002. Orville Bruce, her husband, died in 2005 and his estate was liquidated to $97,000. 
The state of Missouri sought reimbursement for Medicaid costs paid on behalf of Minnie, from 
Orville's estate, in the amount of$150,528.63. The lower court granted Missouri's claim. On 
appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the estate property was not part of 
Orville's probate estate. However, the court noted that it reached this result only because 
Missouri had not adopted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 .u.S.C. § 1396n(b)( 4): 
Section 1369p(b)( 4)B, on the other hand, by using "may," grant:;; Missouri 
permission to include any of the recipient's other property and assets that would 
traditionally fall outside the recipient's probate estate. Estate of Parker, 25 S.W.3d 
611,616 (Mo.App.2000) (" '[M]ay' in a statute implies alternare possibilities and 
that the conferee of the power has discretion in the exercise ofthe power."). 
Section 1396p(b)(4)B empowers Missouri to define "eshte" broadly and 
thereby to pursue property that a recipient owned jointly with ar10ther individual 
when the recipient died but that would not be included in the de:edent's estate. If 
a surviving spouse's estate includes property that was owned jointly with a 
deceased Medicaid recipient, Section 1396p(b) permits a state to trace this 
property back to the recipient and to recover it as a reimbursemt:nt Hence, 
although Section 1396p(b) does not permit recovery from a sponse's estate, 
Missouri's Medicaid program could still recover from the estate of a recipient's 
spouse if Missouri's probate law defined a Medicaid estate to include property not 
susceptible to probate, including property owned by tenants by 1he entirety. 
Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d at 402-3 (citations omitted; underline add(~d). The court further 
explained that recovery from the spouse's estate would be permitted if <mly the Missouri 
legislature would adopt the expanded definition of estate as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)( 4): 
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's estate because the General 
Assembly has not taken the step required by Section 1396p(b)('nB to adopt a 
definition of estate for the purpose of Medicaid recovery to include such property. 
For example, the New Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adopted a definition 
of estate that includes: 
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[A]ll real and personal property and other assets included in the recipient's 
estate as defined in NJ.S. 3B:l-l, as well as any other red and personal 
property and other assets in which the recipient had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death, to the extent of that interest,inc1uding assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the recipient through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other 
arrangement. 
NJ.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (1995). Until the General A.ssemblytakes 
this step, Missouri's Medicaid program will not be able to recovsrr..,nroperty 
possessed by a successor by virtue of being owned as a tenant bv the entirety. 
Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d at 403-4 (footnote omitted; underline added). 
Idaho, like the state of New Jersey cited by the court in Estate of Bruce, has adopted the 
expanded definition of estate almost word for word. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) with 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4): 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or cssign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). Clearly, Idaho has already done what the COUlt in Estate of Bruce said 
was necessary to authorize recovery from the estate of the spouse.26 
26The dissent in Estate of Bruce agreed that adoption of the expanded definition of estate would authorize 
Missouri to recover from the spouse's estate, but believed Missouri law was already sufficiently broad to encompass that 
expanded definition. In re Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398, 406-17 (Mo.App. 2008). The dissenting opinion contains a 
very good history of spousal recovery under the federal Medicaid law. 
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VII. 
THE PERRY CASE IS NOT RELEVANT HE:RE. 
The personal representative cites the case of In the matter of George D. Perry, Ada 
County Case # CV IE 0905214 as ifit is some sort of dispositive authority in this case. In Perry 
the Medicaid recipient, Martha, owned real property she had acquired in her prior marriage, as 
her sole and separate property. She conveyed an undivided interest in the property to her 
husband, George. George then, using a general power of attorney, conveyed the remainder of 
Martha's interest to himself. After George died, while Martha was still living and on Medicaid, 
George's heirs opened probate in order to distribute the real property to themselves. The 
Department filed a contingent claim against the estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-810 which 
was disallowed by the personal representative. The Magistrate upheld the disallowance of the 
Department's claim, upholding the gift made by George using the powm' of attorney, and applied 
the reasoning of In re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). The Department appealed to the 
District Court. The matter has been briefed and is set for oral argumenz November 18,2010, in 
Ada County. Therefore, Perry is not a final decision. 
Perhaps more importantly, from the Department's point of view, L1.e primary issue in 
Perry deals with the validity of the purported gift made by George to hlffi:self. The application of 
Barg is important, but will only arise if the District Court affinns the rv[a~~strate on the issue of 
the gifting. 
Also, the Magistrate in this case did not rely on Barg, but instead, based his decision on 
Idaho community property principles. In this case, money is involved ;md a claimed marriage 
settlement agreement. The Perry case involves two deeds and real property. In this case, the 
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Medicaid recipient died first. In Perry, the Medicaid recipient was alive when George died and 
the Department's claim was filed. So, while there are similarities and the briefing regarding 
Barg and Jackman has overlapped on these two cases, the differences 2:re more striking than the 
similarities. 27 
VIII. 
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS W(JfUI,D 
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
INTERPRETATION. 
The personal representative cites the case of State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 
520,224 P.3d 1109 (2010) stating "a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a manner that 
leads to an absurd result." Respondent's Brief, p. 16, citing Maybee, 148 Idaho at _, 224 P .3d at 
1124. However, it is the interpretation ofthe personal representative that would lead to absurd 
results. 
If the personal representative's argument is correct, then those who are single must 
reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while 
those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse Medicaid and their non-dependent children 
receive a windfall at taxpayer expense. 
Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an 
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but if they are too ignorant or unsophisticated 
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay. 
27When this case was first decided, undersigned counsel had hoped to stay it pc:nding the outcome of Perry, 
expecting it to be dispositive, and in fact filed a Motion to Stay (April 7, 2010). However, the two cases developed so 
differently and the decisions of the Magistrates were so wholly divergent, that this was not possible and the Department 
was forced to abandon its motion. 
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Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies 
first, assets which become the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation of 
law will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid fpouse had signed a 
marriage settlement agreement, making the assets the non-Medicaid sp)use's sole and separate 
property, a moment before death, there can be no recovery. 
In this case, the spouses died only two weeks apart. Under the interpretation of the 
personal representative, if the order of death were reversed, the Department would recover 
because Vivian would have received Emerson's property, whether sepf.rate or not, by operation 
oflaw.28 Only because of the chance order of death does the Department not recover. 
These are absurd results. 
IX. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The personal representative appeals the Magistrate's refusal to lward attorney fees 
against the Department. Attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 can only be awarded to the 
prevailing party. The Department should be determined to be the prevailing party herein. 
A. The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Double Costs. 
In this matter, the Magistrate awarded costs as a matter of right See Order re: Attorney 
Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010. In that order, the Magistrate awarded $20 for witness fees 
and $700 for the services of Dennis Voorhees. The Department did not appeal this order. The 
28Even if the property is separate property, Vivian would have received the fint $50,000 by virtue of the probate 
homestead allowance. Idaho Code § 15-2-402. She would have received all the persomJ property up to $10,000 in 
value. Idaho Code § 15-2-403. And she would have received the spouse share of whatever was left. Idaho Code § 15-2-
102. 
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personal representative now appears to be asking the court to award these same costs again. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 26. There is no authority for awarding duplicate costs on appeal, nor does 
it make any sense. The costs have been paid. 
B. It Has Become Well Settled That Idaho Code § 12-117 Is the E;j:clusive Means for 
Awarding Attorney Fees for the Entities to Which it Applies. 
The personal representative claims the Department has acted fri volously and 
unreasonably in this action. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. While patently false, even if it were true, 
Idaho Code § 12-121 does not apply in this case. As stated in Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch 
School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010): 
The School District also requests attorney fees under I.e. § 12-121, which 
permits fee awards to prevailing parties in "any civil action." This request is 
denied because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for 
the entities to which it applies. See Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 
139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) (citing State v. H{;lgerman Water 
Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391,396 (1997) (stating that § 
12-117 is the exclusive basis for seeking attorney fees against a state agency). 
Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n, 148 Idaho at _,226 P.3d at 1282 (underline adcied); accord Smith v. 
Washington County Idaho, _ P.3d _,2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, 2010). Attorney fees can 
not be awarded against the Department under Idaho Code § 12-121.29 
29In support of his claim that the Department has acted frivolously, the persona I representative again, and 
disingenuously, advances the claim the Department somehow failed to notify the court of the decision in the Perry case. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 22 and 25. The personal representative, knows, or should know by now, that the Magistrate was 
advised of the Perry decision before the Department's counsel even knew of it. See Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright 
(April 20, 2010). 
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C. The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees uuder Idaho Code § 12-117. 
The personal representative seizes on certain language in the Memorandum Decision 
Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate where the Magistrate st8teci: 
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is 
not an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S .C. 1396(b)( 4)(B). 
Another remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The 
Departments expansive interpretation to include all transactiom! is not reasonable. 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate" p. 6. The personal 
representative contends that the use of the words "not reasonable" means that attorney fees must 
be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. The fact that the Magistrate said the "interpretation" 
was not reasonable does not mean the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The Magistrate explained: 
Now, with regard to the claim under Idaho 12-117 and lAT. Masingill again 
honed in on the section on the Department's expansive Interpretation to include 
all transactions is not reasonable. 
Although the Court found that that expansive interpreta'iion was not 
reasonable, I don't find that the department's position was unreasonable. I find 
that the definition that they tried to apply was so expansive that it rendered - it 
rendered the community property law as the separate property llWS of Idaho 
marriage settlement agreement provisions meaningless effectiv~ly but I'm going 
to reserve that issue. 
Tr. (April 21, 2010) p. 31,11. 12-23 (underline added). In his Order on Attorney Fees, filed June 
23, 201 0, the Magistrate further explained: 
The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation 
of an ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. 1hiB court 
determined in its memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law 
expanding collection from a spouses separate property to be in contravention of 
Idaho's community property law and "was not reasonable". Perhaps the 
appropriate term should have been ''too expansive" since that interpretation would 
render Marital Settlement Agreements recognized by Idaho to he meaningless. 
The law on this matter is not settled and each party had a basis to make its 
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arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department are ns:ither arbitrary nor 
groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive interpret.?Ltion of the law. 
Order on Attorney Fees, p. 4 (underline added). Therefore, the fact that the magistrate used the 
word "unreasonable" does not mean he was required to award attorney fees. 
The personal representative has not advanced any other facts or law not discussed below 
and the Department respectfully adopts its points and authorities cited in its Post Hearing 
Memorandum re: Idaho Code § 12-117 (May 17, 2010). 
D. The Question of the Conflict ofInterest of the Personal Represl~ntative Is Not Yet Before 
this Court. 
Among the "reasons" the personal representative offers to show the Department has acted 
frivolously in this matter is listed on page 25 of Respondent's Brief: 
f. The State attempted to convince the Magistrate that the Personal 
Representative had a conflict whereby the Estate could not collect attorney's fees 
despite Idaho Code 15-3-720 
Respondent's Brief, p. 25. This claim arises out of the personal representative's attempt to 
distribute the estate after the Notice of Appeal was filed. The Departrr.ent objected to the 
proposed distribution and filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection (April 14, 2010). 
Included in the Department's objection and memorandum was oppositlon to the personal 
representative's intention to pay $14,623.71 in attorney fees from the f:ssets of the estate. See 1st 
Amended Schedule of Final Distribution Annexed to Petition for Final Distribution (appro:c. 
ApriIS,2010). At § III of the Department's Memorandum in Support of Objection, the 
Department set forth numerous authorities both from Idaho and elsewhere demonstrating that the 
personal representative was not pennitted to pay attorney fees from the estate for litigating in 
pursuit of his own personal interest. 
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Ultimately, this issue was not decided because at the hearing the _Magistrate determined 
he did not have jurisdiction, after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to entertain a Petition to 
distribute the estate. It was further learned at the hearing that the personal representative had 
already paid the attorney and the Magistrate concluded he did not have jurisdiction to either 
approve payment or order the money returned to the estate. Ultimately, an Order Staying 
Distribution of Estate Pending Appeal, staying any further distribution" was entered by the 
Magistrate on April 21, 2010. 
The issue of whether the personal representative's payment to his attorney will be 
approved or not may yet come before the Magistrate, however, this issue is not yet before this 
court. The Department believes its authorities cited in its Memorandur.l in Support of Objection 
are strong support for its position in that matter. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter is not as complex as the scattergun approach of the personal representative 
makes it appear. The real, and primary, issue is whether Judge Frates was correct in holding that 
general Idaho community property principles somehow change the pIa-in language ofIdaho Code 
§ 56-218 which clearly permits the Department to recover assets ofthi8 estate which had 
previously been the couple's community property, whether they became Emerson's separate 
property by voluntary transfer or by operation oflaw. Idaho Code § 5f-218 is straightforward 
and unambiguous and its application to the property of this estate is both expected and weB 
supported by law. 
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State statute authori~dng State to obtain reimburse-
ment from Medicaid recipient's estate after recipi-
ent's death or from es.tate of recipient's spouse after 
spouse's death was preempted by federal statute 
prohibiting such recovery from recipient's spouse, 
thus requiring reversal of judgment ordering estate 
to reimburse State for its Medicaid payments made 
to decedent's deceased wife; although federal stat-
ute authorized spocsal recovery, State did not 
define "estate" in such a way that permitted recov-
ery from traditionall:f non-probated property, such 
as decedent's estate that was held by tenants in the 
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divided interest; ane. thus, when one of the spouses 
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appellant. 
Lawrence D. Love, Kansas City, MO., for respond-
ent. 
*400 PAUL M. SPINDEN, Presiding Judge. 
The Estate of Orville Bruce appeals the circuit 
court's judgment for the State in its claim against 
the estate for reimbursement of Medicaid payments 
made to Orville Bruce's deceased wife, Minnie. The 
State asserted a right to the reimbursement pursuant 
to Section 473.399, RSMo 2000. The estate respon-
ded that federal law, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p, 
preempts reimbursement under Section 473.399. 
We agree and reverse the circuit court's judgment 
for the State. 
Minnie Bruce received Medicaid benefits from Oc-
tober 1990 until she died on February 28, 2002. No 
probate estate was administered for her. On April 
17, 2005, Orville Bruce died. He never received 
Medicaid benefits. His estate consisted of a house 
and an automobile. Bruce had owned the house 
jointly with his wife as tenants by the entirety. His 
estate was liquidated to $97,000. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 473.399, the State sought $150,528.63 from the 
estate for reimbursement of the Medicaid payments 
to Minnie Bruce. The circuit court granted the 
State's claim. 
[1 )[2] In its only point on appeal, Bruce's estate as-
serts that the circuit court erred because, although 
Section 473.399 permits the State to seek reim-
bursement from a spouse's estate, the United States 
Congress enacted Section 1396p that forbids such a 
claim. The estate argues that the federal statute 
preempts enforcement of Section 473.399 pursuant 
to the United States Constitution's supremacy 
clause.FNl This clause says that federallaw "shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 2. 
Federal law preempts state law in three situations: 
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(1) express preemptioL, when a federal directive 
expressly declares that the federal law preempts 
state law, (2) implied field preemption, when "the 
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to 
make reasonable thenference that Congress left no 
room for the States t) supplement it," and (3) con-
flict preemption, when "compliance with both fed-
eral and state regulz.tions is a physical impossibil-
ity, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." Jensen v. Missouri 
Department of Heaith and Senior Services, 186 
S.W.3d 857, 860 (M:.App.2006). 
FN 1. Although the parties did not raise an 
issue conceming jurisdiction, we have a 
duty sua sI"Jnte to address issues of our 
jurisdiction. State v. Miller, 172 S. W.3d 
838, 843 (Mo.App.2005). Article V, Sec-
tion 3, of Missouri's constitution, grants 
the Suprerr.e Court "exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction in all cases involving'the valid-
ity of a tn:aty or statute of the United 
States, or 0;: a statute or provision of the 
constitution of this state[.]" This provision 
gives the S;lpreme Court exclusive juris-
diction over the constitutional validity of a 
state statute. Miller, 172 S.W.3d at 843. 
Hence, if th ~ issue of preemption created a 
question co lcerning the statute's validity, 
we would not have jurisdiction to address 
the issue. F reemption, however, does not 
concern the statute's validity. It merely 
presents an issue of whether or not a stat-
ute must yi ~ld to the dictates of a federal 
directive b;! virtue of the United States 
Constitutior's supremacy clause. Because, 
in reviewing e. preemption challenge, we 
do not determine whether or not a state 
statute is ulconstitutional, we have juris-
diction to n;view Bruce's claim. This posi-
tion is consistent with numerous appellate 
court decisions that have decided preemp-
tion cases. :lee e.g., Jensen v. Mo. Dep't of 
Health & ~'en:'or Servs., 186 S.W.3d 857 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. V'or;(s. 
260 S.W.3d 398 
(Cite as: 260 S.W.3d 398) 
(Mo.App.2006); City of Belton v. Smoky 
Hill Ry. & Historical So<v. Inc., 170 
S.W.3d 429 (Mo.App.2005). 
[3][4] Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state pro-
gram designed to assist the states in providing 
health care to people *401 who cannot afford it. 
McNeil-Terry v. Roling, 142 S.W.3d 828, 833 
(Mo.App.2004). If a state opts to participate in the 
program, it must comply with all federal statutory 
and regulatory requirements. !d. Because Medicaid 
is a cooperative program, it is not susceptible to ex-
press or implied field preemption. It is susceptible 
only to conflict preemption. Jensen. 186 S.W.3d at 
860-6l. 
Missouri has opted to participate in the Medicaid 
program. Gee v. Department of Social Services, 
Family Support Division, 189 S.W.3d 621, 623 
(Mo.App.2006). In Section 473.398 and 473.399, 
RSMo 2000, the General Assembly authorized Mis-
souri's Medicaid authorities to obtain reimburse-
ment from a recipient's estate after the recipient's 
death or from the estate of the recipient's spouse 
after the spouse's death. Section 473.399.2 says: 
For the purposes of this section, the providing 
of assistance shall create an obligation which 
may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate 
division of the circuit court against the decedent 
estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient 
upon such spouse's death as provided by the pro-
bate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and 
475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be 
the full amount of assistance without interest 
provided to the recipient during the marriage of 
such recipient and spouse; provided that the liab-
ility of the obligor estate shall not exceed the 
value of the combined resources of the recipient 
and the spouse of the recipient on the date of 
death of the recipient. 
Orville Bruce's estate asserts that Section 473.399, 
which clearly authorizes spousal recovery, conflicts 
with 42 U.S.c. Section 1396p, which clearly pro-
hibits it in this case. 
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[5] When interpreting a statute, the judiciary'S 
primary task is to a5certain legislative intent. The 
preferred means for doing this is to accord the stat-
ute's language its plain and ordinary meaning. Cline 
v. Teasdale, 142 S.W3d 215,222 (Mo.App.2004). 
Section 1396p(b) say,: 
Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan 
(1) No adjustme.'lt or recovery of any medical 
assistance correct/y paid on behalf of an indi-
vidual under the S'.:ate plan may be made, except 
that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of 
any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan 
A. In the case of an individual described in 
subsection (a)(lI(B) of this section, the State 
shall seek adjus':ment or recovery from the in-
dividual's estate or upon sale of the property 
subject to a lien imposed on account of medical 
assistance paid en behalf of the individual. 
B. In the caSt of an individual who was 55 
years of age or older when the individual re-
ceived such medical assistance, the State shall 
seek adjustment or recovery from the individu-
al's estate, but o1ly for medical assistance con-
sisting of-(i) nnrsing facility services, home 
and communi!) -based services, and related 
hospital and prtscription drug services, or (ii) 
at the option of the State, any items or services 
under the State plan. 
C. (i) In the case of an individual who has re-
ceived (or is enritled to receive) benefits under 
a long-term care imurance policy in connection 
with which assets or resources are disregarded 
in the manner described in clause (ii), except as 
provided in such clause, the State shall seek ad-
justment*402 or recovery from the individual's 
estate on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the inclividual for nursi¥f2facility and 
other long-term care services[.] t 
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FN2. We added the emphasis. 
In Section l396p(b), the United States Congress 
plainly restricts recovery of Medicaid benefits from 
a recipient's estate to three specific situations, and 
none authorizes a state to seek recovery from the 
recipient's spouse. Because Congress has men-
tioned these three situations expressly, we infer that 
it intended to exclude recovery in other situations. 
Groh v. Ballard, 965 S.W.2d 872. 874 
(Mo.App.1998). See also In re the Estate of Bud-
ney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245. 246 
(App.1995) ("[Section 1396p(b) ] does not counter 
the initial blanket prohibition by specifically au-
thorizing a State to recover medical assistance be-
nefits paid on behalf of a recipient from a surviving 
spouse's estate[.]"); Hines v. Department of Public 
Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 
148, 153 (2006) ("No provision [in Section 
1396p(b) ] is made for collection from the estate of 
the recipient's spouse."). 
Although Section 13 96p(b) authorizes recovery 
only from the recipient's estate, it allows states to 
define "estate" in such a way that will permit re-
covery from traditionally non-probate property. 
Concerning this issue, Section 1396p(b)( 4) says: 
F or purposes of this subsection, the term 
"estate," with respect to a deceased individual-
A. shall include all real and personal property 
and other assets included within the individual's 
estate, as defined for purposes of State probate 
law; and 
B. may include, at the option of the State (and 
shall include, in the case of an individual to 
whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real 
and personal property and other assets in which 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), in-
cluding such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, 
or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
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Applying the plain aJ~d ordinary meaning of Section 
1396p(b)( 4)A's lang~.age, we conclude that an es-
tate, for the purpose of Medicaid recovery, lliust in-
clude all of what l\1issouri's probate law would 
define as a recipient's estate. We understand "shall" 
as a mandate. SS},,( Health Care St. Louis v. 
Schneider, 229 S.W 3d 279, 281 (Mo.App.2007). 
Section 1369p(b)(4)E\, on the other hand, by using 
"may," grants Missouri permission to include any 
of the recipient's other property and assets that 
would traditionally 1'111 outside the recipient's pro-
bate estate. Estate of Parker, 25 S.W.3d 611, 616 
(Mo.App.2000) ( " '.:M]ay' in a statute implies al-
ternate possibilities and that the conferee of the 
power has discreti<m in the exercise of the 
power."). 
Section 1396p(b)(4)B empowers Missouri to defme 
"estate" broadly and thereby to pursue property that 
a recipient owned jointly with another individual 
when the recipient (jed but that would not be in-
cluded in the decedent's estate. If a surviving 
spouse's estate inch:des property that was owned 
jointly with a deceased Medicaid recipient, Section 
1396p(b) permits a f:tate to trace this property back 
to the recipient and to recover it as a reimburse-
ment. In the Estate nfShuh, 248 S.W.3d 82, 85-86 
(Mo.App.2008): Hilles, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 
N.E.2d at 154; Esta'e of DeMartino v. Division of 
Medical Assistance and Health SenJices, 373 
N.J. Super. 210, 861 A.2d 138, 145 (2004); *403 
State Department of Human Resources Welfare Di-
vision v. Estate of Ullmer, 120 Nev. 108, 87 P.3d 
1045, 1050 (2004); :ANEL C. FRANK, Note, How 
Far is Too Far? Trrcing Assets in Medicaid State 
Recovery, 79 N.D.L.REV. 111, 130-31 (2003). 
Hence, although Section 1396p(b) does not permit 
recovery from a spl)Use's estate, Missouri's Medi-
caid program could :;till recover from the estate of a 
recipient's spouse if Missouri's probate law defined 
a Medicaid estate to include property not suscept-
ible to probate, inCluding property owned by ten-
ants by the entirety. 
For the purposes of probate, the General Assembly 
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has defined "estate" as "the real and personal prop-
erty of the decedent or ward, as from time to time 
changed in form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise, 
and augmented by any accretions and additions 
thereto and substitutions therefor, and diminished 
by any decreases and distributions therefrom[.]" 
Section 472.01 O( 11), RSMo 2000. Although this 
definition is vague, case law has held consistently 
that probate law does not govern the passing of 
property owned by tenants by the entirety. See 
Rinehart v. Anderson, 985 S. W.2d 363, 367 
(Mo.App.1998) (property passes immediately to 
surviving spouse and is not subject to probate); In 
re Estate of Hughes, 735 S.W.2d 787, 791 
(Mo.App.1987). 
[6](7] Probate's non-application to tenancy by the 
entirety results from its being a form of ownership 
that is created by marriage in which each spouse 
owns the entire property, rather than a share or di-
visible part. Rinehart, 985 S. W.2d at 367. It is 
based on a legal fiction that the husband and wife 
own the property jointly as a single person. In re 
Estate of Hughes, 735 S.W.2d at 791. Together, 
each has an undivided interest,Id. When one of the 
spouses dies, the surviving spouse becomes the 
property's sole owner by virtue of being owner of 
100 percent of the property. Id. Hence, property 
owned by Minnie and Orville Bruce as tenants by 
the entirety was not part of Minnie Bruce's probate 
estate and did not fit within the definition of 
"estate" enunciated in Section 472.010(11). Rine-
hart, 985 S.W.2d at 367; In the Matter of Estate of 
Hughes, 735 S.W.2d at 791. The State, therefore, 
could not use Section 1396p(b)(4)A to seek recov-
ery from Bruce's estate. 
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's 
estate because the General Assembly has not taken 
the step required by Section 1 396p(b)(4)B to adopt 
a definition of estate for the purpose of Medicaid 
recovery to include such property. For example, the 
New Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adop-
ted a definition of estate that includes: 
[A]l! real and personal property and other assets 
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included in the recipient's estate as defined in 
N.J.S. 3B:l-1, as well as any other real and per-
sonal property and oilier assets in which the re-
cipient had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death, to the extent of that interest, including 
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of 
the recipient thro::>gh joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or 
other arrangement. 
N.J.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (l995).FN3 
Until the General A,sembly takes *404 this step, 
Missouri's Medicaid Jrogram will not be able to re-
cover property possessed by a successor by virtue 
of being owned as a tenant by the entirety. 
FN3. Other examples of states that have 
taken this course are Iowa and Nevada. 
The Iowa legislature has defined a Medi-
caid estate to include "any real property, 
personal prcperty, or other asset in which 
the recipiem, spouse, or child had any legal 
title or inte'~est at the time of the recipi-
ent's, spouse's, or child's death, to the ex-
tent of SUCl interests, including but not 
limited to ir.terests in jointly held property, 
retained lil e estates, and interests in 
trusts." 10", a Code Ann. Section 249 A.5 
(2)(c) (2003). Similarly, Nevada has 
defined a l<'edicaid estate as "all real and 
personal pre perty and other assets Lt1.c1uded 
in the esta,e of a deceased recipient of 
Medicaid and any other real and personal 
property and Ocher assets in or to which he 
had an interest or legal title immediately 
before or at the time of his death, to the ex-
tent of that in~erest or title. The term in-
cludes, witl:.out limitation, assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased 
recipient through or as the result of any 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, surviv-
orship, life estate, living trust, annuity, de-
claration 01' homestead or other arrange-
ment." Nev.Rev.Stat. Section ·-122.054 
(2003). 
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The State argues that Section 461.300, RSMo 2000, 
expands the definition of estate to include property 
held as tenants by the entirety. Section 461.300.1 
says: 
Each recipient of a recoverable transfer of a de-
cedent's property shall be liable to account for a 
pro rata share of the value of all such property re-
ceived, to the extent necessary to discharge the 
statutory allowances to the decedent's surviving 
spouse and dependent children, and claims re-
maining unpaid after application of the decedent's 
estate[.] 
Section 461.300 authorizes the court to expand the 
decedent's estate when the estate is insufficient to 
pay its creditors. Even assuming that the State is a 
creditor that could make a claim under Section 
461.300, the State's contention fails because the 
house that Minnie Bruce and her husband owned as 
tenants by the entirety was not a recoverable trans-
fer under the statute. Section 461.300.10(4) defines 
a recoverable transfer: 
[A] nonprobate transfer of a decedent's prop-
erty under sections 461.003 to 461.081 and any 
other transfer of a decedent's property other than 
from the administration of the decedent's probate 
estate that was subject to satisfaction of the de-
cedent's debts immediately prior to the decedent's 
death, but only to the extent of the decedent's 
contribution to the value of such property. 
To meet this definition, Bruce's house would either 
have to be a "nonprobate transfer of decedent's 
property" or "property ... that was subject to satis-
faction of the decedent's debts immediately prior to 
the decedent's death." Property held by tenants by 
the entirety does not fit within either of these cat-
egories. 
Section 461.005(7), RSMo 2000, defines a non-
probate transfer as "a transfer of property taking ef-
fect upon the death of the owner, pursuant to a be-
neficiary designation," and it does not include 
"survivorship rights in property held as joint ten-
ants or tenants by the entirety[.]" And property held 
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by tenants by the entire-:y is not subject to satisfac-
tion of the decedent's debts. In Missouri, creditors 
are not able to levy on this property to satisfy the 
debts or claims of one spouse. Farmers Exchange 
Bank v. },,{etro C01tracting Services, Inc., 107 
S.W.3d 381, 395 (M).App,2003). 
Hence, Orville Brucr's house was not a recoverable 
transfer under Secticn 461.300. Even assuming that 
the General Assembly intended for Section 461.300 
to expand the definilion of the estate for Medicaid 
recovery purposes, :1 did not expand it to cover 
property held by tem,nts by the entirety. 
Equally flawed is the dissent's suggestion that the 
General Assembly resed Section 473.399.2 to ex-
pand the definition of a Medicaid estate. As we 
noted above, Section 473.399.2 says: 
For the purpose'; of this section, the providing 
of assistance shall create an obligation which 
may be recovered by *405 filing a claim in the 
probate division of the circuit court against the 
decedent estate of the spouse of the deceased re-
cipient upon such spouse's death as provided by 
the probate code cf Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 
474 and 475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt 
shall be the full arnOlmt of assistance without in-
terest provided to the recipient during the mar-
riage of such recipient and spouse; provided that 
the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed 
the value of the combined resources of the recipi-
ent and the spouse of the recipient on the date of 
d h if h .. FN4 eat 0 t e reclpl mt. 
FN4. We added the emphasis. 
If, as has been suggested, the General Assembly in-
tended for this statute to expand the definition of an 
individual MedicaiG recipient's estate to include 
non-probate property, it could not have chosen a 
more oblique and crabbed manner for doing so. In-
deed, many of the stctes whose courts have de-
clared that the law pennits spousal recovery did so 
only because those states' legislatures had adopted 
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definitions that closely track the language of Sec-
tion 1396p(b)(4)B. See In re Estate of Laughead, 
696 N.'vV.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005); Estate of De-
f:'f1stino, 861 A.2d at 143; Ullmer, 87 P.3d at 1050. 
FN5. Iowa's expansive definition of Medi-
caid estate appears supra, at 403. New Jer-
sey's and Nevada's expansive defmitions of 
Medicaid estate appear supra, at Note 3. 
Weare dubious that Missouri would have elected to 
shroud its expansion of the definition of a Medicaid 
estate in discussions of the limits on the value of 
the property to be recouped. Such a prospect is 
highly unlikely. Indeed, the Supreme Court has in-
structed that the primary rule of statutory construc-
tion is to glean legislative intent by understanding 
the statute according to its objective. Nixon v. 
QuikTrip Corporation, 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. 
bane 2004). The objective that the General As-
sembly articulated in Section 473.399 was to au-
thorize spousal recovery and to set a limit on how 
much could be recouped from the obligor's estate. 
Nothing in the statute's language indicates that its 
objective was to expand the definition of a Medi-
caid estate. Even had the General Assembly de-
cided to take an oblique and crabbed route to rede-
fining a Medicaid estate, surely it would have de-
clared that the liability of the obligor's estate exten-
ded only to the spouses' combined resources instead 
of saying that the "liability of the obligor estate 
shall not exceed the value of the combined re-
sources of the recipient and the spouse." FN6 The 
General Assembly' use of this phrase establishes 
that the Section 473.399's second sentence was the 
monetary limit for spousal recovery. 
FN6. We added the emphasis. 
Although the General Assembly enacted Section 
473.399.2 for the obvious purpose of facilitating 
spousal recovery, it did so in 1990. LAWS OF 
MISSOURI 1990. At that time, however, federal 
law did not give the states the option of defining es-
tate to include non-probate property. Federal au-
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thorization for reCOUi;>ment of non-probate property-
provided a state redefined a Medicaid estate to al-
low it-did not come '111tiI three years after the Gen-
eral Assembly ena:ted Section 473399.2. See 
FRANK, 79 N.D L.REV. at 118 (Congress 
amended SECTION 1396p during 1993 to include 
the definition of estlte currently found in Section 
1396p(b)(4)). 
That Section 473.399.2 predated federal authoriza-
tion is quite telling in eliminating the possibility 
that the General Assembly intended for the statute 
to expand the defmifon of a Medicaid estate. Obvi-
ously, *406 the Geileral Assembly did not enact 
Section 473.399.2 lecause it foresaw Congress's 
enactment of Section 1394p(b)(4). The timing of 
Section 473.399's emctment belies a notion that its 
purpose was to expald the definition of a Medicaid 
estate. 
The State avers nurrercus public policy reasons as 
to why we should interpret Section 1396p(b) as 
providing for spousrl recovery. While these public 
policy reasons may be valid, we are constrained by 
the language of Section 1396p(b). It simply does 
not permit spousa recovery under Missouri's 
present statutes. Mi isouri has not opted, as other 
states have, to take advantage of the authority af-
forded by Section 1396p(b)(4)B to define a Medi-
caid estate in such a manner as to capture tradition-
ally non-probate as;;ets. If the General Assembly 
wanted to empower Missouri's Medicaid program 
to recover non-prob lte assets, all it need do is re-
define "estate" for rurposes of Medicaid recovery, 
but it has not done so. 
For these reasons, vie reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court. We renard the case to it so it can va-
cate its jUdgment for the State and enter judgment 
for Orville Bruce's e ,tate. 
JAMES M. SMART. JR, Judge, concurs. 
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, hdge, dissents in a separate 
opinion. 
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that 
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federal law allows a state to recover Medicaid as-
sistance from the recipient's spouse's estate if the 
state opts to expand its definition of "estate" to in-
clude property that the Medicaid recipient owned 
jointly with his or her spouse at the time of the re-
cipient's death. However, I differ with the major-
ity's conclusion that Missouri has not adopted such 
an expanded definition, finding rather that the legis-
lature did so when it enacted the public assistance 
FNI 
recovery statutes, §§ 473.398 and 473.399. 
FN 1. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory 
references are to RSMo 2000. 
Sections 473.398 and 473.399 are amendments to, 
and parts of, the Probate Code, specifically Chapter 
473 dealing with administration of decedents' es-
tates. While Chapter 472 contains the general pro-
visions of the Probate Code, and § 472.010 
provides the general definition of "estate" for pro-
bate purposes, §§ 473.398 and 473.399 are more 
specific statutes dealing with the same issue. 
Statutes addressing the same subject matter are con-
sidered in pari materia, and must be construed to-
gether. KC Motorcycle Escorts, L.L.c. v. Easley, 53 
S.W.3d 184. 187 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). "When one 
statute deals with a subject in general terms and an-
other statute deals with the same subject in a more 
specific way, the two statutes should be harmonized 
if possible. If the statutes cannot be reconciled, the 
more specific prevails over the more general." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
Sections 473.398 and 473.399 amended the Probate 
Code to permit recovery of public assistance. They 
set forth the procedure for doing so and the extent 
to which recovery may be had. In doing so, they ex-
panded the concept and definition of "estate" for 
purposes of Medicaid assistance recovery. This 
conclusion is confirmed by an examination of state 
and federal statutes and applicable case law. 
A review of the Medicaid Act and its history is es-
sential to an understanding of both the federal and 
Missouri statutory schemes. Congress created the 
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Medicaid program when it amended the Social Se-
curity Act in 1965, tt what is now codified as *407 
42 U.S.C. § 1396, et. seq. In re Estate of Shuh, 248 
S.W.3d 82, 83-84 Ci"'lo.App. E.D.2008). States are 
given the option of participating in the Medicaid 
program. !d. If they ehoose to do so, they must ad-
opt a state plan, including provisions for eligibility 
and assistance, that ,~omp1ies with all federal stat-
utory and regulatory requirements. Id. If a state par-
ticipates, it reimburses health care providers for the 
cost of care provided to Medicaid recipients, and 
the federal government then reimburses the state for 
a portion of the expenditures. West Virginia v. 
United States HHS, 132 F.Supp.2d 437, 440 
(D.W.Va.200l). 
Congress became concerned as early as 1980 that 
wealthy elderly Anericans were "gaming" the 
Medicaid program bJ divesting themselves of their 
assets before enterin:~ a nursing home and then ap-
plying for Medicaid benefits. Thus, "[t]he first ma-
jor restriction in th,~ Medicaid program came in 
1980 with the Boren-Long Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(c)(2)(J988). " Ira Stewart Wiesner, OBRA 
'93 and ii-fedicaid: A .• set Tramfers, Trust Availabil-
ity, and Estate Recmery Statutory Analysis in Con-
text, 19 Nova L.Rev 679,682 n. 10 (Winter 1995). 
Continued concern a',od loopholes in Medicaid eli-
gibility led to frequent amendments between 1980 
and the adoption of the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1993 i"OBRA '93"). !d. OBRA '93 
contained the estate recovery provisions that are 
generally still applicabie today and are at issue in 
this appeal. 
"Prior to 1993, stat!s were permitted, but not re-
quired, to establish estate recovery programs." West 
Virginia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. OBRA '93 made it 
mandatory that state, "recoup benefits from the es-
tates of certain decnased Medicaid recipients as a 
condition of receivirg Medicaid Funds." !d. But, as 
noted by the cour in the West Virginia case, 
"OBRA '93 does not force estate recovery upon any 
citizen of a state. Persons subject to estate recovery 
elect to receive Me :licaid benefits and the regula-
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tions demand that such recipients receive notice of 
the estate recovery requirement when choosing to 
accept or reject Medicaid long-term care benefits," 
Id. at 441. 
Although Congress expressed frequent concern 
about loopholes in the Medicaid laws in the decade 
or more leading up to its adoption of OBRA '93, it 
was similarly concerned about protecting the eld-
erly from hardships. A person seeking to qualify for 
Medicaid as medically needy must have low in-
come and low assets, and, therefore, the person's re-
sources, to the extent they exceed the statutory and 
regulatory limit, must be spent down before quali-
fying. Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 84-85. Congress recog-
nized the potential hardship that "spend down" re-
quirements could have on the spouses of medical 
assistance recipients. Id. 
To ameliorate that hardship to spouses of Medi-
caid recipients, Congress enacted the Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 ("MCCA") 
which includes provisions to financially protect 
the spouse who was not receiving medical assist-
ance. These provisions, commonly called the 
spousal impoverishment provisions, allow the 
spouse to retain a certain level of resources and 
income and protect those assets from use as pay-
ment for medical care. 
Id. 
Congress's concern over spousal hardship was also 
apparent in OBRA '93. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(a)(1)(B) 
authorizes imposition of a lien on a Medicaid recip-
ient's real property, but 42 U.S.c. § J396p(a)(2) ex-
pressly provides that "[n]o lien may be imposed un-
der paragraph (l )(B) on such individual's home if-
(A) the spouse of such individual... is lawfully 
residing in *408 such home." The provisions of the 
federal law applicable to this appeal similarly re-
flect a desire not to impoverish a Medicaid recipi-
ent's spouse during their lifetime. In 42 U.S.C. § 
13 96p(b), authorizing a recovery of benefits under 
the state plan, subsection (b )(2) expressly limits re-
coveries, stating that "[a]ny adjustment or recovery 
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under paragraph (1) may be made only after the 
death of the individual's surviving spouse.... " 
(Emphasis added). 
The spousal impoverishment provisions relating to 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits, and the estate re-
covery provisions of the Medicaid law authorizing 
such recoveries onl;, after the recipient's spouse's 
death, are an expre1;sion of two salutary congres-
sional goals. 
First, expanding estate recovery furthers the 
broad purpose of providing for the medical care 
of the needy; the g~eater amount recovered by the 
state allows the state to have more funds to 
provide future s,;:rvices. Second, the MCCA 
[Coverage Act of 1988] serves as part of the 
overall effort to not impoverish a Medicaid recip-
ient's spouse duri:lg the spouse's lifetime. Ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court and 
the Congressional Record, the goal of the MCCA 
was to protect the community spouse from 
poverty, while pntecting the Medicaid system 
from being abused by financially secure couples. 
Shuh, 248 S.W.3dlt 86 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
All the while, however, Congress was expanding 
the Medicaid progrun, often without appropriate 
funding levels, which led to skyrocketing costs for 
the states. "The states, particularly after the passage 
of the MCCA, experie:J.ced rapid, and [from their 
perspectives] uncontroEable escalation oftheir state 
Medicaid expenditures!' Wiesner, supra, at 693. 
"In Florida, for exanpie, the annual Medicaid ex-
penditures for nursbg homes increased onr $100 
million for a $1 hilEon budget for fiscal year 
1992-1993." Id. at 6B n. 14 (citing Burton D. Dun-
lop et al., Fla. Int l Univ., The Context of Long 
Term Care in Floric'a: Interrelationships of Medic-
ally Needy, Assets Recovery and Long Term Care 
Insurance Policy Initiatives 1 (1992». 
As a result, Goverr.ors and state legislatures con-
cerned with balancing state budgets were creatively 
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trying to reduce costs and secure recovery for pay-
ments made. "Prior to 1993, states were permitted, 
but not required, to establish estate recovery pro-
grams." West Vir:..~inia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. Thus, 
the states, as is often the case in "cooperative feder-
alism" programs, served as incubators of new ideas 
in cost management and recovery. 
For example, as early as the late 1970s, New York 
adopted provisions granting eligibility to a Medi-
caid applicant even though he or she had a spouse 
with sufficient income and assets to provide medic-
al assistance. See In re Estate of Imburgia. 127 
Misc.2d 756, 487 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 
(N.Y.Surr.Ct.l984) (ajj'd by 130 A.D.2d 658, 515 
N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y.App.Div.1987), disapproved on 
other grounds by In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 
388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 
(N. Y.1993». The statute was interpreted to create 
an implied contract allowing for recovery from the 
spouse or the spouse's estate. !d. 
California, on the other hand, adopted a statute pri-
or to 1987 that permitted the state to " 'claim 
against the estate of the decedent, or against any 
recipient of the property of that decedent by distri-
bution or survival an amount equal to the 
[Medi-Cal] payments received.' " Citizens Action 
League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th 
Cir.1989) (quoting Cal. Welf & Inst.Code § 
14009.5 (West Supp.1989)) (emphasis *409 and 
brackets in original). Thus, the statute expanded the 
definition of "estate" to include property owned in 
joint tenancy with a former benefits recipient. 
At least as early as 1990, Minnesota had a statute 
allowing for recovery from a surviving spouse's es-
tate to the extent of "the value of the assets of the 
estate that were marital property or jointly owned 
property at any time during the marriage." 
lv/inn. Stat. § 256B.15. This is the same statute, but 
for minor changes not here relevant, that was ex-
amined in lobe. Gullberg, and Barg. all discussed 
infra. 
And, of course, Missouri, also in 1990, adopted §§ 
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473.398 and 473.39S', which will be discussed in 
more detail infra, g':nerally allowing for recovery 
from a surviving spouse's estate to the extent of 
"the value of the combined resources of the recipi-
ent and the spouse d ti1e recipient on the date of 
death of the recipien:" § 473.399.2. 
Not surprisingly, tr,,~re were legal challenges to 
some of these statutes, but they met with mixed res-
ults. In Imburgia, th('; state paid the cost of nursing 
home assistance for Mrs. Imburgia prior to her 
death in 1981 then 50ught to recover those costs 
from the estate of ~h. Imburgia after his death in 
1983.487 N.Y.S.2d [,t 264 (adopting facts from pri-
or decision at In re Estate of Imburgia, 122 Misc.2d 
1033, 472 XY.S.2d 305, 305-06 
(N.Y.Surr.Ct.l984)). The estate claimed that, to the 
extent New York statutes permitted such recovery, 
they conflicted witl:. L"-le pre-1993 version of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 p(b)(l), which provided that "[n]o 
adjustment or recov~ry of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made." !d. The court analyzed 
federal statutes and regulations relating to the 
concept of "deeming ," where a portion of a spouse's 
income is "deemed" available to the benefit recipi-
ent, and those relatir.g to recoupment of medical as-
sistance. Id. at 264- 55. Based on this analysis, the 
court held that "to lhe extent that New York stat-
utes permit recovery against the estate of [a surviv-
ing spouse], such statutes are not in conflict with 
Federal law or regulations and do not therefore vi-
olate the supremac:r clause of the United States 
Constitution." Id. at 265. 
The California stature was also challenged in Kizer, 
a 2-1 decision with one judge dissenting. In that 
case, survivors of Medicaid recipients who held as-
sets in joint tenanc:r with the recipient during the 
recipient's lifetime claimed that the California pro-
vIslon was incorsis:ent with 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(1)(B) (19112). 887 F.2d at 1005-06. The 
majority noted that:he federal statute limited states 
to recouping benefi:s from the recipient's "estate," 
and that Congress had not defined "estate" in the 
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statute. !d. at 1006. Therefore, the majority looked 
to the common law definition of the term, holding 
that "[b]ecause 'estate' under common law does not 
include property formerly held in joint tenancy, '" 
we conclude that the California statute is imper-
missibly broad and is inconsistent with federal 
Medicaid law." Id. at 1007-08. The dissent, on the 
other hand, argued that adoption of the common 
law definition "makes recovery depend on a tech-
nical distinction that has nothing necessarily to do 
with the purposes of the Medicaid program or of 
the exception permitting recovery of benefits fur-
nished .... " Id at 1008. 
Thus, when Missouri adopted §§ 473.398 and 
473.399 in 1990, the state of the law was far from 
clear as to whether a state could expand its defini-
tion of "estate" to include "combined resources of 
the recipient and the spouse ... on the date of death 
of the recipient," § 473.399.2, and could permit re-
covery from a surviving spouse's estate. Accord-
ingly, any suggestion that § 473.399 could not have 
been *410 intended to expand the definition of 
"estate" because it predated 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(b)(4)(B) (1993) is clearly without merit. 
Rather, it is absolutely crystal clear that the intent 
of the Missouri legislature was to push the envel-
ope, to expand the definition of estate, and to allow 
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The Missouri law was not challenged prior to the 
adoption of OBRA '93, so it is unknown whether it 
would have passed muster based on the prior ver-
sion of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b). But when COI!gress 
fi 11 d d h . ... FNT d lila y respon e to testate illlilatives an 
specifically allowed states to expand their defini-
tion of "estate" with the passage of OBRA '93, Mis-
souri was already on board with the expanded 
concept of "estate" encompassed in § 473.399. See 
Demille v. Belshe. 1994 WL 519457, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13917,42-43 (N.D.Ca1.l994) (holding 
that Kizer's striking down of California's expansive 
definition of estate was superseded by the adoption 
of an expansive definition of "estate" in OBRA '93, 
stating that "[n]ow, the state is permitted to recoup 
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its expenses from pr:perty (such as joint tenancies) 
not included within ;he common law definition of 
'estate.' "). 
FN2. In addition to the numerous state law 
initiatives, at both the January 1992 meet-
ing of the Stat,;: Medicaid Directors' Asso-
ciation ("S1>rlDA") and the July 1992 con-
ference of tbe National Governors' Associ-
ation ("NGA"), Medicaid reform was a 
featured and hot topic, where "[r]estriction 
of eligibility, through the attractive vehicle 
of loophole closing, and budget replenish-
ment through stronger estate recovery au-
thority wen! the most sought results." 
Wiesner, sUj:ra, at 691-94. 
This brings us to the relevant provisions of federal 
and Missouri statutory law that are applicable to the 
case sub judice. The pertinent federal law is set out 
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b): 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid unde:r a State plan. 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as-
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual 
under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any 
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
* * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 
years of age or older when the individual re-
ceived such medical assistance, the State shall 
seek adjustment or recovery from the individu-
al's estate .... 
* * * 
(2) Any adjustmelt or recovery under paragraph 
(1) may be mademly after the death of the indi-
vidual's surviving spouse, if any .... 
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* * * 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"estate", with respect to a deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property 
and other assets included within the individu-
al's estate, as defined for purposes of State pro-
bate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State '" 
any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the ex-
tent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, ten-
ancy in common, survivorship, life estate, liv-
ing trust, or other arrangement. 
*411 Missouri's estate recovery statute, § 473.399, 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
1. As used in this section, the following terms 
mean: 
* * * 
(2) "Obligor estate", the estate against which an 
obligation under this section arises; 
(3) "Recipient", a person to whom or on whose 
behalf assistance is provided; 
* * * 
2. For the purposes of this section, the providing 
of assistance shall create an obligation which 
may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate 
division of the circuit court against the decedent 
estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient 
upon such spouse's death as provided by the pro-
bate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and 
475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be 
the full amount of assistance without interest 
provided to the recipient during the marriage of 
such recipient and spouse; provided that the liah-
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ility of the obligfN estate shall not exceed the 
value of the comb.ined resources of the recipient 
and the spouse 0/ the recipient on the elate of 
death of the recipient. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As noted supra, based on the history of the Medi-
caid program and the states' efforts to control costs, 
it is certain that the purpose of the Missouri legis-
lature in adopting il 473.399 was to expand the 
definition of "estate'" and provide for recovery from 
the estate of a benefi: recipient's spouse. Whether it 
was effective in dobg so prior to 1993 is unclear, 
but the conclusion is inescapable that it did so after 
adoption of OBRA '93. While evident on its own, 
this conclusion is als,) supported by significant case 
law. 
We start with the :t,:orth Dakota Supreme Court's 
decision in the case of In re Estate of Thompson, 
586 N.W.2d 847 (t;.D.1998). In that case, Nath-
aniel Thompson received Medicaid benefits prior to 
his death on December 20, 1992. Id. at 848. His 
wife, Victoria Thomoson, never received any med-
ical assistance benefits. Id. She died on September 
15, 1995, leaving assets subject to administration. 
Id. An estate was opened and a personal represent-
ative appointed. Id. The North Dakota Department 
of Human Services filed a claim against Mrs. 
Thompson's estate f)r recovery of the medical as-
sistance benefits prcvided to her husband. !d. The 
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of 
the Department allo'ving the claim, and the person-
al representative aprealed. Id. 
On appeal, the cout did not examine its general 
definition of "estate" but only looked at the follow-
ing language in its e itate recovery statute, N.D. C. C. 
§ 50-24.1-07: 
1. On the death of any recipient of medical assist-
ance who was fifty-five years of age or older 
when the recipien' re::eived the assistance, and on 
the death of the spouse of such a deceased recipi-
ent, the total amcum of medical assistance paid 
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on behalf of the recipient following the recipi-
ent's fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a pre-
ferred claim against the decedent's estate .... 
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of 
the decedent's surviving spouse, if any .... 
ld at 849 (emphasis omitted). The court held that 
the "broad definition of the recipient's estate in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)( 4) must be considered," id at 
850, stating: 
That expansive definition is broad enough to en-
compass the department's claim against the estate 
of a deceased *412 spouse of a deceased recipient 
of medical assistance benefits for the amount of 
medical assistance paid out, to the extent the re-
cipient at the time of death had any title or in-
terest in assets which were conveyed to his or her 
spouse 'through joint tenancy, tenancy in com-
mon, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or oth-
er arrangement.' " 
ld In so holding, the court also stated: 
Because the expansive federal defmition of 
'estate' in 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only 
to assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the 
time of death,' it is a matter of little moment 
whether the department seeks to recover the be-
nefits paid by filing a claim in the estate of the 
recipient after the death of the recipient's sur-
viving spouse or by filing a claim in the surviv-
ing spouse's estate. 
ld at 851 n. 3 (emphasis added). 
A Minnesota court reached a similar result in In re 
Estate of lobe, 590 N.W.2d 162 (Minn.App.1999). 
In that case, Amos and Alice Jobe, husband and 
wife, owned 120 acres that they acquired in 1974. 
Id at 164. Mr. Jobe entered a nursing home in 1993 
and received Medicaid benefits from that time until 
his death in 1995. ld Mrs. Jobe, who never re-
ceived medical assistance, died in 1996 and was the 
sole owner of the 120 acres at that time. Id The 
County Department of Social Services filed a claim 
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against Mrs. Jobe's e~ta~,e for the amount of medical 
assistance benefits provided to Mr. Jobe before his 
death.ld The trial court allowed the claim, and the 
estate appealed. !d. 
The estate asserted on appeal that the statute au-
thorizing recovery of medical assistance was inval-
id because it conflicted with federal law. [d The 
statute in question pmvides: 
Subd. lao Estates subject to claims. If a person 
receives any medical assistance hereunder, on the 
person's death * * I< or on the death of the surviv-
or of a married couple, either or both of whom re-
ceived medical assistance, the total amount paid 
for medical assistance rendered for the person 
and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the 
estate of the perso!l or the estate of the surviving 
spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate 
the estate. 
* * * 
Subd. 2. Limitati JUS on claims. * * * A claim 
against the estate of a surviving spouse who did 
not receive medicLl assistance, for medical assist-
ance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is lim-
ited to the value ,)f the assets of the estate that 
were marital property or jointly owned property 
at any time during the marriage. 
ld. at 164 (emphasis added); Minn.Stat. § 256B.15. 
The Minnesota cowt regan its analysis by stating 
that there was a:hree-part test in determining 
whether a federal statute preempts a state statute, 
that being: "(1) conpliance with the federal and 
state provisions is physically impossible; (2) pree-
mption is express and unequivocal in language of 
the federal statute; me:. (3) congressional preempt-
ive intent is implici1 in the overall scheme of feder-
al and state regulat;on." Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 165. 
The court found thLt the second and third parts of 
this test did not apIly to the facts at hand and that 
the only basis for p,:eemption was whether compli-
ance with the feder21 and state provisions was phys-
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ically impossible. Id. 
The court then reviewed the federal statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b). It noted that the federal statute 
gives states the option to define an individual's es-
tate as including *413 "assets in which a decedent 
held 'any legal title or interest at the time of death,' 
including 'assets conveyed ... through joint tenancy 
... or other arrangement.' " Id. at 165. The court re-
jected the estate's contention that the Minnesota 
statute went beyond the authority granted by the 
federal statute by permitting recovery from the es-
tate of a surviving spouse. Id. It stated that 
"[a]cceptance of the estate's position and its narrow 
interpretation of section 1396p would render por-
tions of the federal statute meaningless, particularly 
the phrase 'conveyed to a survivor ... through joint 
tenancy.' " Id. at 166. The court also rejected the 
assertion that allowing claims against surviving 
spouse's estates conflicts with the asset allocation 
and spend down provisions of state and federal law. 
[d. In doing so, the court stated: 
The rules regarding eligibility for medical assist-
ance do not necessarily override rules for recov-
ery of benefits paid. Rather, because both federal 
and state law allow recovery only after the death 
of an individual's surviving spouse, dual interests 
are served. One policy prevents the impoverish-
ment of the surviving spouse during his or her 
lifetime. Once that spouse dies and the need for 
protection from impoverishment ceases, allowing 
a state to recover medical assistance benefits pre-
viously paid furthers the broader purpose of fund-
ing future services to the medically needy. These 
policies are both served by allowing the state to 
recover medical assistance benefits paid to or on 
behalf of a predeceased spouse from a surviving 
spouse's estate, to the extent the assets contained 
in that estate were jointly owned by the couple 
during their marriage. 
Id. (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). 
The Minnesota court's holding is clear and concise: 
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Because federal law now allows states to opt for 
a definition of es1ate that may include "assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of ;;he de-
ceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy-
in-common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement," the state statute that al-
lows medical assi;;tance benefit reimbursement 
from the estate ,t)f a surviving spouse from 
"assets of the estt;~te that were marital property 
or jointly-owned property at any time during the 
marriage" is entir.rdy consistent with federal law 
and not preempted. We therefore affirm the dis-
trict court's allow:mce of this claim against the 
estate. 
[d. at 166-67 (internd citation omitted). 
It is important to recognize that the Minnesota stat-
ute under review ir lobe, like Missouri's statute, 
predated the passage of OBRA '93. It remained es-
sentially unchanged from the time it was adopted 
until lobe was decided (and thereafter). Accord-
ingly, lobe, like Demille, supra, also stands for the 
proposition that it matters not whether the statute 
was efficacious prier to 1993 because even it was 
not, it became effective upon passage of OBRA '93. 
The Minnesota Cou.1: of Appeals addressed this is-
sue again, albeit in a different factual situation, in 
In re Estate oj Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709 
(Minn.App.2002). In Gullberg, the recipient spouse 
had conveyed the 'lomestead, which was marital 
property held in j.JinI tenancy, to the surviving 
spouse before appl:/ing for and receiving medical 
assistance benefits. Id. at 713. The court reaffirmed 
its holding in Job,'~, declaring that "the county's 
claim against the e~;tate is clearly allowed by Min-
nesota's estate reccvery statute," but asserted that 
"the issue is whether allowance of the claim in its 
entirety complies with federal law." Id. The court 
stated *414 that to the extent that Minnesota law 
"allows recovery 'to the value of the assets of the 
estate that were mlrital property or jointly owned 
property at any tirr.e during the marriage,' we con-
clude that it goes b,~yond what is allowed by federal 
law, which allows recovery only 'to the extent of' 
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the individual's legal interest at the time of death." 
Id at 714. Thus, the court found a partial preemp-
tion, holding only, as had lobe. that Minnesota law 
"allows claims against a surviving spouse's estate 
only to the extent of the value of the recipient's in-
terest in marital or jointly owned property at the 
time of the recipient's death." Jd. The court con-
cluded its analysis by stating: 
Thus, allowing a claim like this serves to fulfill 
the purposes of the Medicaid Act by protecting 
the surviving spouse's right to enjoy and use as-
sets during his or her lifetime, while enabling the 
county to recoup a portion of its expenditures and 
to prevent "capable individuals from using Medi-
caid as artificially inexpensive long-term care in-
surance." 
!d. (quoting Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and 
the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a Practical 
Approach to A1edicaid Estate RecovelY, 5 Elder L.J. 
359,374-76 (Fall 1997)). 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals' most recent pro-
nouncement on the subject came in the recent case 
of In re Estate of Barg, 722 N.W.2d 492 
(Minn.App.2006). The issue in Barg was the proper 
calculation, pursuant to Gullberg, of the value of a 
Medicaid recipient's interest in transferred joint-
tenancy property that was part of the surviving 
spouse's estate. Id. at 494. Nonetheless, the court 
again reaffirmed the holding in lobe, stating: 
Minnesota's estate-recovery statute provides that 
the state may assert a claim against the estate of a 
surviving spouse to recoup medical-assistance 
benefits provided to the predeceased spouse. The 
Minnesota statute thus reflects the legislature's 
exercise of the option to expand the definition of 
estate to allow claims against the surviving 
spouse's estate. 
lei. at 495 (emphasis added). 
Several other courts have reached similar results. 
See In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312,317 
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(Iowa 2005) (holding that the probate definition of 
"estate" and the gen::ral probate laws do not apply 
because the estate nco very statute "is a specific 
law that addresses tl:e particular matter at issue"); 
Estate of DeMartino v. Div. of Medical Assistance 
& Health Servs., 373 N.J.Super. 210, 861 A.2d 138, 
145 (NJ.Super.Ct.2004) (holding that the estate re-
covery statutes define the term "estate" consistent 
with federal law anc the assets of decedent's testa-
mentary trust, which was merely a vehicle for trans-
fer of the decedent's assets to his heirs, are part of 
decedent's "estate" for purposes of estate recovery 
act); State of Nevad, I Deptt of Human Resources v. 
Ullmer, 120 Nev. 108, 87 P.3d 1045, 1050 
(Nev.2004) (Nevaca estate recovery "statutes 
broaden the definiticn of 'estate' to include 'assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the de-
ceased [Medicaid] r ~cipient through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, slli-vivorship, life estate, living 
trust or other arrangement.' " (quoting NRS 422.054 
(2001) (amended 2003))). 
Cases ruling to the, on:rary are limited. In Hines v. 
Dep't of Public Aie', 221 m.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 
711, 850 N.E.2d 14:5 (111.2006), Beverly and Julius 
Tutinas were husband and wife and owned their 
home and an automc,bile in joint title. Id. at ISO. Ju-
lius entered a nursir.g home and received Medicaid 
benefits prior to his death. Id. Beverly died several 
years later still owring, as the survivor, the home 
and automobile. Jd. An estate was opened and *415 
the Department of'ublic Aid filed a claim to re-
cover the benefits paid on behalf of Julius. Id. The 
trial court allowed the claim, and the estate ap-
pealed. Id. The Corn of Appeals reversed and the 
case was transferred. Id. at 150-51. The Illinois Su-
preme Court, while noting that many states would 
allow such a recove::y, held that the Illinois General 
Assembly had "exFessly limited the more expans-
ive definition of estate to the only situation where 
the Medicaid Act requires it to be used, namely, 
where the deceased recipient 'has received (or 
[was] entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term 
care insurance poLey.' " Id at 154 (quoting 305 
ILCS Ann. 5/5-13, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 
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189 (Smith-Hurd 2001)). Thus, Hines was decided 
on the basis of a state statute that expressly pre-
cluded recovery. 
The only other case to which we have been re-
ferred, or have found through our own research, is 
In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 
N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App.1995).FN3 In that case, Paul 
and Grace Budney were husband and wife. Id. at 
246. Grace entered a nursing home and received 
Medicaid benefits prior to her death. Id. Paul sub-
sequently died, and the Department of Health & So-
cial Services filed a claim in his estate to recover 
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of Grace. 
Id. The estate ohjected, and the trial court entered 
judgment in favor of the estate. Id. The court, in 
one short paragraph with virtually no analysis, and 
without any mention whatsoever of the federal 
law's expansive definition of "estate," concluded 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) does not permit recov-
ery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Id. 
FN3. The Budney court cites Estate of 
Craig. 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 
624 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y.1993), as being in 
accord. This is incorrect because Craig 
was applying prior law. The New York 
court expressly stated that "[t]he Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ... has 
no relevance to the resolution of this case; 
it applies only to Medicaid recipients who 
die after October 1, 1993. Thus, by its own 
terms, the amendments '" do not aid the 
appellant's case for nunc pro tunc recovery 
on the 1983 payments on behalf of Mr. 
Craig." Jd. at 1006 (internal citations omit-
ted). 
Budney has only been followed in one case, Biene-
mann v. State, 577 N.W.2d 387 (Wis.App.199N4 
and otherwise has rarely even been mentioned. F 
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Thompson dis-
cussed the holding in Budney. but it stated that "the 
Budney court did not address the effect of the broad 
definition of 'estate' in 42 U.S.c. § 1 396p(b)(4), 
and we are not persuaded by the decision." 
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Thompson, 586 N.W 2d at 850. I am likewise un-
persuaded by the decision. 
FN4. The d;:cision in Budney, among nu-
merous others, was noted in In re Estate of 
Smith, 2006 WL 3114250, 2006 Tenn.App. 
Lexis 715 (Tefu'1.Ct.App. Nov. 1,2006), in 
referring to Gases addressing issues similar 
to that in Smith. The Tennessee court 
found it uru::ecessary to decide whether the 
state could recover through the estate of a 
surviving s)ouse, concluding rather that 
the state cculd not recover "because the 
benefit recirient, Mrs. Smith, had no estate 
as that tern is defined under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 p(b)(4)." Id. at *4, 2006 Tenn.App. 
Lexis 715 al *13. 
Returning now to the instant appeal, Missouri's es-
tate recovery statute, § 473.399.2, provides, in per-
tinent part, as follows: 
The amount of the state debt shall be the full 
amount of assistance without interest provided to 
the recipient during ;:he marriage of such recipi-
ent and spouse; p;>ovided that the liability of the 
obligor estate sh(!ll not exceed the valut! of the 
combined resources of the recipient and the 
spouse of the reclpient*416 on the date afdeath 
of the recipient. 
(Emphasis added.) 'I'his language is very similar to 
the Minnesota statute, which limited recovery from 
the spouse's estate to "the value of the assets of the 
estate that were marital property or jointly owned 
property at any time during the marriage." Jobe, 
590 N.W.2d atl64. Although the statute in 
Thompson did not include this limiting language, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court still found that it 
fell within the e'l.pansive federal definition of 
"estate" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) of "assets in 
which the medical assistance benefits recipient 'had 
any legal title or imerest in at the time of death.' " 
586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3. 
As noted above, the Bruce's residence was titled as 
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a tenancy by the entirety. Under Missouri law, 
"[ a]n estate by the entireties is created by a con-
veyance to the husband and wife by a deed in the 
usual form. It is one estate vested in two indi-
viduals who are by a fiction of law treated as one 
person, each being vested with entire estate. 
Neither can dispose of it or any part of it without 
the concurrence of the other, and in case of the 
death of either the other retains the estate. It dif-
fers from a joint tenancy where the survivor suc-
ceeds to the whole estate by right of the survivor-
ship; in an estate by entireties the whole estate 
continues in the survivor. The estate remains the 
same as it was in the first place, except that 
there is only one tenant of the whole estate 
whereas before the death there were two." 
In re Estate of Honse, 694 S.W.2d 505, 508 
(Mo.App. S.D.1985) (quoting Greene v. Spitzer, 
343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Mo.1938)) 
(emphasis supplied by Honse court). Thus, although 
the estate passes in its entirety to the surviving 
spouse upon the death of one spouse, the prede-
ceased spouse clearly has a "legal title or interest" 
in the property at the time of death. The Missouri 
statute does not define "combined resources." 
"When a term is not defined, the legislature is not 
held to a technical meaning, but rather reference is 
made to the dictionary to find the meaning that the 
legislature intended." Fisher v. Waste lli!anagement 
of Missouri, 58 S.W.3d 523,526 (Mo. banc 2001). 
"Combine" is defined as "to come or bring into uni-
on; to unite or join," and "combined" is defined as 
"united closely." Webster's New Twentieth Century 
Dictionary 360 (2d ed.1979). The word "resource" 
is defined among other ways as "wealth; assets; 
available money or property." Id. at 1542. Accord-
ingly, "combined resources," by definition, means 
joint wealth or assets. Nothing could be more un-
qualifiedly "combined resources" than a tenancy by 
the entirety, where one estate is vested in two indi-
viduals. 
Thus, it is my view that the legislature expanded 
the definition of "estate" sufficiently in § 473.399 
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to permit estate reco'/erj of medical benefits as al-
lowed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). 
1 am mindful that the Ea.stern District of this Court, 
like the majority here, recently concluded that 
"Missouri's statutory definition of 'estate' does not 
allow for spousal re:overy." Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 
89. Curiously, the Shuh court found Thompson and 
Jobe "persuasive," 221d relied on them in holding 
that "Congress intended the term 'estate' can have a 
broad meaning under the Medicaid Act allowing for 
spousal recovery," but it did not apply their reason-
ing in analyzing Mis ,ouri's statutory scheme. Id. at 
88. In any event, since Shuh reached essentially the 
same result as the mFJority here, I must respectfully 
differ with it as well. 
*417 For all the fon:going reasons, I would affirm 
the judgment of the learned trial judge below and 
allow the State of Missouri's claim against Re-
spondent Randy R. Bruce, Personal Representative, 
in the amount of $8C ,OC3 .00 and assign the claim to 
Class 7. 
Mo.App. W.D.,2008. 
In re Estate of Bruce 
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A.M. __ ....l 
MAR 1 6 2011 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FO{JRTH JUDfCLi\L DIST~~is~HER D. RICH, rk 
S NlCOL TYLER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlINTY OF 1-
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV -IE-2 )OQ-052 t 4 
MErv!ORANDUlYf DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable 
Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate 
proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009. His late wife, Martha J. Perry 
(" Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separat!~ property, of certain real 
property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the 
couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor 
named as '" Martha Jean Boy Ie" (her prior name) and the grantee :;s "Martha J can Perry & 
George Donald Perry" Several years later, with Martha's health declining. George and Martha 
23 II I needed assistance in paying for Manha's medical care. To qualify for government assistance 
24 
with medical costs, the couple and Martha. individually. could not exceed certain maximum asset 
2S I I criteria. On or about July 31. 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning 
26 I 
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Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on 
behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney 0 
A few months later, on or about September 15. 2006, George and Martha applied to the 
Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay 'or Martha's medical careo 
Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments 0 The Department 
provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at 
least $108,364.230 
Although it was Martha's health which was in decline, George predeceased Marthao 
After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General. 
(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement 
for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The masistrate denied this request, 
holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property dujng her lifetime, she had 
no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimburserrent The Attorney General 
subsequently filed this appeaL Martha, the recipient, died while this app·;al was pendingo 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A vVhether the magistrate erred in detennining that the gene~al power of attorney held 
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to him~elf 0 f Martha Perry's real 
property. 
R Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of [daho Code § 56-
218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estae of George Perry 
C Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interrretarion of 42 USC 
§ 1396p as preempting application of Idabo Code § 56-2[80 
Do Vlhether [he magistrate erred in failing to apply [he Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Depamnent of HealTh aJ7..d Welfare v. Jackman, 132 rdaho 213,970 Pold 
6 (1998) to the facts of this case. 
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E. \Vhether the State is entitled to attomey fees on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Vhen a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judg<:" the district judge is acting 
as an appellate court, not as a tTial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 
(1992); rRCP 83(u)(J). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the 
Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds (he lower 
court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; and 
affinns conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of kgaI principles to the facts 
found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094 (Ct. Apu. 1988). Interpretation of 
an instrument, such as the power of attorney. is a question of law. Cl'avez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 
212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008) 
Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review. 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,814 P.2d 917 (1991). An issue involving 
statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. State 
Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96,100, 102,90 P.3d 321,325,317 (S. Ct. 2004). 
ANALYSIS 
21 I. Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property to George was not 
performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant to a power of attorney from Martha. The 
State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid 
power of attomey to transfer Martha's Interest in the property to himself. The State argues that 
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magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding \vhether t-..1artha consented to the 
transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent. 
Although not addressed in detail in rhe magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue 
was addressed and decided by tbe magistrate. The magistrate made a factual and legal 
detemlination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, 111d found that although the 
gifting Janguage in paragraph H was not rhe "clearest kind of authority." "[i]t certainly can be read 
that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney", "the document was 
entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, .. incllldjng the right to deal with 
interest in real property." 
Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, fron~ conveying the community 
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney." 
As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of atwrney, which declares in all 
capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." A subsequent 
section states: 
(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for, 
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim 
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other prClperty interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and 
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary 
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the beneti: of the principal 
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then di:;tributable to the 
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, inseneraL exercise 
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could 
exercise jf present and under no disability; provided, however, that the 
Aaent mav not make or change a will and mav not revoke or amend a trust 
:;:, , -' 
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
for the benefit of the principal to pay income or princpal to the Agent 
unless specific authority to that end is given. (emphasis added) 
The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by tl-:e persona! representative 
1!1 Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability to act with regards to 
additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney 
allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of 
attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Unif)ml Power of Attorney Act, 
Idaho Code § 5-12-10 1 el seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to ma1(e gifts, but 
it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption 
of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirms the interpreta lion by the magistrate. 
II. Statutory Interpretation and Preemption 
This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. /\ statute must be construed 
as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3c 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 
135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (200I). If a statute is not ambiguous, the COllrt does not construe it, but 
simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm ivIut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 
P.2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary, 
a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. /v/iller v. State, 
110 Idaho 298,715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533,82 P.3d 445 (2003). 
Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative end,=avor 
I In which the Federal Government provides financial assistance (0 partici:1ating States to aId them in 
<.5 i 
24 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. A'fcRae, 448 U.s. 2<77,308,100 S.Ct. 2671,65 
25 ! LEd.2d 784 (J980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into 
2;; I 
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
1 
:2 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.e. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Sup{::. III 2003). 
3 At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs 
4 of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the reclpient's spome. The State argues that the 
5 state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estae of the recipient and the 
6 
recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estat; and were transferred from 
7 
the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that I.e. § 56-218( I) allows 
8 
recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "asses" within the definition of 
9 
"estate" under 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4). The definition of "assets" inchdes property transferred to 
10 
11 one's spouse prior to death under 42 V.S.c. 1396p(h)(l). 
12 The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct The magistrate 
13 held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the 
14 recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law, Because the recipient transferred her 
15 property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the sarne nature considered in the 
16 
statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State'; claim. 
17 
A. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.,s,c, §1396p(b)(4) 
18 
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and 
19 
20 
recovelles, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[ a ]djustnent or recovery of medical 
assistance cOlTectly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or 
22 recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances. 42 USC § 
23 1396p(b)( I )(A),(C)(I). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual'S "estate," 
24 
and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a 
state. Those provisions state: 
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", wirh respect to a 
deceased individual--
CA) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 
and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of 
an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and 
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent ()f such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative'snterpretation, which places 
emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets ofthe recipient )fbenetits held "at the time 
of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look 
back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior tc death. This Court agrees. 
The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may 
have automatically transferred upon the death of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that 
where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that 
17 individual's estate. Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were 
18 divested weJl before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articuiate in those 
19 provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements. 
20 
Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistan<::e, under § 1396p( c)( )(A), 
21 
the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for 
22 
23 
assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the reclpient and/or recipient'S 
24 spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility deteiminations, while allowing 
25 assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or 
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II 
recovery payments in probate, However, § J396p(c)( l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not 
recovery, Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the ;,rea of probate and recovery 
matters, they easily could have made stich distinction. The Court note:;, however, that even in the 
context of eligibility, "[aJn individual shall not be ineligible for medica assistance ... to the extent 
that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred to (i) the spouse of 
such individua![.]" 42 USC. 1396p(c)(2), Thus, even in the st:icter setting of eligibility 
determinations, the dratters recognized and pemlitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the 
home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to articulate specific 
instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of 
property. 
Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Cocrt notes that provision (B) 
allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of "estate," except "in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.)" Paragraph (J)(C)(i) addresses "[aJdjustment or 
recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were 
paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received. 
However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain f':Jrms of medical assistance, 
including long-tenn care services and nursing facility services. !d. In (lis scenario, which appears 
to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this ex Janded version of "assets." 
B. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h) 
The State also disputes the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1 J96p(h), 
particularly as applied to § 1396p(b)(4). That provision states: 
(h) Definitions[:J fn this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
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(1) The tenn "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such irdividual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the 
recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her 
agent at the time, The Court has several problems with this interpretation. 
First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court 
notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more 
clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were :ikely aware of this, as they 
had previously used the phrase "real property" in multiple sections, inchlding § 1396p(b )(4)(A),(B), 
above. 
More Importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 13(;'6p(h)(5), "has the meaning 
given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the 
home (including the land that appertains thereto)." 42 U.S,c. 1 382bia)(l ), Accordingly, where 
"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds It 
necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well. TIm;, even with this expanded 
definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B), the Court filds it fails to expand that 
recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death. 
C. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.e. q 56-218. 
Idaho Code § 56-21S( 1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical 3.ssistance" and states: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance WIth federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an in jividual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individlal received such 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, ar;d the estate of 
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
The State argues this language clearly includes the option of rec(very from "the estate of the 
spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees thar this departure from the language 
of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs 
from the estate of the recipient's spouse. 
As far as I.e. § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly 
indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spou"e of a recipient. However, 
several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing ale :1e, allows the state to look 
back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death. 
First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by 
"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) ofLe. § 56-218, states "the ternl "estate" shall include:" 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent 
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a suprivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenmcy, tenancy m 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
Jd. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language 
used in the federal code, 42 U.S.e. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The person<i representative argues that 
because I.e. §56-218(4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statue, it should be interpreted 
accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context 0 f the federal statute clearly 
limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the 
2S I time of death. Thus, the "assistance (which] may be recovered from the estate of the spouse" 
26 
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appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section, 
1 
:2 
and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the 
abdity to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded. In I.e. § 56-218(1), it refers to the 
4 recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The lan~uage of § 56-218(4)(a),(b) 
5 refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient. It contains no reference or 
6 limitation on the estate of the spouse. 
7 I 
8 I 
9 I 
The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid 
recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and regulations of the 
10 I Department. IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and "sets forth the 
I 11 I provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things. IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01, states 
12 I in relevant part: 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the 
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time atter October 1, 
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the 
separate property, and jointly owned property. 
13 
14 
15 
16 ld. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language oL.e § 56-218, which allows 
17 the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate elf Ihe spouse." I.e. § 56-
18 218(1). 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Id. 
23 
24 
A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03,09.905,05 states: 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreemen' which separates 
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of 
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage 
settlement agreement or other such agreement may belOided if not for 
adequate consideration. 
Taking into account the broad language of I.e. § 56-218, i 1 addition to the specitlc 
:;" provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same ()rce and effect of iaN per 
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004», it is clear that Idaho law p1ennits 
recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate" 
of I.C § 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints ~)f lD.A.PA 16.0309.905.01 
Thus, the clear and plain language of Ida..ho law (without considering the federal provisions and 
effect they have) \vould allow the State to recover from the estate of the spouse, so long as the 
property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was 
the case here. 
E. Preemption Doctrine 
This Court has found that the plain meaning of the rda.~o and federal Medicaid provisions 
differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broadeI~. the ability of the State to 
recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those asset, in which the recipient had 
an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the 
I Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption. 
The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VJ, 2 of the United States 
Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the t=ontrary notw·ithstanding." 
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a ~tate law that conflicts with 
federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.5. 504, 516, 112 S.O. 2608, 
2617, t20 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culloch v. Marylalld. 17 U.S.( 4 \Vheat) 316,427, 4 LEd. 
579,606 (1819); Lewis v. Stale, Dept. oj Transp, , 143 Idaho 418, 146 P,3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Congressional purpose IS " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Mali.Jne v. 
White AIotor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 LEd.2d 443 (1973) (quoting Retail Clerks 
Inc'/ Ass 'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.O. 2U, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). 
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This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed. 
1 
2 
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 s,Ct. 683, 93 LEd.2d 613 (1987), The 
3 United States Supreme Court has explained that H[c]onsideration of issues arising under the 
4 Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
5 not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is) the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" 
6 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S,Ct 2608, 120 LEd,2d 407 
7 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 61 S.Ct. 1146,91 LEd. 1447 
8 
(1947»). Thus. preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 C.S, at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct. 
9 
10 
2608). 
11 
Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expres;;!y or impliedly. Boundary 
12 Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). Express 
13 preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lel .... is v. State, 
14 Dept. of Transp., supra. w'here such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field 
15 
is preempted. Id. fn this instance congress clearly did not intend t) occupy the entire field of 
16 
Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary. as the laws in this area are full of 
17 
provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their 
18 
19 
overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S,c. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of 
20 
the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "c(JmJly with the provisions of 
21 the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for a~sistance paid. 42 U.S,c. 
§ 1396p; 42 USc. § 13963(a)(18). 
Thus, where congress has not expressed [he intent to occupy a given field of law, st2.te law 
24 
may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state la\,( conflicts with federal law, 
, II Lewis F. Siole, Dept. of Trallsp., supra. This is called "connict preemption" and requires that state 
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law is preempted to the extent it cont1icts with the federal law. Jd. Hm." ever, conflict preemption is 
only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 US. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2:d 248 (1963)), or when the 
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fur pt:.rposes and objectives of 
Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 58l (1941). 
In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S. 
Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Med.icaid, in particular the rules 
involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate 
rules, it also foood that "both the federal government and state govemnent expect federal law to 
predominate" in that regard. Id. at 460, 534. 
In the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Mim1. 2008), the court specitically 
dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this cast, As that court noted, the 
federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery. 
fd. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens,ldjustments and recoveries, 
and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan." Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule 
prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recove y in certain circumstances. 
Tl1at provision states: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical as~;istance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following indiViduals: 
42 U.S,c. 1 396p(b)(I). Thus, the federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting 
5 
I recovery. As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to pn:vent recovery in all but a 
26 I 
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limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circunsLmces are expanded by a 
particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accompJi~hment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted. 
Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception againEt the estate of the recipient 
individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits 
recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, horne and community. For :onvenience, that provision 
states: 
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical 
assistance consisting of--
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based servlces, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services uncer the State plan 
(but not including medical assistance for medicare co:;t-sharing or for 
benefits described in section I 396a(a)(10)(E) of this title) 
42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1 )(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by 
types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include, Neither party has argued 
regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back, 
full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), 42 V.S.c. 1396p(h)(J), and 
1. C. § 56-218( 1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the ass::ts of the recipient's spouse 
in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time 0 f death. As discussed in detai I 
above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had 
an interest at death. 
Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit re::overy except in cel1ain 
circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narro'vvly, and 
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because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court filds the State provisions are 
preempted. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 US. 726, 739,109 S.C!, 1455, 103 LEd.2d 753 (1989). 
D. Effect of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 
'* Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the Jfovisions above, the Court 
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has relied upon relatively little case lav,,·. By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of 
statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language 
contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous. Consequ::ntly, legislative intent and 
case law are not necessary to further interpret the language. George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46 P.Jd 9, 14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560 
P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion ft)f a court to construe the 
language.")). 
The State, however, argues throughout its briefing that ldaho has clear precedent 
interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Departrrzent of Health and Welfare 
v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's spouse received nearly all 
community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the 
recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery ITem the estate of the spouse. 
Id. at 214, 7. The language of I C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the 
spousal estate only where rhe estate of the recipient contained absolute' y nothing. Thus, although 
[here was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from [he spousal 
estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never o:cur. where the imprecise, 
express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8 
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The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interp'etation, which woule! be in 
1 
2 
line with the legislature's intent. would be to allow recovery against lhe spousal estate where the 
3 estate of the recipient was insufficient. ]d. However, in the very next section, the court found 
federal law preempted the Department's authority given by 1. C. § S6-218 to recover from the 
5 spouse's separate estate. Id. at 216. 9. The court's analysis in t:mt case involved state and 
6 federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended. This Court finds it offers 
7 'I' I 'd th 1 d d ... . . Itt e or no glll ance to e re evant an etermmatlve Issues 111 thIS cas~. 
8 
The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case, 
9 
10 
which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that 
11 it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision 
12 I would have been different if the court had been able to apply the stautes in their current form. 
13 The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute Minion are not ascertainable 
14 
by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule 0 f the Idaho Supreme Court 
15 
15(f)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Cour: will not speculate about a 
16 
17 
withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes in 
18 question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine. 
19 Ill. Attorney's Fees 
20 Pursuant to LA.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, each party has resi~rved the right to attorney's 
21 fees on appeal. fdaho Code § 12-117(1) requires this Court to award re;.sonable attorney's fees and 
expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing part} acted without a reasonable 
23 II basis in fact or law," Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fee:; should be awarded only if 
22 
24 
25 
the nonprevaJling party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, net fairly debatable, position. 
26 
Lowerv v. Board of COlin tv Com'rs for Ada Co lin t}', 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (S. CL 198.3). A 
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state agency acted yvithout reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action. 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel. Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 PJ d 340 (S. CL 2004). In this 
case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by I.e.? 56-218 and corresponding 
agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be pr :!empted, the magistrate did 
I not make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a m ltter of first impression, the 
State acted based on reasonable argument and authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is p.FFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this Iv ~ day of March, 2011. 
II 
! 
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IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DTSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHlNGTON 
) 
IN TIIE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
) 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and ) 
) 
E1vIERSON D. WIGGINS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2009-1926 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL 
This matter carne on for hearing on February 8, 2011, on appeal from the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate. Appellant was 
represented by Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, I-Iuman Services Division and the 
Respondent, who is the personal representative for the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. 
Wiggins, was represented by Brad MasingiU. Respondent filed a Notic~: of Augmentation andior 
Supplementation of his Brief on March 21, 2011, which included the recent appellate decisjon i.n 
the Ada County case of George D. Perry, CV-IE-2009-5214. The Cour: having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel as well as the briefing fHed, now issues this Memorandum 
Decision on Appeal. 
1. FACTS 
Vivian Wiggins was bor and died on January 30, 2009. Emerson 
Wiggins was bor and died on February 9, 2009. Vivian and Emerson were 
1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL 
married and continued to be married at the time they applied for Medicaid benefits and up until 
the time of Vivian's death. In June 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home. Emerson 
and Vivian applied for medical assistance on November 18,2002 to help pay for Vivian's 
medical care and again on August 27,2003. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September 
l., 2003~ and between that time and Vivian's death, the Department of Health and Welfare 
(Department) paid for Vivian's medical care through Medicaid, in the snm of at least 
$272,134.68. The Department received a voluntary payment in April 2008, in the amount of 
$7,460.23, resulting in the Department's claim amount of $264,876.45. 
A joint probate estate for Vivian and Emerson (the Estate) was cpened on May 21,2009, 
and the inventory which was filed shows assets of $78,659.44. On November 23,2009, the 
Department filed a claim against the Estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of Vivian in the 
amount of $264,674.45. The Estate's personal representativefiJed a Nctiee ofDisallcwanee of 
Claim on November 30, 2009. The trial court heard the Department's I=etition for aUowan.ce ofa 
claim against the Estate on February 3,2010. The parties stipulated in open court that the 
Department treated Vivian as if she had entered into a Marriage Settlerr ent Agreement (MSA) in 
2002 or 2003. but that a copy ofthe MSA cannot be found. The admittl~d purpose of the MSA 
was to transfer any assets in which Vivian had an interest to Emerson, ~s his sole and separate 
property, so that she would be considered eligible to receive Medicaid henefits. The trial court 
found that the assets in the Estate were Emerson's separate property baDed upon the MSA which 
had transmuted the community property to separate property, and there was no legal obligation 
owed by Emerson' 5 Estate to repay the Department for his wife's care ll'om his separate 
property. The trial court disallowed the Department's claim in its MelT.orandum Decision filed 
on March 30, 2010. The Department appealed that decision to this COlilt. 
2 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
Wh.ile the Department lists a number of issues in its opening brief, the basic assertion is 
that the Magistrate Judge erred in detennining that a valid MSA existed and that the MSA 
transm.uted Vivian and Emerson's community property to the separate property of Emerson l1'om 
which the Department could not recover. The Department also argues tilat in making that 
determination, the trial court improperly interpreted and applied Idaho Code Section 56-218 and 
42 U.s.C. 1396p. Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney fees 0:3. appeal. 
ITI. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Department has appealed the trial court's decision to deny the Department's Petition 
for Allowance of Claim seeking recovery from the Estate of money spent on Vivian's healthcare. 
The Department argues that it is entitled to recover this money under I.e. §56-218 from assets 
which were the separate property of Emerson at the time of Vivian's de;lth. The Department also 
contends that Vivian's estate includes the property she transferred to Enerson through the MSA 
and is an asset which is subject to a claim for Medicaid reimbursement:Jnder both federal and 
state law. Finally, the Department asserts that it did not stipulate to all)f the facts the magistrate 
judge relied on in his decision. 
Respondent argues that under both state and federal law, the cla 1m filed by the 
Department only applied to property in which Vivian had an interest as ofthe date of her death 
and does not apply against Emerson's separate property which he acquired when the MSA 
transmuted the community property to separate property_ 
3 
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A. Standard of review 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge as an appellate 
proceeding, rather than exercising the option of granting a trial de novo, the district judge is 
acting as an appellate eourt, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992). 
A court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantlal and 
competent, thou.gh conflicting, evidence. T.R.C.P. 52(a). The trial court is the arbiter of 
conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility, inferef':::e, and implications 
thereofwill not be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions: from the written record 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck. 146 Idaho 423, 431-432, 196 P.3d 341,349·350 (2008). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which dis Court exercises free 
review. State v. Hart. 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). Il1t1:rpretation of a statute 
begins with an eXanJ.ination of the statute's literal words. State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654~ 659, 
978 P .2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts 
give effect to the statute a.,c; 'Nritten~ without engaglng 1n statutory constrlctlon. STale v. Rhode, 
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). Only where the language is ambiguous will this 
Court look to ru1es of construction for guidance and consider the reason lblencss of proposed 
interpretations. Idaho Conservation League. Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't l! r Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 
368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006). Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, 
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. Bunt v. Ci(vof 
Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). In construing a statute, this Court 
will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word tberein, lending 
4 
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substance and meaning to the provisions. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fite & Rescue. 148 Ide.ho 
391,398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 (2008). 
B. Stipulation of facts 
At the hearing before the trial court, both the Department and the Estate, through their 
respective attorneys, stipulated to the fact that the Department treated Vbian and Emerson as if 
an MSA had been entered into between them prior to Vivian's receipt ofM,!dicaid asslstance. 
They further stipulated that the MSA was entered into for the purpose of transmuting Vivian's 
interest in the community property to Emerson's separate property so sh~ could meet the 
eligibility requirements to receive Medicaid l , Both agreed that the orig.bal MSA eould not be 
located. On appeal the Department is challenging the existence of the lV'SA and its effect in 
tiansmuting property, even though it failed to raise the issue with the trial court and appears, 
from the record, to have S-bTIeed to these facts. Based upon the parties' :ltipulation, the Court will 
not address this issue further. 
c. Id9ho Code Section 56-218(1) 
The Department argues that I.e. §56-218(1) allows recovery fron the estate of the 
recipient of Medicaid and also from the estate of the rccipient~s spouse. Respondent argues that 
the claim filed by the Department only applied to property in which Vhian. had an interest as of 
the date of her death and does not apply against Emerson's separate property. 
Idaho Code Section 56-218 is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance~' and 
provides in part: 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal 
law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the 
I It appears the intent was to enable Vivian to become eligible for Medicaid assistanc ~ while at the same time 
leaving Emerson, who did not need nursing home care. with enou~h money on which to live while Vivian was in the 
nursing home. 
5 
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individual received such assistance may be recovered from the 
individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid 
paid to either or both .... 
The Department tlrgue!i tha.t this section gives broad authority for the Depa.'1ment to seek 
recovery from the spouse of a Medicaid recipient for any monies owed. Admittedly this part of 
the statute appears to allow sueh recovery, but there are additional provi3ions which narrow this 
authority. 
Idaho Code §56-218(4) states as follows: 
For purposes ofthls section, the tenn "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probatei:;w; 
and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, ':0 
the extent of such interest,. including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor. heir. or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust 
or other arrangement. 
The Department agrees that "individual" as used in this statute refers to the recipient, Le. Vivian. 
Thus, the question becomes, once the MSA was executed, was there any property in which 
Vivian had "any legal title or interest at the time of death?" It appears from a plain reading of 
this section that the recipient'S estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a 
legal interest but also property which passed by operation of law to sorr:.cone else at the time of 
the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include prcpcrty which the recipient 
had sold, given away or transferred prior to death. 
Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what should be included in 
the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community property law and does not address the impact of 
having separate property in the recipient's spouse's estate. Indeed~ in its bde,f, the Department 
asserts that I.e. §56-218(l) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the 
6 
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property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no indicati In in this statute that the 
Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping change by simply authorizing the State to assert a 
claim against a recipient's spouse's estate. 
Idaho Code defines separate property in Section 32-903 as: 
All property of either thc husband or the wife owned by him or her 
before marriage, and that acquired aftetvlard by either by gift, 
bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall 
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, by way 
of moneys or other property, shall remain his or her sole and 
separate property. 
A debt incurred by the Medicaid recipient is a community debt and clea.r1y the recipjent's interest 
in separate property or in the recipient's share of community property would be liable. Idaho 
Code §32-911 states: "The separate property ofthe wife [husband] is O,)t liable for the debts of 
her husband [his wjfe], but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after marriage." 
Typically, under Idaho community property law, the spouse's separate :property is not liable for 
debts incurred by the other spouse. I.e. § 32-912, entitled "Control of community property" 
provides: 
Either the husband or the wife shall have the rig11t to manage and control 
the community property, and either may bind the community property by 
contract., except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, conveyor 
encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in ex!~cuting the 
sale agreement, deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real 
estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered. and any community ohDgation 
incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consenl in writing 
of the other shall not obligate the separate property o/the spouse who did 
not so consent: provided, however, that the husband or wjfe may by 
express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell. 
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal All 
deeds, conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in 
conformity herewith are hereby validated. (emphasis added) 
7 
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There is nothing in the record to 1ndicate that Emerson signed in writing agreeing to bind his 
separate property for the debts of Vivian. While that may very well have: bleen part of the 
Medicaid application process, it is not in the record. Thus. while I.e. §56-218 gives the 
Department the legal authority to seek reimbursement from both spouses, it doesn't answer the 
question of which assets in the estate are liable for the Medicaid debt. 
At the hearing in this matter, the Department admitted that it car.~10t pursue property that 
has always been the separate property of the recipient's spouse (even tht)ugh this contradicts the· 
Department's argument that I.e. 56-218 broadly allows recovery against both spouses' estates). 
The Department contends it can collect from separate property that was:mce community 
property if it was community property after October 1, 1993, and itjustHles this position by 
citing to a Department rule that provides as fonows: 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (deleted in 2010) 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's ch:im. 
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to 
Sections 56-218 and 56-21SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the 
estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, 
community property. or the deceased participant's share of the 
separate property, andjointly owned property. Recovery will not 
be made until the deceased participant no longer is survived by a 
spouse, a child who is under age twenty-one (21). or a blind or 
d.isabled child. as defined in 42 U.s.C. 1382c as amended and, 
when applicable, as provided in Subsection 900.09 ofthls rule. ::~o 
recovery will be made if the participant received medical 
assistance as the result of a crime comm.itted against the 
participant. (3-30-07) 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010) 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. .A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which 
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the deb' 
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse. 
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such 
agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-:: 0-
07) 
8 
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Both of the IDA..P A rules that the Department relies on were deleted in ::010. At oral argument 
the Department was unable to jnstify the reasoning or lOglc to support i1 s position that some 
separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State while ofler separate property is 
not (apart from the Rule mentioned above). 
Thus, while I.C. §56-21S gives the Department the authority to !;eek recovery from the 
estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, it does not answer the question )fwhether it controls 
over Idaho's community property law and allows recovery from separate property which would 
otherwise not be liable for community debts incurred by the recipient. ,Absent some clear 
authority, this Court does not read this statute to do so. 
D. Meaning of "estate" 
The Department argues that not only can it collect from separate property in Emerson's 
estate,l but it can also collect from property which once belonged to Vivian. It makes this 
argument based on the definition of "estate" contained in federal and stlte laws. The Department 
argues that 1. C. § 5 6-21 g authorizes recovery in this case because the strtute does not say that 
recovery is limited to assets of the community. Respondent argues that the federal statute only 
provides recovery for property in Vivian's estate; property in which Vi'ria.'1 had an interest at the 
time of her death; and community property. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed the federal Medicaid pDgram and its relationship 
with the state. "While it is often thought of as pr.oviding medical care )nly for the indigent, it 
also provides coverage for the aged whose income a.l1d resources are in:rufficient to meet the 
costs of necessary medical services including nursing horne care." StaffOrd v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health & Welfare. 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 PJd 456,460 (2008). The States operate Medicaid 
by their own design but these programs roust be consistent with federal standards and 
regulations. Jd. Both the federal goverrunent and the state government expect federal law to 
9 
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predominate in determining qualifications for receipt of Medicaid assistmce. Jd. Fjnal1y~ 
Court went on to comment that: "Over the years, as the Medicaid prognrrn evolved from strictly 
an indigent assistance program to one that provided assistance to elderly persons who struggle to 
meet the cost of medical and nursing homc care, steps were taken to keep those recipients from 
having to divest themselves of their home and other basic resources.~' ld, 
The definitions of "estate'~ under state law and federal law are si:-nilar. The state 
definition which is found at I.e. §56-218(4) was previously quoted above. The federal law 
governing Medicaid defines "estate" in Title 42 U.S.CA. § 1396p as follows: 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid tInder a State plan 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate~', with respe(!t to a deceased 
individuaJ--
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets i:Jcluded within the 
individual's estate, as defi.ned for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall inc1ude~ in the case of an individual 
to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
Thus fedcral1aw includes all assets in the recipient's estate which would be allowed under state 
probate law, and also allows the state to broaden "estate'~ for purposes cfrecovering medical 
assistance to include other property in which the recipient had an intere:;t at the time of death, as 
Idaho has. Fcderal1aw does not discuss the impact of state community property laws and, 
presumably, that must be up to the state. 
The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to 
the "individual's" estate (Le. recipient, not spouse of recipient). The Department also agrees that 
Vivian had no legal interest in any property at the time of her death; however, it argues that the 
10 
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federal definhion of ""assets" found in 42 USC 1396p(h)(1) must be incorporated. The federal 
law governing Medicaid defines "assets" in Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p a.!i follows: 
(h) Definitions 
Ln this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "'assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's 
spouse, including any ineome or resources which the individual or 
such individual's sIXluse is entitled to but does not receive becau~e 
ofaction--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body. with 
legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or 
such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, 
acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or SUGh 
individual's spouse. 
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what s;:lould be included in the 
recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient would have had in his or 
her estate but for the actions of the recipient ()r the recipienfs spouse. '\?bile this would appear 
to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA as the Department nrgu.es, there is nothing in 
the statute that makes this happen automatically. Tn other words, simply because the definition 
of "assets" could include that property doesn't m.ean that such transactions are set aside without 
further action. There should be some action takcn to recover those resouces into the recipient's 
estate, such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in tliis Decision. 
E. Effect of Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 
In its brief, the Department argues that the issue presented by th:s appeal has already been 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. Of Health and We~ure v. Jackman, 132 
Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). That case does have facts similar to those in this case but it 
addressed the version ofLe. 956-218 in effect in 1993. In .lackman, a marriage settlement , 
agreement was signed, which transmuted most of the wifers community property into the 
11 
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separate property of the husband. After the wife died, her estate was probated and the money left 
in her estate was paid to the State as partial reimbursement for the Medjl~aid paid on behalf of the 
wiJe. After the husband died, the State sought to obtain additional mon'ies owed for the wife~5 
care from the husband's estate. The Court held that the federal statute r:!garding recovery of 
Medicaid assistance as it existed in 1991. did not permit the Department to recover from the 
husband's estate. This was so because the definition of "assets" from which recovery could be 
made excluded "assets disposed of on or before [Aug. 10, 1993]." Because the MSA executed 
by Jackman was signed prior to this date, any assets transferred by that document were excluded. 
While the Supreme Court did talk about the effeet of the 1993 amendments in broadepJng the 
definition of "assets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its reasoning. The 
Court was not presented directly "With the question of whether, under the law as it now exists, 
federal law would trump state community property laws in making sepZlrate property liable for 
debts that could otherwise not be rec()vered from separate property. 
While it would seem that the Department has no recourse against assets transferred to the 
recipient's spouse, there is an additional provision which allows it to set aside the MSA and 
place the assets back in the recipient's estate. Thus, regardless of how the terms "estate" and 
"assets" are interpreted, there is a process through which the Departrner.t can set aside the MSA 
and can collect current or fonner community property from both spouse:s' estates as ifthe MSA 
never existed. 
F. Application of I.e. §56-218 (2) 
Idaho Code Section 56-218(2) states: 
Transfers of real or persol1al property, 011 or after the look-back 
dates defined in 42 U.S ,c. 1396p~ by recipients of such aid, or 6eir 
spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may 1: e 
set aside by an. action in the distri.ct court. 
12 
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This statute has also been incorporated into a Department rule: 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010) 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. P, 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which 
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt 
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse. 
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such 
agreement may be voided jf not for adequate consideration. (3-30-
07) 
If the terms "estate" and "asset" are as broad as has been argued by the Department, those terms 
would automatically include any property transferred by an MSA and there would be no need to 
set aside such an agreement. Not every transfer ofpToperty by a Medicn.id recipient is improper 
or without adequate consideration, nor should transferred property autor::latically be included in 
the individual's estate and be liable for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits paid. Some action 
should be required in order for those resources to be included and Le. §56~218(2) is the vehicle 
for doing so. 
The Department argues this provision is of no use to them in cases like the current one 
because there is a three-year statute of limitations for setting aside the ?viSA and that ran in 2005, 
well before Emerson died. This is a matter which could be addressed b~r the Idaho legislature in 
order to give the Department more time within which to set aside the M SA. It is not a 
justification for broadly interpreting the meaning of "estate" or amendir:g Idaho community 
property law so the Department doesn't have to go through the process ~f setting aside an MSA. 
The Department further argues that it can't go back and void the MSA after the fact 
because ti1at would render Vivian "ineligible" for benefits, meaning that she should never have 
received benefits in the first place. That argument ignores the fact that LC. §56-218 (2) 
specifically provides that any transfer of property without adequate consi.deration is "voidable" 
not '''void''. A voidable contract is one in which the parties have the pO'Ncr to avoid the contract 
13 
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provisions, or they can ratify it and it will continue in effect. Robinson v State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 1.73., J80,45 P.3d 829,836 (2002); Restatement (Sc·~ond) of Contracts, §7. 
A void contract is one that is treated as if it never existed~ void ab initio The consequences of 
voiding a voidabJe contract vary depending on the circumstances; thus, setting aside the MSA 
would not necessarily retroactively affect benefits already paid to the recip:ent. 
Moreover, 42 USC 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), which governs asset transters for the purposes of 
Medicaid reimbursement provides in part as i:allows: 
(2) An individual shan not be ineligible for medlcal assistance b:r 
reason of paragraph (1) to the extent that--
*** 
(B) the asset'l-· 
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the 
sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
This means a recipient is not ineligible for benefits by reason of having disposed of assets for 
less than their fair market value to the extent that the assets were transfn:red to a spouse fOT the 
spouse's benefit. That is exactly what l.e. §56-218 (2) is designed for -- it allows the State tJ set 
aside transfers that lack consideration, and the transfer doesn't render the recipient ineligible for 
benefits. 
G. Attorney fees 
Both parties have asserted a right to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117 which 
provides as follows: 
(l) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative proceedings or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political 
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fee~; 
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted 'without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. 
14 
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It is this Court's view that the questions presented by this appeal are difficult and complex, 
involving interpretation of state and federal Medicaid benefits law. wllile this Court bas 
concluded that the magistrate judge was correct in denying the Dcpartmt;nf s claim, the answer is 
by no means simple or clear and both parties presented persuasive arglliL.ents regarding their 
views of how the statutes and administrative rules should be interpreted. This is clearJy not a 
situation where either party acted "without a reasonable basis in tact or law" and therefore, both 
requests for attorneys fees on appeal are denied. The Respondent is entitled to its costs on 
appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The burden is on the Department to assert a cognizable claim against Vivian and 
Emerson's Estate and to support it by citation to some statute. The statl1tes must be clear that not 
only can the Department collect from the recipient, Vivian, but ~hat ther:~'s a statutory basis for 
claiming property of Emerson which would otherwise not be liable for 11ivian's debts under 
Idaho's community property law. While Vivian's e5tate could have incuded property she 
transmuted to Emerson utilizing I.e. §56-218 (2), that was not done in thls case. Broadening the 
meaning of "estate" under Idaho law in order to reach Emerson's sepanlte property, or altering 
accepted community property law, is not an alternative solution. to allo'\:{ recovery to the 
Department. Based on the reasoning above~ the dedslon of the trial cour is AFFIRMED. 
d-DATED this hd day of July) 2011. 
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ill THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ill AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
In the Matter of the Estate Of: 
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------) 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson 
D. Wiggins, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV 2009-1926 
NOTICE OF Al'PEAL 
TO: Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative and his Attorney, R. Bra 1 Masingill, Esq., and to 
the Clerk of the above Entitled Court: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Y:\i\1RCaseslEstate\WCc\WCC Open Cases\Wigg' lSV\Supreme Court\i"<otice of Appeal.wpd 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hf~;~eihafter "the 
Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, 
filed on the 20th day of July, 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Seni')r District Judge, 
presiding. 
2. The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Ru1es 1 1 (a)(2) and 11(b), 
Idaho Appellate Ru1es, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7). 
3. The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to: 
a. Mether the Magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets whkh had been community 
property, but had become the separate property of Emerson Wiggins. 
b. Mether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) - which 
authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property, 
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by fedemllaw. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Department requests the preparation of the fonowing portions oftlJ.e 
reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by: 
1. Oral argument presented to the district court at th,:;, hearing held February 
8,2011 at 1:30 p.m. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggi 1SV\3upreme Court\Notice of AppeaLwpd 
ii. Oral argument presented to the magistrate divisioJ at the hearing held 
February 3, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. Claim Against Estate (11/23/2009) 
b. Demand For Notice (11/23/2009) 
c. Objection to Final Settlement (11/23/2009) 
d. Notice of Disallowance of Claim (1113012009) 
e. Inventory Schedules (11130/2009) 
f. Petition for Allowance of Claim (12/0112009) 
g. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (12/0112009) 
h. Reply Brief (02/03/2010) 
1. Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum (03/25/2010) 
J. Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate 
(03/30/2010) 
k. Notice of Appeal (04/0712010) 
L Appellant's Brief (09/17/2010) 
m. Respondent's Brief (10/22/2010) 
n. Appellant's Reply Brief (1111512010) 
o. Memorandum Decision on Appeal (0712012011) 
7. Not applicable. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements 
have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the 
hearings dated February 8, 2011 and February 3,2010. 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estirna:~ed fee for the 
preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 Y:\ivfRCaseslEstate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggi 1SV'Supreme Court\Notice of Ap,eaLwpd 
(d) That the appellant is exempt from paying the appc:l1a!e filing fee purSUB..lt 
to Idaho Code § 67-2301. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 25th day of August, 2011. 
;iJ?z~>~<1 
Vi.C9REYCART~GHT---------
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing doct:ment was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R BRAD MASIN GILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
CAROLE BULL 
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
COURT REPORTER 
1115 ALBANY ST 
CALDWELL ID 83605 
DATED this Q5Jay of August, 2011. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
,n )~~ ~secre;Y 
Contracts and Administratlve Law Division 
Y:\\1RCases\Estate\WcaWCC Open Cases\Wigg insV\Supreme Court\Notice of AppeaLwpd 
R. BRAD M.A..8INGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 'V. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208) 414-0490 
email bmasin2ill(@.hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF: ) Case No.: CV-2r~09-1926 
) 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and ) 
) NOTICE OF CPOSS-APPEAL 
El\'IERSON D. WIGGINS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
----------------------------) ) 
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
VIVIAN GGINS AND El\'IERSON D. ) 
WIGGINS, ) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant) 
TO: The State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its Attorneys, Lawrence G. 
Wasden, S. Kay Christensen, W. Corey Cartwright, and the Clerk of the above Entitled Court. 
Notice of cross-AP7. al - 1 
1)0'0· '1 '1 UV ;'~~£"X 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
L The above entitled estates, by and through their attorney of record, R. Brad Masingill, 
of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeal the Department of Health and Welfare's 
Appeal filed on August 25th, 2011. This Cross-Appeal i:, only for the denial of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs to pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121 [md Idaho Code 12-117. 
2. The above entitled estates, by through their attorney of reGord, R. Brad Masingill 
appeals to the Idaho Supreme court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, filed 
on the 20th day of July 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge 
presiding. 
3. The above estates have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pun,uant to Rules 11 (a) (2) 
and 11 (b), Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-20 I}). 
4. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken is th: Idaho Supreme Court. 
5. The Estate cross-appeals regarding the decision denying an award of Attorneys Fees 
by the Magistrate Court and the District Court. The two decisions of the Magistrate 
Court and the one decision of the District Court are: (a) tha: Order on Attorney Fees 
filed June 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the der::ision which failed to 
award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: il.ttorney's,Fees and Costs 
filed on April 30, 2010, and (c) the Memoralidum Decisior all Appeal filed on July 
20,2011. 
6. This cross appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law. 
7. This matter was heard at District Court by oral argument on :february 8, 2011 at 1 :30 
p.m. 
8. The issues on cross-appeal are: 
a. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Esta,;;s their attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121? 
b. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117? 
9. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant 
and from the one order of the District Court denying attorney's fees to the Estates. 
10. Cross-Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay 
the estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made availal:1e. The Cross-Appellant 
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not already 
included in the Appellant's request. It is unnecessary to duplicate the transcript, 
however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to 
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throughout the entire case, not 
just the briefing relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21, 
2010 hearing, but to include the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability 
of Idaho Code 12-117, which was referenced in the June 23. 2010 Order on Attorney 
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010. 
11. Additional Transcript: The Cross-Appellant further requests :hat the stipulation put on 
the record on February 26, 2010 and the entire transcript of :hat hearing be made part 
of the record. 
( 
12. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's recc,d: In addition to ul0se 
documents automatically included in the record pursuant to I\R 28, and in addition to 
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of A)peal shall be as follows: 
The Cross-Appellant requests that all filings in the Magistrate case be included in the 
record, including all motions, all memorandums, all briefs. all affidavits, including 
, ~ 
but not limited to the following: 
a~j Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24,201')9; and 
b.~Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D. Wiggins' 
Property dated January 29,2010; and 
c. :iResponsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lim Against Emerson D. 
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and 
d. ~Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legisative History of Idaho 
Code 56-218 dated February 8, 2010; and 
~e. Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05,2010; and 
f.~ Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for Attcrney's Fees and Costs, 
Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated Apri16, 2010; anli 
(" g. Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum in Support (fthe Estate's Motion for ) 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion fo' Stay re Attorney's Fees 
dated April 20, 2010; and 
i. il:. Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay dated April 9, 
2010; and 
j. ",)Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
dated April 6, 2010; and . 
Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated MITch 31, 2010; and 
l. .JFirst Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Esta.te of George D. Perry, 
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15, 20i 0; and 
m::>Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 201 C, 
13. Cross-Appellant further requests that the transcript of the apfeal hearing from District 
Court of February 8, 2011 be part of the record. 
14'?Respondent's Brief to the District Court dated October 22nd, 2010. 
15~Cross-Appellant further requests the Notice of Augmentatior. and or Supplementation 
of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f)(1) dated the 21"1 day of March, 2011. 
16:::Cross-Appellant further requests that the Memorandum Dedsion on Appeal by the 
Honorable Linda Copple Trout on July 20th, 2011 to be part )fthe record. 
17. Appellant further agrees to pay any cost of preparation of the clerk's record or the 
transcript as required by law when such is submitted. 
18. Cross-Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeal, .n addition to those at the 
lower levels. 
DATED this I 3 fJ, day of September, 2011. 
;1 A_~_"'--------",--( 
Aijf..ad M~gill 
Attorney for the Respondent! 
Cross-Appella 1t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f~ I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the /3 Hay of September, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Cross-Appeal was sent via facsimib and mailed by regular 
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste B 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
&~,~ 
Attorney f{lr the Respondentl 
Cross-App ~lhmt 
LA \VRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORl'ffiY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS Al'ID 
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W DIVISION 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 3361 
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or "V ASHINGTON 
In the Matter ofthe Estate Of: 
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson 
D. Wiggins, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39129-2011 
Washington COt nt; Docket No. 
2009-1926 
REQUEST Fn~ ADDITIONAL 
RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NANffiD CROSS-APPELLANTS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
REQUEST FOR 
i\DDITIONAL RECORD - 1 Y;IJvlRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsVlSuprerr j COur!\Request for Additional Recordwpd 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Cross-Respondent in the above !:ntitled proceeding 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, LA.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by the LA.R. and the notice of appeaL 
Additional clerk's record requested: 
1. 4/20/2010 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dis:lllow Attorney Fees and 
2. 
4. 
5. 
4/30/2010 
5/19/2010 
511912010 
6123/2010 
Costs 
Order RE: Attorney Fees and Costs 
Post Hearing Memorandum RE: Idaho Code § 12-117 
Second Affidavit of W. Corey Cartwright 
Order on Attorney Fees 
I certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court and upon the following parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Lynn Wiggins, 
CIO R. Brad Masingill, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 467, '7Ieiser, ID 83672 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2011. 
REQUEST FOR 
jt/~;~~-
W. C~TWRIGflT 
Deputy Attorney General 
ADDITIONAL RECORD - 2 Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wigginsv\Supremt COllrt\Request for Additional Record.wpd 
Clerk Dis!;!\:: Court 
~;~ fuw o.pul"J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICl,(L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF vVASIDNGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~--) 
Case No. ·=V-2009-1926 
ORDER 
This court having filed its Memorandum Decision on Appeal on July 20,2011; 
NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons set for in the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, the 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate is l:ereby AFFIRMED. 
~~( b ENTERED this L \ day of ~~ ~hQ . V 2011, 
ORDER -1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docr.lment was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
BRAD NIASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
ViEISER ID 83672 
W COREY CARTWRIGHT 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0009 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
APPEALS CLERK. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY COURTHO{ rSE 
256 EAST COURT 
WEISER ID 83672-0670 
HONORABLE GREGORY FRATES 
NIAGISTRA TE JUDGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY COURTHOI.TSE 
256 EAST COURT 
"VEISER ID 83672-0670 
DATED this ~~day of~~~~r, 201l. 
~ ~ ~ J. ~W""",--eJ _ ~ty Cl~rk of the Distril:t Court 
ORDER-2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certifY that a certified copy of the Order in C33e No. CV 2009-01926, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39129-2011, was mailed delivered this 31 st day of October 2011, to the 
following persons: 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
Attorney General 
State ofIdaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 
BETTY J. THOMAE 
Clerk of the District Court 
-r 
By~I~J 
Dept ty Clerk 
LA "VRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W DIVISION 
W.COREYCART~GHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 3361 
camvriw@dhw.idaho.gov 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
In the Matter of the Estate Of: 
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~) ) 
State ofIdaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
P etitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson 
D. Wiggins, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------) 
Case No. CV 2009-1926 
Al\1ENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative and his Attorney, R. Brai Masingill, Esq., and to 
the Clerk of the above Entitled Court: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPKL\L - 1 
Y:\.lvlRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsVlSupreme Court\Ac\:ffit;'I?ED Notice of Appeabvpd 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (h:reinafter "the 
Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on appeal, filed on the 25th 
day of October, 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge, presiding. 
2. The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 11 (a)(2) and 11 (b), 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7). 
3. The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to: 
a. Whether the Magistrate erred in its application and interp ~etation ofIdaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets whi ~h had been commurdty 
property, but had become the separate property of Emerson Wiggins. 
b. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) - which 
authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had h!eI1. community property, 
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Department requests the preparation of the f( Howing portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by: 
1. Oral argument presented to the district court at th~ hearing held February 
8,2011 at 1:30 p.m. 
11. Oral argument presented to the magistrate divisio n at the hearing held 
February 3, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
Y:\,\1RCasesIEstateIWCO,WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\AMENDED Notice of AppeaJ.wpd 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be inc luted in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R. 
a. Claim Against Estate (11123/2009) 
b. Demand For Notice (11123/2009) 
c. Objection to Final Settlement (1112312009) 
d. Notice of Disallowance of Claim (11130/2009) 
e. Inventory Schedules (1113012009) 
f. Petition for Allowance of Claim (12101/2009) 
g. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (12/0112009) 
h. Reply Brief (02/03/2010) 
1. Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum (03/25/2010) 
J. Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate 
(03/3012010) 
k. Notice of Appeal (04/07/2010) 
1. Appellant's Brief (09/17/20 1 0) 
m. Respondent's Brief (10122/2010) 
n. Appellant's Reply Brief (11115/20 1 0) 
o. Memorandum Decision on Appeal (07120/2011) 
7. Not applicable. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements 
have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the 
hearings dated February 8, 2011 and February 3,2010. 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212. 
(d) That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 67-2301. 
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( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pUrSUllijt 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2011. 
/" ~J ---~. , ,:----A--~C~W1UG~r----------
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R BRAD MASIN GILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
CAROLE BULL 
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
COURT REPORTER 
1115 ALBANY ST 
CALDWELL ID 83605 
DATED thlsd:1 day of October, 2011. 
~I < .~ 
Dawn Phipps, Legal Secretary 
Contracts and Administrati ve Law Division 
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R. BRAD lVIASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 "V. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208) 414-0490 
email bmasingill(a)hotmaiI.com 
m . 1. l. . ~"l;~ . 
.. '~ ~ ... ~. I pCP';" __ : 
.. t ,_'. \~ ~ • <... ""., , • 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF: ) Case No.: CV-2009-1926 
) 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and ) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
EMERSON D. 'WIGGINS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
-----------------------------) ) 
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
VIVIAN WIGGINS AND EMERSON D. ) 
WIGGINS, ) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant) 
TO: The State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its Attorneys, Lawrence G. 
Wasden. S. Kav Christensen, W. Corey Cartwright, and the Clerk ofthi: above Entitled Court. 
, . ' 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above entitled estates, by and through their attorney of record, R. Brad Masingill, 
of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeal the Department l)f Health and Welfare's 
Amended Appeal filed on 27th day of October, 2011. This Amended Cross-Appeal is 
only for the denial of Attorney's Fees and Costs to pursucnt to Idaho Code 12-121 
and Idaho Code 12-117. 
2. The above entitled estates, by through their attorney of r ::cord, R. Brad Masingill 
appeals to the Idaho Supreme court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, filed 
on the 20th day of July 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge 
presiding. 
3. The above estates have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 11 (a) (2) 
and 11 (b), Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201 (7). 
4. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken is the Idaho Supreme Court. 
5. The Estate cross-appeals regarding the decision denying an award of Attorneys Fees 
by the Magistrate Court and the District Court. The two d'~cisions of the Magistrate 
Court and the one decision of the District Court are: (a) thLt Order on Attorney Fees 
filed June 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the decision which failed to 
award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs 
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filed on April 30, 2010, and (c) the Memora11dum Decisio:l on Appeal filed on July 
20,2011. 
6. This amended cross-appeal is taken upon matters of fact ane law. 
7. This matter was heard at District Court by oral argument or. February 8, 2011 at 1:30 
p.m. 
8. The issues on the amended cross-appeal are: 
a. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121? 
b. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117? 
9. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant 
and from the one order of the District Court denying attorney's fees to the Estates. 
10. Cross-Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay 
the estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made available. The Cross-Appellant 
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not already 
included in the Appellant's request. It is unnecessary to duplicate the transcript, 
however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to 
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throughout the entire case, not 
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just the bdefmg relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21, 
2010 hearing, but to inelude the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability 
of Idaho Code 12·117, which was referenced in the June 23, 2;) 1 0 Order on Attorney 
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30,2010. 
11. Additional Transcript: The Cross-Appellant further requests that the stipulation put on 
the record on February 3, 2010 and the entire transcript of that hearing be made part 
of the record. 
12. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's record: In addition to those 
documents automatically included in the record pursuant to IAR 28, and in addition to 
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of App,~al shall be as follows: 
The Cross-Appellant rcques+t.S that all filings in the MagistraTe case be included in the 
record, including all motions~ all memorandums, all briefs, a] affidavits, including 
but not limited to the following: 
9. Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24,20)9; and 
b. Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D. Wiggins' 
Property dated January 29,2010; and 
c. Responsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D. 
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and 
d. Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legis[atlve History of Idaho 
Code 56·218 dated February 8, 2010; and 
c. Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05, 2010; and 
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f. Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for Att)mey's Fees and Costs, 
Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated April 6, 2010; ard 
g. Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum in Support )fthe Estate's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and 
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion fer Stay re Attorney's Fees 
dated April 20, 2010; and 
i. Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Moti)n to Stay dated April 9, 
2010; and 
j. Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for p,ttorney's Fees and Costs 
dated April 6, 2010; and 
k. Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated March 31,2010; and 
l. First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: E3tate of George D. Perry, 
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15,2010; and 
m. Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 2010. 
13. Cross-Appellant further requests that the transcript of the appeal hearing from District 
Court of February 8, 2011 be part of the record. 
14. Respondent's Brief to the District Court dated October 22nd, 2010. 
15. Cross-Appellant further requests the Notice of Augmentatie,n and or Supplementation 
of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f)(1) dated the 21 st day of March, 2011. 
16. Cross-Appellant further requests that the Memorandum Decision on Appeal by the 
Honorable Linda Copple Trout on July 20th, 2011 to be part of the record. 
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17. Appelllli'1t further agrees to pay any cost of preparation the clerk's record or the 
transcript as required by law when such is submitted. 
18. Cross-Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeaL in addition to those at the 
lower levels. 
nf(\ 
DATED this _'""_I day of November, 2011. 
R. Brad Ma ItgiIL-----
Attorney for the Respondent/ 
Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the gtnday of November, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Cross-Appeal was sent via facsimie and mailed by regular 
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste B 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
!Y~llJ:..J;J 
R. Brad M~singm 
Attorney f,i)r the Respondent/ 
Cross-Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, 
Deceased. 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of 
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson 
D. Wiggins, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------------) 
Supreme Court Case No. 39129 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS 
I, Betty Thomas, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Washington County, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated 
to be included under Rule 28, I.A.R. of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, 
the Notice of Cross-Appeal, the Amended Notice of Appeal, and the Amended Notice of 
Cross-Appeal. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS 
I certify that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification and 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
I further certify that the additional document being a copy of the Affidavit of Peter 
Sisson, filed 05/05/2010, is included in this Record on Appeal. 
I submit the transcript of the February 3, 2010, hearing as requested in the 
Amended Notice of Appeal and the transcript of the April 21, 2010, hearing as 
requested in the Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official 
seal this :J.)",j day of /l/?ue rnher , 2011. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS 
, Clerk of th€~ District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, ) 
Deceased. 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of ) 
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson ) 
D. Wiggins, ) 
Respondent. ) 
---------------------------) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Supreme Court Case No. 39129 
I, BETTY J. THOMAS, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington, do hereby 
certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United State8 Mail, one copy of 
the CLERK'S RECORD and one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT(S) to 
each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Attorney for Respondent 
Lawrence Wasden 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court this 3 / ~+ day of Ie} 11(( C{ ""1 ' 2011. 
BETTY J. THOMAS 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
